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Abstract
This research is concerned with investigating the effect of selected
internal and external corporate governance mechanisms and principles on
UAE corporate performance. The UAE started to apply uniform corporate
governance standards in 2009 with the introduction of Resolution No. (518)
of 2009 concerning Governance Rules and Corporate Discipline by the
regulator SCA. Since then, there have been various rules implemented by
the regulator in 2016 and 2020. Corporate governance has been in the
spotlight of academic research, particularly in the United States and Europe,
due to the vital role it plays in the overall health of economic systems. In the
UAE, most existing research in this area predates the implementation of the
Commercial Companies Act (2015), and the UAE Corporate Governance
Code (Resolution No. (7 R.M) of 2016). Studies showed that the existing
research conducted under the now-repealed law Ministerial Resolution No.
518 of 2009 failed to closely engage with the applicable legal principles.
Therefore, there is a gap in corporate governance research in the UAE which
makes this a valuable topic for this dissertation and for future research. This
research explores corporate governance reforms in the UAE and their effect
on listed companies’ performance from 2017 to 2020. The sample firms are
listed on either the Abu Dhabi Exchange (ADX) or the Dubai Financial
Market (DFM). Regression analysis and a mixed linear effects model were
employed to test the hypotheses of the study, and a survey and interviews
were conducted to test the principles and mechanisms of corporate
governance quantitatively and qualitatively.
The conceptual framework of this dissertation describes how
corporate governance principles and mechanisms impact corporate
performance. In the framework, corporate governance principles are based
on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)

vii

Principles of Corporate Governance. The corporate governance mechanisms
are board member experience, gender, insider trading, auditor rotation, and
internal controls. Corporate performance was assessed using return on
assets, return on equity, and Tobin’s Q. This dissertation uses both the
agency and stakeholder theories to investigate how corporate governance
can affect corporate performance in the UAE.
To accomplish the research objectives, a mixed methods research
model was adopted using both quantitative methods (questionnaire and
secondary data) and qualitative methods (interviews). Secondary data was
obtained from the annual corporate governance reports of listed companies
on the Dubai Financial Market (DFM) and the Abu Dhabi Securities
Exchange (ADX). The data was analyzed using the Statistical Package for
the Social Sciences (SPSS, Version 28) and STATA 17 statistical package.
Qualitative results were analyzed using NVIVO12.
The results of the questionnaire show that corporate governance
principles have been implemented in listed companies and board
responsibilities, and shareholder rights have the highest scores indicating
that board responsibilities are taken seriously, and shareholders’ rights are
protected. In the second model, auditor rotation and insider trading were
statistically significant. The interviews revealed that the main priorities for
the interviewees were market transparency and corporate performance.
This research will benefit listed organizations, regulators, securities
lawyers, and academics. It is worth noting that the UAE has one of the most
sophisticated corporate governance legal frameworks in the Middle East.
Therefore, these research findings will also be beneficial to other Middle
Eastern countries and their policymakers.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic
تقييم ألثر آليات ومبادئ حوكمة الشركات على أداء الشركات :حالة دولة اإلمارات العربية
المتحدة

الملخص
يعنى هذا البحث بدراسة تأثير اآلليات والمبادئ الداخلية والخارجية المحددة لحوكمة
الشركات على أداء الشركات المدرجة في دولة اإلمارات .وقد شرعت دولة اإلمارات بتطبيق معايير
موحدة لحوكمة الشركات سنة  2009بإصدار قرار مجلس الوزراء رقم  518لسنة  2009بشأن
قواعد الحوكمة واالنضباط المؤسسي عبر هيئة األوراق المالية والسلع .منذ ذلك الحين ،طبقت الهيئة
العديد من القواعد في عامي  2016و .2020ولقد كانت حوكمة الشركات محط اهتمام البحث
األكاديمي ،ال سيما في الواليات المتحدة وأوروبا ،نظرا ً للدور المحوري الذي تمارسه في السالمة
العامة لألنظمة االقتصادية .ومعظم األبحاث المتداولة في دولة اإلمارات في هذا المجال سابقة
لتطبيق قانون الشركات التجارية  2015وقرار حوكمة الشركات اإلماراتي قرار مجلس الوزراء
رقم  7لسنة  .2016وقد أظهرت الدراسات أن األبحاث المتداولة التي أجريت استنادا ً للقرار الوزاري
صرت عن التعامل الدقيق مع المبادئ القانونية النافذة .لذا فهناك
رقم  518لعام  2009الملغى قد قَ ُ
فجوة في أبحاث حوكمة الشركات في دولة اإلمارات ما يعطي أهمية وقيمة لهذه الرسالة ولألبحاث
المستقبلية .فهذا البحث يسلط الضوء على إصالحات حوكمة الشركات في دولة اإلمارات وتأثيرها
على أداء الشركات المدرجة من عام  2017إلى عام  .2020والشركات المذكورة في البحث هي إما
مدرجة في سوق أبو ظبي لألوراق المالية أو في سوق دبي المالي .وقد
استُخدم نموذج تحليل االنحدار ونموذج التأثيرات الخطية المختلطة الختبار فرضيات الدراسة،
وأجريت استطالعات ومقابالت لفحص مبادئ وآليات حوكمة الشركات من حيث الكم والنوع.
يعرض اإلطار النظري لهذه الرسالة كيفية تأثير مبادئ وآليات حوكمة الشركات على
األداء المؤسسي ،حيث تستند مبادئ حوكمة الشركات في هذا اإلطار إلى مبادئ منظمة التعاون
االقتصادي والتنمية في مجال حوكمة الشركات .وتتمثل آليات حوكمة الشركات في خبرة أعضاء
مجلس اإلدارة والجنس والتداول الداخلي وتدوير المدققين والرقابة الداخلية .كما جرى تقييم األداء
المؤسسي باستخدام العائد على األصول والعائد على حقوق الملكية ومقياس (.)Tobin’s Q
وكذلك تستخدم هذه الرسالة نظريات الوكالة وأصحاب المصالح في دراسة كيفية تأثير حوكمة
الشركات على األداء المؤسسي في دولة اإلمارات.
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وتحقيقا ً ألغراض البحث ،اعتُمد نموذج بحثي متنوع األساليب باعتماد كل من األساليب
الكمية (االستبيانات والبيانات الثانوية) واألساليب النوعية (المقابالت) .حيث استخلصت البيانات
الثانوية من التقارير السنوية لحوكمة الشركات المدرجة في سوق دبي المالي وسوق أبوظبي لألوراق
المالية .وتم تحليل البيانات باستخدام الحزمة اإلحصائية للعلوم االجتماعية (اإلصدار  )28والحزمة
اإلحصائية لبرنامج ستاتا  .17وجرى تحليل النتائج النوعية باستخدام برنامج نفيفو .12
تعرض نتائج االستبيان تطبيق مبادئ حوكمة الشركات في الشركات المدرجة
واستحواذ مسؤوليات مجلس اإلدارة وحقوق المساهمين أعلى المؤشرات ما يدلل على مراعاة
مسؤوليات مجلس اإلدارة حق الرعاية وأن حقوق المساهمين محمية .في النموذج الثاني ،كان تدوير
المدققين والتداول الداخلي ذا داللة إحصائية .وكشفت المقابالت عن أن األولويات الرئيسية لمن
أجريت معهم هي الشفافية السوقية واألداء المؤسسي.
سيعود هذا البحث بالفائدة على المؤسسات المدرجة والهيئات التنظيمية والقانونيين
المتخصصين في مجال األوراق المالية واألكاديميين .وجدير بالذكر أن دولة اإلمارات تحوز واحدا ً
من أكثر األطر القانونية تقدما ً في مجال حوكمة الشركات في الشرق األوسط .بنا ًء على ذلك ،ستكون
نتائج هذا البحث مفيدة أيضا ً لدول الشرق األوسط األخرى وصناع السياسات فيها.
مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :حوكمة الشركات ،الشركات المدرجة في دولة اإلمارات ،األداء المؤسسي،
المبادئ القانونية.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
The topic of corporate governance is vast and from a legal
perspective begins with the emergence of large corporations, such as the
East India Company which was formed in 1600 (Stern, 2015). Corporate
governance became a key topic for law makers and regulators in the 1960s
and 1970s. Eells (1960) described corporate governance as the structure and
functioning of the corporate polity. According to Shleifer and Vishny
(1997), corporate investors rely on corporate governance to assure
themselves to obtain a fair return on their financial investment. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the independent federal
government regulatory agency of the United States, implemented the first
corporate governance rules in 1975 pursuant to the 1975 amendments to the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Apart from the OECD Guidelines, one of
the most important pieces of legislation for the development of corporate
governance is the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act (2002) in the United States.
The primary goal of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was to address auditing issues
of U.S. listed companies and to oversee and regulate their governance
structure (Coates & John, 2007). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also created
requirements for listed firms to establish an internal controls function. The
associated benefits should be greater transparency, more reliable financial
reporting, and accountability and a lower risk from potential losses caused
by fraud and theft. The Act remains a work in progress with various
amendments that have been enacted over the years. It should also be noted
that the investor community and listed companies were more than doubtful
initially of whether the Sarbanes Oxley Act would be a success (Romano,
2004; Zhang, 2007). With the inception of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the
financial markets started to enact legislation globally that almost replicated
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certain provisions of the Act (Garner et al., 2014). Corporate governance
has gained further importance due to financial scandals and volatility in the
global stock markets which emphasized the need to have a system of rules
and checks in place to assure the longevity and sustainability of listed
organizations. America’s Business Roundtable proposed an updated
definition of “the purpose of a corporation” and agreed that each company
has a purpose not reducible to profits and needs to be aware of its purpose,
integrating corporate governance and social responsibility considerations
(Business Roundtable, 2016).
As the corporate environment continues to evolve, a strong
emphasis on effective corporate governance remains essential as reflected
by the regulators’ focus on the topic in 2019 and 2020. In May 2020, the
Oman Capital Market Authority (CMA) circulated draft Corporate
Governance Principles for State Owned Enterprises. On 28 April 2020, the
Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) in the UAE issued Board
Resolution No. (03/R.M) of 2020, an updated corporate governance code
for the UAE stock exchanges. Corporate Governance practices are of key
importance in the UAE as demonstrated by the ongoing legal reforms since
2009. Compliance with applicable corporate governance rules has also
become increasingly important for companies listed on stock exchanges of
the UAE. UAE law makers and the regulator expect to see compliance with
the Companies Law and corporate governance rules. For several years, the
UAE, under the auspices of the Securities and Commodities Authority
(SCA) which is the regulator of the UAE’s stock exchanges has attempted
to attain developed market status by updating rules and regulations
applicable to the listed companies, among other factors. In 2011, the UAE
was upgraded from frontier market status to emerging market status by two
global index compilers, Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and
Standard & Poor’s (S&P). This upgrade brought the UAE in the radar of
2

global investors and increased liquidity in the UAE by increasing foreign
direct investment (John, 2011). Key provisions of the Companies Law and
the corporate governance rules include mandatory rotation of the external
auditor every three years, compliance with insider trading rules,
establishment of internal controls, gender diversity and demonstration of
relevant sector specific experience by board members. The academic
literature on UAE corporate governance is scarce in comparison to the
United States, Germany and the United Kingdom where corporate
governance cases are frequently litigated in court such as the Delaware
Supreme Court case Marchand v. Barnhill (2019). Spraggon and Bodolica
(2014) describe the UAE as a developing market that differs from developed
economies in several important aspects, including a relatively new corporate
governance regulatory framework, weak-form efficient stock market, as
examined by Moustafa (2004) and more concentrated ownership structure,
including partial government ownership of listed companies (Abdallah &
Ismail, 2017; Zeitun, 2014). As a result, listed corporations are characterized
by the dominance of internal governance mechanisms of control such as
board composition and ownership structure rather than external governance
mechanisms imposed by the regulator. Clearly, the recent legal
developments in the field of corporate governance demonstrate the
importance of this topic to the UAE economy and policy makers alike.
1.2 Context of Study
Corporate governance is a well-established research topic in
developed economies and many studies have been published concerning the
impact of corporate governance on performance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997;
Gompers et al., 2003; Black et al., 2006). The Harvard Law School’s
Program of Corporate Governance has become an important forum where
industry and academic theory come together and a lot of influential literature
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and theory has emerged from that forum (Bebchuk & Tallarita, 2020). In
developing markets, key research has been conducted by the OECD and the
World Bank. Important corporate governance research, apart from
publications in the MENA region, has emerged from India, Hong Kong,
South Korea, and Malaysia (Goel, 2018; Claessens & Fan, 2003). The
qualitative literature on corporate governance is significantly less than
quantitative literature in developing markets compared to quantitative
publications (Cohen et al., 2013) and we observe even fewer qualitative
publications in developing economies. Mahadeo et al. (2012) conducted
qualitative research in Mauritius (2012) and qualitative studies have been
conducted on Malaysia which has a well-established corporate governance
framework (Mat Yasin et al., 2014).
Corporate governance has become an important topic in the
literature published about financial markets in the UAE (Aljifri & Moustafa,
2007; Farhan et al., 2017; Al-Gamrh et al., 2020), yet very few studies have
been published analyzing the 2016 corporate governance rules in detail. As
evidenced by this research, there are important developments captured in
the 2016 corporate governance rules including corporate governance
mechanisms that merit to be studied. In the GCC context, the Saudi and
UAE models of corporate governance have been heavily influenced by the
Anglo-American model, generally referred to as a “market model” or
“shareholder model” (Pillai & Al-Malkawi, 2018), which relies on the
agency theory and focuses on maximizing owners’ wealth as propounded
by Berle (1931) and Friedman (1970).
Much of this dissertation has been written during the global
lockdown caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. My research progress,
particularly in attending interviews with individuals, was impacted by the
social distancing restrictions imposed in light of the COVID-19 pandemic.
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However, the unprecedented turn of events brought by the COVID-19
pandemic also presented new opportunities such as the use of technology to
conduct the interviews for the qualitative part of my research remotely using
Microsoft Teams interview and recording feature. As the world enters into
a more volatile period in world financial markets and economics, driven
among other factors by the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic which has
severely disrupted the global economy since March 2020, ongoing inflation
and global turmoil, financial markets have been shaken and governments as
well as market regulators are looking for solutions to stabilize them.
COVID-19 has tested the resilience of governments and businesses alike.
Post the 2009 financial crisis which saw the collapse of Lehman Bank and
other major institutions, financial markets have rewarded investors with
persistent growth in Europe and the United States fuelled by government
stimuli from central banks. COVID-19 has laid bare and exacerbated
existing weaknesses in the financial markets. To some extent, COVID-19
has also been the gift of revelation of what could be considered good or bad
corporate governance. COVID-19 has further shown how businesses will
shape the future, especially large, listed companies in the UAE such as
Etisalat, Emirates Group, Emaar, or DP World.
This study analyzes corporate governance practices of listed
institutions in the UAE. Federal Law No 4 of 2000 established the Emirates
Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). SCA’s function is to regulate
and develop the stock exchanges in the UAE. The Dubai Financial Market
(DFM) was established in March 2000 and the Abu Dhabi Securities Market
(ADX) started operating in November 2000. NASDAQ Dubai, the UAE’s
third exchange was founded in September 2005 although it is important to
note that the latter is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority
and not by SCA and thereby not within the remit of this dissertation. A
possible consolidation between ADX and the DFM has been discussed
5

numerous times as consolidation would be expected to boost liquidity and
improve stock valuations (Gamal, 2018; Yasin, 2011; Basit, 2010). In 2020,
hopes for a merger between the two exchanges were revived when the UAE
Cabinet approved the merger between the UAE Central Bank and the UAE
Insurance Authority (Wakalat Anba’a al Emarat (WAM) 2020). Cohen et
al. (2013) stated that, “during periods of heightened regulation, political
turmoil or communication advances, exchanges tend to fail or merge.
Economic prosperity, increased financial speculation and high levels of
market uncertainty, by contrast, drive new entries”. In the UAE, Ministerial
Decision No. R/32 of 2007 on Corporate Governance Codes for Joint Stock
Companies and Institutional Discipline (“2007 corporate governance rules”)
were the first corporate governance rules issued by the Securities and
Commodities Authority (“SCA”). The first comprehensive corporate
governance code in the UAE was issued two years later under Ministerial
Resolution No. 518 of 2009 Concerning Governance Rules and Corporate
Discipline Standards (“2009 corporate governance rules”). Although the
2009 corporate governance rules were silent on the treatment of the 2007
corporate governance rules, it is unlikely that the two resolutions were
meant to co-exist and the 2009 corporate governance rules should be
considered as repealing the 2007 corporate governance rules. The 2009
corporate governance rules were applicable to all companies and institutions
whose securities were listed on a securities market in the UAE except “(1)
companies and institutions wholly owned by government; (2) banks, finance
companies, financial investment companies, money exchange companies,
monetary brokerage companies that are under the supervision of the Central
Bank; (3) the foreign companies listed on any of the financial markets”
(Article 2(c); 2009 corporate governance rules).
The 2009 corporate governance rules were comprised of sixteen
articles which included:
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a) the education of board members with a particular emphasis on
the development of knowledge and skills; b) the maximization of individual
participation of all board members in board processes; c) the responsibility
of the board in establishing clear rules and practices promoting good
governance; and d) emphasizing the importance of board committees, most
notably the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration
committee. The 2009 corporate governance rules also required the Board to
implement corporate governance processes and to supervise the application
of such processes. Listed companies were required to set up an internal
control procedure to be verified and monitored by a compliance officer who
was directly accountable to the Board.
It is also important to note that the 2009 corporate governance rules
were issued when the previous Commercial Companies Law (1984), Federal
Law Nr. 8 of 1984 was still in force. In 2015, the UAE issued the new
Commercial Companies Law (2015), Federal Law Nr. 2 of 2015 which
introduced some significant changes. All companies were required to amend
their existing memoranda and articles of association to reflect, and comply
with, the changes introduced by the 2015 Companies Law, and any
companies that failed to make the requisite amendments by 30 June 2016
were automatically dissolved. The objective of the 2015 Companies Law
was to continue the UAE’s development into a global standard market and
business environment and, in particular, raise levels of good corporate
governance, protection of shareholders and promotion of social
responsibility of companies. Notable features of the 2015 Companies Law
included the recognition of the concept of holding companies, procedures
for pledging shares, expert valuation of shares in kind (i.e., non-cash) and
the requirement to rotate auditors (for Public Joint Stock Companies) every
three years.
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On 28 April 2016, the Chairman of the Securities and Commodities
Authority of the United Arab Emirates (SCA) issued the Decree No. 7 R.M
of 2016 (2016 corporate governance rules) which repealed the 2009
corporate governance rules.
The 2016 corporate governance rules were intended to complement
the 2015 Companies Law which was introduced to continue the UAE’s
development into a global standard market and business environment. The
2016 corporate governance rules contain fifty-five articles as opposed to the
previous rules, the 2009 corporate governance rules which only contained
sixteen articles and constituted a substantial enhancement of the previous
legislation, along with some important changes and clarifications. For the
2016 corporate governance rules, SCA consulted with the World Bank to
ensure that the normative framework of public joint stock companies was
strengthened and set penalties for non-compliance.
The most important changes introduced by the 2016 corporate
governance rules are as follows:
a) Listed firms to establish a mandatory Insider Trading Supervisory
Committee to oversee insider trading activities and maintaining an insiders
register.
b) New provisions in relation to related parties and conflicts of interest
including the requirement to keep a related parties register and a conflicts of
interest register.
c) Female representation: The 2009 corporate governance rules
require publicly listed companies to have at least one female board member.
The 2016 corporate governance rules require publicly listed companies to
ensure female representation on their board of not less than 20% of the total
number of board members. Companies which do not satisfy this requirement
need to disclose to SCA why such requirement is not satisfied.
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d) Directors’ vetting and Directors’ knowledge and expertise: a board
member candidate must have at least five years of experience in the field of
the company for which he/she is nominated. Board members candidates
must not have been dismissed from a previous board position in any publicly
listed company in the UAE for twelve (12) months prior to the date of
nomination on the board of another company.
e) Enhanced shareholder rights: The 2016 corporate governance rules
allow shareholders who own ten percent (10%) of the issued share capital
of public companies to call for an urgent general assembly meeting to
discuss urgent matters. This rule bolsters minority shareholders’ rights.
f) Government shareholding: If the government owns five percent or
more of a listed company’s shares, the government may appoint a
representative to the company’s Board of Directors pro rata to its
shareholding. This also mirrors Article 148 of the 2015 Companies Law.
g) Penalties: If a listed company breaches the provisions of the 2016
corporate governance rules, SCA may do any of the following: a) send a
written warning to the defaulting company; b) a monetary fine up to a
maximum limit stipulated in the 2015 Companies Law; c) refer the breach
to public prosecution if it warrants possible criminal action.
h) Corporate Social Responsibility and Reporting: Pursuant to the
2016 corporate governance rules, it is a legal requirement for listed
companies to have a policy on the local community efforts and the
environment. The board of directors has the responsibility to set the policy
regarding stakeholder welfare and improving the relationship between the
stakeholders and the company. That policy or a separate policy should also
set out the company’s engagement with the local community and the
environment.
i)

Internal Control System: a listed company must have an internal

control system that aims to develop an assessment of the company's means
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and procedures for: i) risk management, ii) sound application of corporate
governance rules, iii) verifying that the company complies with applicable
laws, regulations and resolutions governing the company’s operations.
On 15 August 2019, the UAE Central Bank Corporate Governance
Regulations became an effective law to supplement Resolution 7 RM. The
UAE Central Bank Corporate Governance Regulations comprise of
corporate governance regulations and accompanying standards for the
purpose of implementing the corporate governance at banks and financial
institutions listed on a UAE exchange. Until the publication of the UAE
Central Bank Corporate Governance Regulations, Resolution 7 RM did not
apply to banks and financial institutions which made a comprehensive
corporate governance analysis of banks and financial institutions difficult as
the legal parameters were missing to do so. This dissertation deliberately
omits discussion of the UAE Central Bank Corporate Governance
Regulations and also omits banks and insurance companies from the sample
as they were subject to different regulators and different regulatory regimes
during the research period.
On 28 April 2020, the Chairman of the Securities and Commodities
Authority (SCA) issued Board Resolution No. (03/R.M) of 2020 (2020
corporate governance rules) which adopted the new Corporate Governance
Guide for Public Joint-Stock Companies and repealed the 2016 corporate
governance rules. The 2020 corporate governance rules introduce new
corporate governance rules for PJSCs in line with international best practice
and aim to promote accountability, fairness, gender diversity, and
transparency. Although this dissertation contains an analysis of the 2020
corporate governance rules, the data analysis is based on the 2016 corporate
governance rules as there is a grace period for companies to apply with the
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2020 corporate governance rules and sufficient data is not available yet for
analysis.
The main changes pursuant to the 2020 corporate governance rules
are as follows:
1. Uniformity: The 2020 corporate governance rules apply to all local
listed companies without exception, including banks and insurance
companies. There are additional separate rules that apply to banks and
insurance companies issued by their regulators. The 2016 corporate
governance rules did not apply to banks or insurance companies which were
under the umbrella of the Central Bank and the Insurance Authority
respectively.
2. Female representation mandatory quota: a minimum female
representation in the board of not less than 20% of the number of board
members and an obligation on the company to disclose the percentage of
female representation in its annual corporate governance report, together
with a requirement for the board to establish policies concerning gender
diversity.
3. Mandatory Conflict of Interest Disclosure: a requirement for the
board members to inform the company, on a quarterly basis of any conflict
of interest.
4. Board member qualification check: more elaborate criteria for
board members’ qualifications and ability to serve as an officer.
5. Dual governance structure: the introduction of an optional dual
governance structure whereby two board committees are formed: an
executive committee and a supervisory committee.
6. Enhanced risk management procedures.
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7. Enhanced disclosures regarding the content of the annual corporate
governance report and the requirement to submit the report for approval at
the company’s annual general meeting.
8. Subsidiary company governance: the introduction of guidelines to
regulate the governance of subsidiary companies, requiring the parent
company’s board of directors to set out and approve the group’s corporate
governance framework and ensure that the management of the subsidiary
company adopts an appropriate corporate governance framework.
9. Requirement for revised corporate social responsibility policy.
10. A requirement that the majority of board members should be
independent, non-executive members.
11. Requirement to appoint an independent board secretary.
The context of the research conducted for this dissertation focuses
mainly on the 2016 corporate governance rules in contrast to the 2009
corporate governance rules. A major motivation of this study is to
investigate whether the corporate governance reforms starting from 2015
with the introduction of the 2015 Companies Law in the UAE have been
successful or not and if certain requirements such as the establishment of an
insider trading supervisory committee for listed companies accomplished
the desired purpose. To measure the effectiveness of the corporate
governance reforms, this research analyses corporate governance practices
using financial years 2017-2020.
In January 2021, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the
ruler of Dubai, issued Decree No. (3) of 2021 on the Listing of Joint Stock
Companies in the Securities Markets in the Emirate of Dubai. Decree No.
(3) of 2021 requires all public joint stock companies established in the UAE
which have over half of their assets or profits derived from business
activities in Dubai, to be listed on either the DFM or NASDAQ Dubai. If
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they are not already listed on the DFM or Nasdaq Dubai, they were required
to do so by January 2022. Further, all existing public joint stock companies
established in Dubai (including the Dubai free zones) must be listed on
either the DFM or Nasdaq Dubai and in case they are not, they must do so
within the same timeframe. The provisions of Decree No. (3) of 2021
mandate Dubai businesses to list on Dubai’s securities exchanges in order
to boost the city’s capital markets. Mandatory listing is a double-edged
sword. If a company has not listed on a local market, there are usually viable
business reasons for not doing so. As mentioned above, the UAE has three
active stock exchanges and speculation is ripe that a merger may occur and
bring synergies (Gamal, 2018; Yasin, 2011; Basit, 2010). Decree No. (3)
stipulates a mandatory listing requirement for Dubai based PJSCs. Making
a listing mandatory is not necessarily positive for the company nor for
investors. Investors want to see companies come to the public markets after
a strong IPO and that can comply with the ongoing obligations of a public
company, particularly around market disclosure and corporate governance.
However, this requirement is subject to fulfilling the eligibility requirements
of the regulator and stock exchange. This should ensure that companies that
are inappropriate for listing do not come to market, despite the mandatory
requirement to do so. Further, certain exchanges benefit from distinguishing
themselves from competitors. NASDAQ Dubai announced in October 2020
that it will launch a “Nasdaq Dubai growth market” in 2021 to support small
and medium-sized companies (Azhar, 2020).
1.3 Objectives of the Study
The primary objective of this dissertation is to investigate the
impact of corporate governance principles and mechanisms on corporate
performance of selected listed firms in the UAE. The research objectives are
to assess the corporate governance rules in the UAE and compare them with
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comparable provisions in the UK and the US. Further, the dissertation will
evaluate the implementation of selected corporate governance principles
and mechanisms of the corporate governance rules. The dissertation will
identify areas in corporate governance that have faced difficulties in
implementation and examine the impact of corporate governance
mechanisms and principles on the financial performance of companies listed
on the ADX and the DFM. The theoretical and conceptual framework
consists of the corporate governance principles, the corporate governance
mechanisms, the agency theory and the stakeholder theory and their impact
on corporate performance. The following research questions identify the
specific objectives that this dissertation will address:
Research Question #1: How is corporate governance
understood by stakeholders in the UAE?
Research Question #2: Do corporate governance reports of the
UAE listed firms comply with the 2016 corporate governance code
stipulated by the UAE statutory requirements?
Research Question #3: What is the impact of the 2016 corporate
governance code on the performance of the UAE listed firms?
Research Question #4: Do sector-specific variations in the level
of compliance exist in the corporate governance reports of these UAE
firms and why?
To achieve the research objectives, seven research hypotheses have
been developed to examine the nature of the relationship between corporate
governance practice and corporate performance. Research Hypotheses that
test corporate governance mechanisms are analyzed pursuant to the agency
theory. The stakeholder theory is used to analyze corporate governance
principles as the stakeholder theory focuses on the effect of the corporate
activity on all identifiable stakeholders of the corporation. The overall
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objective of the dissertation is to gain insight into directors’ and executives’
perceptions of the effectiveness of corporate governance with respect to
enhancing corporate performance which will be examined quantitatively
and qualitatively.
1.4 Contribution and Significance of the Study
After reviewing the secondary sources, there is a research gap,
especially when considering the new legislation and theoretical
developments in the field of corporate governance. Alagha (2016) and
Otman (2014) relied on the 2009 Code which was at a time when corporate
governance was still in its infancy in the UAE. Alkuwaiti (2019) relies on
the 2016 corporate governance rules, but she did not filter out the banks,
financial institutions, and insurance companies which were outside the remit
of the 2016 corporate governance rules. Therefore, her findings benefit from
being further investigated and refined as the sample was not adjusted to the
requirements of the 2016 corporate governance rules. To the researcher’s
knowledge, the existing scientific literature has not engaged critically with
the corporate governance rules and the Companies Law. This dissertation
fulfills the task and addresses the gap in the literature by focusing on a
number of key corporate governance mechanisms, such as mandatory
rotation of the external auditor every three years, compliance with insider
trading rules, establishment of internal controls, gender diversity and
demonstration of relevant sector specific experience by board members as
further outlined in the methodology section. The contribution of this
dissertation is unique in many respects. The majority of hypotheses under
analysis have not been previously tested. To the researcher’s knowledge, it
is the first dissertation that applies mixed methods research on this topic in
the UAE. The dissertation utilizes a unique dataset handpicked from the
listed companies’ corporate governance reports. More than 240 corporate
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governance reports were reviewed. Further, spreadsheets were produced to
track insider trading, gender diversity, auditor rotation and whether
companies had implemented an internal controls function aligned with the
rules and as disclosed in the corporate governance report. Further, the
dissertation tests the applicability of corporate governance rules to UAE
listed companies and the level of compliance by the listed companies
qualitatively and quantitatively. To the best of researcher’s knowledge, this
research will be the first research project in the UAE to consider the impact
of board members occupational experience and legal insider trading on
performance based on empirical data. This research will also be the first to
analyze the effect of mandatory auditor rotation on corporate performance.
Auditor rotation was only made mandatory in the UAE in 2015 with the
introduction of the 2015 Companies Law. As further discussed in the
literature review section of this dissertation, this research benefits from
contributions by Goel (2018) who conducted corporate governance research
over two reform periods in India and performed an industry sector specific
analysis. Although Goel’s research is different as it compares two reform
periods, her approach to the sector specific differences was formative, as it
is a recent study concerning the listed companies in India, which as a
developing market economy presents some similarities with the UAE.
Otman’s DBA dissertation (2014) and Alkuwaiti’s DBA
dissertation (2019) were also useful. Otman conducted corporate
governance research post implementation of the 2009 corporate governance
rules and contrasted the results with prior corporate performance. Alkuwaiti
conducted corporate governance research post implementation of the 2016
corporate governance rules. With the evolution of corporate law and a
revised corporate governance framework, this dissertation analyses whether
the 2016 corporate governance rules have indeed generated improvements
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in the corporate governance process in the UAE and whether this has
resulted in better performance.
The findings are succinctly presented. Model 1 which includes the
data of the questionnaire responses determines that the sub corporate
governance indices board responsibilities and shareholder rights have the
highest means. The regression analysis of Model 1 reveals that disclosure
and transparency, and board responsibilities are statistically significant, and
the model has an R square of 0.435. Model 2 was analyzed using a linear
fixed effects model. The interaction between insider trading and auditor
rotation was statistically significant. This dissertation also finds that
differences exist among the sectors concerning compliance with and
implementation of corporate governance rules. This dissertation will benefit
the regulator, shareholders, executive management of UAE listed
companies, and academic researchers. This research will contribute to the
development of theoretical and practical knowledge because not only is
there very limited mixed methods research in corporate governance, but also
because findings are not mature or inexistent, especially in relation to
occupational experience, gender representation, insider trading and auditor
rotation.
1.5 Structure of the Dissertation
The dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 reviews the literature and provides an overview of the
corporate governance structure and the impact of corporate governance on
performance as discussed in the literature. Empirical evidence is presented
from the UAE, as well as developed economies such as the United
Kingdom, the United States, and Germany. Chapter 3 presents the
theoretical and conceptual framework and the two models developed for this
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dissertation and discusses the development of the hypotheses. Chapter three
also reviews the different theories which apply to corporate governance and
considers how the applicable theories could be developed further.
Chapter 4 explains the research paradigm, research methods,
research design, and data collection employed in this dissertation. The
chapter includes the methodology, primary and secondary data collection,
questionnaire development, pilot study, response rate and secondary data
collection. Moreover, it illustrates the design of the semi-structured
interview questions, interview population and analysis of the data.
Chapter 5 presents the results of the questionnaire, interviews and
statistical analysis, including testing of the hypotheses. Chapter 6 discusses
and explains the results of the quantitative and qualitative data analysis and
presents the findings regarding the role of corporate governance principles
and mechanisms in improving corporate performance.
Chapter 7 provides the conclusion to the dissertation and discusses
the findings, associations, and limitations of the dissertation, as well as
recommendations for future research.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the literature review that
has been published in connection with corporate governance and its impact
on performance. It presents the key literature in relation to corporate
governance in the UAE and the MENA region and draws on relevant
examples from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other
jurisdictions. This chapter also reviews the function of the OECD Principles
of Corporate Governance. Corporate governance is a checks and balancing
system that permeates the organization and ensures that an internal control
system and delegations of authority are present. Effective corporate
governance goes hand in hand with the efficient use of resources in the
company and proper resource allocation should lead to better corporate
performance. This chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the
empirical evidence of corporate governance and corporate performance.
Section 2.3 presents the role of the OECD in shaping the corporate
governance principles. The literature review of the challenges and
opportunities for corporate governance in the MENA region is presented in
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 presents the limitations of the existing literature and
the research gap. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter.
2.2 Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: Empirical
Evidence
There is extensive literature on corporate governance that
researches the effectiveness of corporate governance in corporations and its
impact on performance. Most of the literature has been published in the
United States and Europe. There have been some research papers focussing
on Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. The laws, processes, and
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implementation of corporate governance are distinct when comparing
developing and emergent countries with developed markets such as the
United States or the United Kingdom. Therefore, this literature review
focuses on a cross section of these publications to present corporate
governance in developed economies, the emerging market context, and
scientific literature and laws in relation to corporate governance in the UAE.
2.2.1 The Significance of Corporate Governance
Eells (1960) in his seminal work described corporate governance
(corporate governance) as the structure and functioning of the corporate
polity. The term has since been molded to comprise a set of control
mechanisms to protect the interests of different stakeholders of a
corporation. During the past ten years, post the 2009 financial crisis as well
as during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, corporate governance has
gained further importance due to the volatility in the global stock markets
and the desire to have a system of rules and checks in place to assure the
longevity and sustainability of listed organizations. Indeed, whether the
purpose of the corporation is to generate profits for its shareholders or to
operate in the interests of all of its stakeholders has been actively debated
since 1932, when it was the subject of competing law review articles by
Columbia Law School professor Adolf Berle (1931) and Harvard Law
School professor Merrick Dodd (1932). Berle argued for “shareholder
primacy”, the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its
shareholders. Dodd challenged Berle’s position and he suggested that “there
is in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the
community but that our corporate managers who control business should
voluntarily and without waiting for legal compulsion manage it in such a
way as to fulfill those responsibilities.” He quoted the heads of several major
corporations, such as General Electric, to argue that business leaders had
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come to recognize that corporate managers needed to consider social
responsibility when running their companies.
In 1970, Friedman announced that the social responsibility of a
corporation is to increase its profits, thus endorsing Berle’s theory. Since
then, for almost 50 years, shareholder primacy was widely viewed as the
purpose and basis for the governance of a corporation. However, since 2018
we are seeing important new support for counterbalancing shareholder
primacy and promoting long-term sustainable investment instead.
On 11 April 2019, the members of the National Assembly of the
French Parliament adopted the PACTE Law (PACTE Law, 2019). The
PACTE Law was enacted and published on 23 May 2019. As a result of this
law, the French Civil Code has been amended to add, “The company shall
be managed in its own interest, considering the social and environmental
consequences of its activity”, following the existing, “All companies shall
have a lawful purpose and be incorporated in the common interest of the
shareholders”. This amendment was intended to establish the principle that
each company shall ensure the continuity of its operations, sustainability,
collective creation and innovation which are at the core of corporate
governance.
In August 2019, nearly 200 CEOs as part of America’s Business
Roundtable, approved an updated definition of “the purpose of a
corporation” and agreed that each company has a purpose not reducible to
profits and needs to be aware of its purpose, integrating corporate
governance and social responsibility considerations. Since its inception in
1970, the Business Roundtable has published guidance and best practices to
uphold high ethical standards and deliver long-term economic value as
stated in the American Business Roundtable Principles of Corporate
Governance (2016). The new Business Roundtable Statement on the
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purpose of a corporation essentially rejects Friedman’s theory (1970) who
stated seeking profits for shareholders would alone allow a company to
prosper, keep people employed, and fuel the economy. Instead, the Business
Roundtable endorses the idea of “conscious capitalism”, which proposes
that a company has a broader responsibility to society, which it can better
serve if it considers all stakeholders in its business decisions.
2.2.2 Relevant Aspects of Corporate Governance in Developed Economies
Many studies have been conducted testing the impact of corporate
governance on corporate performance from a set of listed companies in
various stock exchanges across different economies and countries. The
often-cited work by Gompers et al. (2003) reports that firms with well
implemented corporate governance which are listed on the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) show higher market valuation and lower expenditure
than firms with less implemented corporate governance. Bhagat and Bolton
(2008) consider the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate
governance, corporate performance, corporate capital structure, and
corporate ownership structure. Endogeneity refers to situations in which the
explanatory variables are correlated. Bhagat and Bolton conduct a number
of robustness checks for stock ownership of board members, CEOChairman separation and two performance indices and find that stock
ownership of board members and CEO-Chairman separation are
significantly positively correlated with better firm performance. In 2019,
Bhagat and Bolton publish “the sequel” to their original work, extending the
sample period from 2002 to 2016 (Bhagat & Bolton, 2019). The findings
confirm that director stock ownership is most consistently and positively
related to firm performance for the years from 2003 to 2016.
Research conducted by Black et al. (2006) examines 526 Korean
firms to find out whether there is a significant relationship between
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corporate governance and share prices. The findings of the study show that
there was a significant relationship between corporate governance and share
prices, i.e., that firms with better corporate governance structure performed
better in terms of Return on Total Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity
(ROE). This can be contrasted with Shleifer and Vishny (1997) whose
research concentrates on corporate governance systems around the world,
and who find that large shareholders impact corporate performance most.
According to Shleifer and Vishny, corporate investors rely on corporate
governance to assure themselves to obtain a fair return on their financial
investment. Lehmann and Weigand (2000) use data from 1991 to 1996 for
361 German companies, of which 183 are listed on a German stock
exchange. The researchers use ROA and ROE to measure corporate
performance. According to Lehmann and Weigand (2000), the identity of
the business’s owners is important for performance. The researchers state
that whether control rights are with government, family interests, allied
industrial firms, banks, and holding companies, this will have an impact on
corporate governance mechanisms and their implementation and in turn on
performance. In the United States, dispersed ownership (as opposed to
companies with controlling interests) is the most common ownership
structure of public companies, especially for large-capitalization firms
(Lehmann & Weigand, 2000). Lehmann and Weigand acknowledge that
shareholders of diffusely held firms (institutional investors such as pension
funds or companies with large diffuse shareholding such as Coca Cola or
Microsoft) are viewed as outsiders. Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) state in
the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial
Regulation, that “ownership structure is perhaps among the most significant
corporate governance factors, as it determines the balance of power within
a corporation and can directly affect governance practices and company
behaviour”. In Germany, Lehmann and Weigand (2000) report that there is
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a positive relation between firm value and ownership by institutional
investors. In the United States, Shleifer and Vishney (1997), also find that
there is a positive relationship between institutional ownership and
corporate performance. On the other hand, other research conducted in the
United States by Chaganti and Damanpour (1991) suggests that there is little
evidence that corporate performance is impacted by institutional ownership.
Gillan (2006) portrays a corporate governance model “beyond the balance
sheet”, encompassing laws, regulations, and markets. Through the model
shown in Figure 1, Gillan (Source: Gillan, 2006) classifies corporate
governance mechanisms into internal and external governance and explains
links between them.

Figure 1: Corporate Governance Beyond the Balance Sheet Model

Internal governance comprises the board of directors, managerial
incentives, capital structure, company’s constitutional documents, and the
company’s internal control system. External governance mechanisms
include laws and regulations, the capital markets, capital market
information, the labour market, the product market, accounting, legal and
financial services from external parties of the firm, and external oversight,
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such as the media and external lawsuits. In Gillan’s model, the board of
directors acts as an internal corporate governance mechanism has a
responsibility to advising and monitoring management who acts as
shareholders’ agents in making decisions regarding corporate resources
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Jensen and Meckling argue that there is an
inherent divergence of interests between the managers and owners of the
company which is representative of the agency theory. Siddiqui (2015)
compares data from different legal systems, mainly mature civil law and
common law countries and tests the effects of external governance
mechanisms, such as new laws, and internal governance mechanisms, such
as shareholder rights on firm performance. She finds that external
governance mechanisms exert more influence on firm performance than
internal governance mechanisms. Publications from the United States prove
valuable when analysing variables such as legal (as opposed to illegal)
insider trading patterns (Bebchuk & Fershtman, 1994) and the impact on
corporate performance. Because of advanced legal rules in the United States
and long-term observations in insider trading patterns, the scientific
literature is very comprehensive and informative for this research.
2.2.3 Corporate Governance in Emerging and Developing Markets
According to the literature, it is widely recognized that
implementing reliable corporate governance frameworks is a key
contributor to increase market capitalization (price per share). Goel (2018)
analyses corporate governance practices of Indian companies in two
corporate governance reform periods in India (2012–13) and (2015–16) and
estimates the impact on corporate performance. Goel concludes that the total
corporate governance score is a significant predictor of the company’s
market valuation and accounting performance. Many scientific studies
research compliance in developing countries based on a local corporate
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governance code or international principles, such as the OECD principles of
corporate governance. According to Vo and Nguyen (2014) who conducted
research in Vietnam, the board of directors is considered “the most
important factor in corporate governance, which affects the whole business
and owners’ interests”. Azutoru et al. (2017) use data from 2011-2015
covering twenty Nigerian insurance companies and examine corporate
governance mechanisms such as board size, board independence, executive
directors’ remuneration, non-executive directors’ remuneration, directors’
ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership and their impact
on corporate performance. The researchers use a fixed effects model and
regression to evaluate the effect of these corporate governance mechanisms
on the financial performance of Nigerian insurance companies. The fixed
effect econometrics show that, board size and non-executive directors’
remuneration have a negative and significant effect on financial
performance measured by ROA. The researchers find that board
independence, and institutional ownership have a positive and significant
impact on the financial performance using the agency theory. Ali (2016)
conducts research with 100 listed companies from the Karachi Stock
Exchange of Pakistan and the New York Stock Exchange to measure the
impact of corporate governance on performance. Corporate governance is
measured by board’s ownership, efficiency, size of board, board
independence, CEO and CEO duality and board’s education and experience
whereas the firm’s financial performance is measure by ROA and ROE. Ali
finds there is less adherence to corporate governance mechanisms in
Pakistan, due to the mostly family-owned nature of businesses. In the survey
conducted by Ali and subsequent analysis, a strong rating for corporate
governance variables such as board ownership, board education and
experience and CEO duality are found to have a positive relationship with
company performance. Mak and Li (2001) use Singapore as an example and

26

argue that privately owned firms are more efficient and more profitable than
state owned firms. They explain that government tends to be less involved
with its investments. They also claim that there is weaker accountability and
monitoring of state-owned firms. Qasim and Mohammad (2014) mention
that whether government ownership has a positive or a negative impact on
corporate performance depends on the country under examination. In China,
Xu and Wang (1999) find a negative relationship between government
ownership and corporate performance. However, studies conducted in the
UAE, Kuwait, Malaysia, and Singapore find a positive relationship between
government ownership and corporate performance (Aljifri & Moustafa,
2007; Najid & Abdul Rahman, 2011; and Alfaraih et al., 2012). In the UAE,
government owned firms may face less pressure to comply with the financial
reporting requirements which could give their managers some room to select
those accounting choices that improve the corporate performance
measurement (Tobin’s Q) (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007). Institutional investors
refer to the ownership stake in a company that is held by large financial
organizations, insurance companies corporate pension funds, college
endowments, commercial banks, hedge funds, mutual funds, and boutique
asset management firms (Pillai & Al-Malkawi, 2018). The involvement of
institutional investors has emerged as a vital force in corporate monitoring
and as a mechanism to protect the interest of minority shareholders (Qasim
& Mohammad, 2014).
The literature review in various developing countries shows that
corporate governance still needs to be better implemented in developing
countries and a lack of a strong internal control system or processes that
would ensure acceptance of corporate governance principles and
mechanisms. The literature also shows that there is increased attention by
stock markets in developing countries to improve corporate governance.
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2.2.4 Corporate Governance in the UAE
The impact of government ownership on corporate performance has
been researched in the UAE since the implementation of the first corporate
governance code in 2009. According to the literature (Alagha, 2016; Otman,
2014; Aljifri & Mustafa, 2007), there is a clear trend of improvements in
corporate governance and corresponding best practices. Whether they
improve company performance in the UAE, is less apparent.
Alagha (2016) examines the changes to corporate governance
practices from 2008-2009 to 2011-2012 and their impact on financial
performance. He uses the total population of all listed companies from both
DFM and ADX for the period examined. His analysis mainly concentrates
on the financial sector companies listed on the exchanges. The two time
periods selected are very interesting for research as the first corporate
governance rules in the UAE are the 2009 CG Rules. Therefore, Alagha’s
selected time periods contrast the effect of the first corporate governance
rules in the UAE post implementation, the time period 2011-2012 with the
time period 2008-2009 when no formal corporate governance practices were
implemented. The findings state that good corporate governance can be an
essential factor in corporate performance but also that there is not
necessarily a causal link between them.
Hussainey and Aljifri (2012) examine the impact of corporate
governance mechanisms on financial decisions of companies listed on the
Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock markets and how this in turn affects UAE firms’
capital structure. The researchers use regression analysis and descriptive
statistics on data obtained from the corporate annual reports from 71 listed
companies during 2006. They conclude that dividend policy is negatively
associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio, while firms’ size is positively
associated with debt‐to‐equity ratio. The findings support that company
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directors and managers in the UAE may act at shareholders’ expense if no
effective corporate governance mechanisms are implemented. Aljifri and
Moustafa (2007) examine the impact of corporate governance mechanisms
on the financial performance of companies listed on the Abu Dhabi and
Dubai stock markets. Their research utilizes a sample of 51 firms using
accounting and marketing data from 2004. The researchers use regression
and statistical analysis to test the hypotheses. UAE corporate performance
is measured by Tobin’s Q ratio because it provides an estimate of the
intangible assets value, quality of management and growth opportunities.
The researchers conduct regression analysis to test the hypotheses of the
study and conclude that the governmental ownership, the debt ratio (total
debt/total assets), and the pay out of dividends ratio have a significant
impact on the corporate performance; whereas the institutional investors,
the board size, the firm size (sales), and the audit type show a non‐significant
impact.
AlKuwaiti (2019) investigated CEO duality in the listed companies
in the UAE. CEOs with significant voting power are more likely to maintain
power at companies’ boards by holding the combined role of Chair of the
Board and CEO. CEO and Chairman duality has been researched in detail
globally and to some extent in the UAE and by 2019 most listed companies
in the UAE have separated the roles of CEO and Chairman as stipulated by
the 2016 corporate governance rules, Article 4(b) “The Chairman of the
Board shall not hold the position of company's manager, and/or Managing
Director or any other executive position in the Company”. Therefore,
chairman/CEO duality will not be investigated in this dissertation.
The research on the relationship between government ownership
and corporate performance in previous research is not conclusive. One
school of thought suggests a negative relationship between government
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ownership and corporate performance, and other researchers suggest a
positive relationship. In the UAE, Aljifiri and Moustafa (2007) found that
institutional ownership has a negative, although insignificant, impact on
Tobin’s Q. Further, in the UAE, the influence of institutional investors needs
to be considered and whether they exercise latent or active influence. Active
power is usually in the hands of a firm’s executives to control key decisions
regarding investments, products, and markets. Latent power, on the other
hand, is only the power to constrain certain decisions. Here, the institutional
shareholding needs to be contrasted with government shareholding, as in the
UAE firms with a high government shareholding are considered to benefit
from “government support” which means they are able to attract cheaper
loans, market their products more prominently, and benefit from regulatory
exemptions.
It can be concluded from the above discussion that corporate
governance is increasingly important in the UAE as it aims to establish itself
as a developed economy. This is also apparent by the numerous legislative
reforms from 2009 to 2020. The current research is motivated by the gap in
the literature as identified in Chapter 1. It will focus on corporate
governance mechanisms taken from the UAE laws that have until now not
been the focus of academic research. The study also aims to evaluate the
application of the corporate governance principles as established by the
OECD principles of corporate governance and assess the progress of
implementing corporate governance with the help of a corporate governance
index. Since this dissertation reflects on the changes brought about by the
corporate governance rules 2016 and the Companies Law, the hypotheses
selected focus on changes brought about by the legislation introduced in
2015 and 2016.
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2.2.5 Impact of Board member’s Occupational Experience on Corporate
Performance
An area which merits further investigation is the occupational
expertise of the members of the board of directors and the impact of
presence or absence of sector experience on a company’s performance. This
dissertation analyses whether the presence or absence of occupational
expertise (sector experience) by the members of the board of directors has
an impact on performance. It is widely acknowledged that investigating
occupational and functional backgrounds of members of the board of
directors is a valuable tool to measure performance (Goodstein et al., 1994).
Several studies have investigated the influence of occupational expertise on
performance with a number of these studies in the financial services and
banking sector (Van Ness et al., 2010; Brown, 2006; Kroszner & Strahan,
2001). Kroszner and Strahan (2001) found that bankers and members of the
board with financial experience are associated with stable stock returns.
Differences among corporate directors are most properly viewed in terms of
their experience and expertise (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). A recent study
conducted with listed firms on the Milan stock exchange used regression
analyses and proved that directors’ educational backgrounds and work
experience in specific professional areas are predictive of corporate
performance (Rossignoli et al., 2021).
According to the literature, the applicable theory is the agency
theory. Agency theorists assert that top management teams shirk
responsibilities and make risk-averse, suboptimal decisions (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Further, executive careerism focusing on short-term,
labour-market value enhancing performance conflict with shareholder
interests (Gupta & Bailey, 2001). The 2016 Corporate Governance Rules,
Article 41(a), require that “the candidate shall have at least five years’
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experience in the field of the Company which he/she is nominated for its
Board membership”. This research investigates the presence or absence of
occupational experience (sector expertise) of the members of the board of
directors of listed companies on the ADX and DFM by analysing the
Corporate Governance Reports and mandatory disclosures regarding board
members’ professional and sector experience. Brown (2006) and Kroszner
and Strahan (2001) find evidence of a positive relation between board
members occupational experience and increased performance, and it is
expected that testing this hypothesis in the context of the UAE will
demonstrate a positive relationship between occupational experience and
corporate performance.
2.2.6 Relationship between Gender and Corporate Performance
In 2012, the UAE Cabinet made it compulsory for corporations and
government agencies to include women on their boards of directors. The
2012 announcement was made by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice
President of the UAE and Ruler of Dubai, in December 2012. However, no
fixed quotas for gender representation on UAE listed companies Board of
Directors were introduced in the UAE until the 2020 corporate governance
rules were introduced. Pursuant to the 2016 corporate governance rules
there was no firm obligation for a Board of Directors to have female
members – it merely required female candidates for election. Compared to
a few decades ago, today women are more educated, highly qualified and
ready to assume responsibilities for high-level, highly impactful positions
in the corporate world. However, progress in that direction at the UAE-listed
companies seems to be slow.
Some of the literature reviewed finds a positive impact of the
presence of female board members on corporate performance (LückerathRovers, 2013). However, there appear to be difficulties with quantifying the
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impact of gender representation on corporate performance using statistical
methods. Hussein and Kiwia (2009) examine the relationship between
female board members and corporate performance for a panel of 250 US
firms over the years 2000 and 2006. They use fixed effect regression to
estimate the relationship of the effect of female board members with four
measures of corporate performance (ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q ratio and price
at close). The researchers find no positive and significant relationship
between female board members and the four measures of corporate
performance selected. However, applying the Shannon index, a diversity
index frequently used in the ecological literature originally developed by
Claude Shannon (1948), they find a positive and significant relationship
between gender representation and firm value.
Article 40 of the 2016 Code requires that listed companies’
candidates for Board membership shall be represented by at least 20%
female board member candidates. The company shall disclose the reasons
in case no female candidate is nominated. The rate of female representation
in the Board of Directors also needs to be mentioned in the annual corporate
governance Report. There are currently no penalties or consequences if a
listed company has no female board member(s). In fact, still very few firms
do have female board members in the UAE.
In 2020, the UAE was the first Arab country to take an active step
towards introducing quotas for female board members. Article 9, paragraph
3 of the 2020 corporate governance rules states as follows:
“The Articles of Association of the Company shall specify the
formation method of the Board, number of its Members and the Membership
term, provided that the representation of women is not less than (20%) of
the number of Members. The Company shall disclose the reasons for the
failure to achieve such a percentage, and it is also required to disclose the
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percentage of representation of women in the Board within its annual
Governance report.”
and Article 59, paragraph 1:
“Set a nomination policy for membership of the Board of Directors
and the Executive Management to diversification of the sexes in the
formation and encourage women through incentive and training benefits and
programs and provide the Authority with a copy of this policy and any
amendments thereto.”
At the stage of writing this dissertation less than two years have
passed since the implementation of the 2020 corporate governance code,
and it is still too early to assess improvements resulting from the
introduction of the new code. Globally, 2020 was an important year for
regulatory changes aimed at empowering women to gain board positions in
various jurisdictions. In November 2020, the German government
introduced a mandatory quota for women in the boards of listed German
companies. Listed companies with boards of more than three members must
in future include at least one woman (Chazan, 2020). This is a big step
towards gender diversity in Germany, where a system of voluntary
commitment to gender equality was in force since 2015 yet failed to yield
results. A quota for female board participation had been discussed in
German politics since the early 2000s, yet German chief executives and
heads of industry had argued against a quota and that it represented
unwarranted interference in the internal affairs of companies, and that there
was a dearth of suitable female candidates for senior management roles.
Women currently make up only 12.8% of the management boards of
German companies listed on the blue-chip Dax index, according to a recent
survey by the Swedish-German AllBright Foundation (Chazan, 2020).
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The “soft quota” principle in effect in Germany until 2020 is
comparable to the 2016 corporate governance code, Article 40, paragraph
1:
“The Company’s Articles of Association shall determine the
method of formation of the Board of Directors, number of the Board
members and term of membership. Candidates for Board membership shall
be represented by female board members (at least 20%), the Company shall
disclose the reasons in case no female is nominated; and shall also disclose
the rate of female representation in the Board of Directors in its Annual
Governance Report.”
The “comply or explain” model pursuant to the 2016 corporate
governance code failed to materially change the number of board positions
held by females of the UAE listed companies. Pursuant to the 2016
corporate governance code, listed companies needed to explain the reasons
why they did not have female board members and did so in the Annual
Governance Report, mandatory for companies listed on a UAE exchange.
However, SCA did not assess the substance of the company’s explanation
and only verified that a listed company without female board members had
indeed provided one.
On December 1, 2020, the US exchange NASDAQ- New York
announced the filing of a proposal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to adopt new listing rules related to board diversity and
disclosures and that companies listed on its exchange should have at least
one woman and one member of an under-represented minority on their
boards (Temple-West & Edgecliffe-Johnson, 2020). In its proposal, Nasdaq
opts for a "comply-or-explain" model which is similar to the UAE’s 2020
corporate governance code.
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This "comply-or-explain" model stands in contrast to recent
legislation in California where certain NASDAQ- New York listed entities
have their principal headquarters. In September 2018, California adopted
Senate Bill 826, mandating representation of women on the boards of
publicly held corporations based in California. Pursuant to the NASDAQNew York proposal, the disclosure requirement in case no female board
members has been appointed, is to explain the reasons why it does not have
female directors. Similar to the UAE’s 2016 corporate governance code, it
does not assess the substance of the company’ explanation but verifies that
the company has provided an explanation. The current Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, stated that “gender inequality is the
overwhelming injustice of our age, and the biggest human rights challenge
we face”, (Guterres, 2020). Women are still excluded from the top table,
from governments to corporate boards. The latest research by the World
Economic Forum states it will take 257 years to close this gap (Guterres).
The scientific literature on this topic is divided and country specific.
Lückerath-Rovers (2013) analyzes performance of the listed companies on
the Dutch stock exchange and finds that gender diversity is statistically
significant and has a positive impact on performance. Iren (2016), on the
other hand, finds that diversity has no impact on corporate performance. If
gender diversity does not affect corporate performance, the results might
imply that the female board members are used as window-dressing and for
image purposes (Helland & Sykuta, 2005). While it might be true that firms
which have females on their boards have better financial performance, it
might also be true that firms which perform better and have better
governance practices choose to include women in their boardrooms.
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2.2.7 Relationship between Insider Trading and Corporate Performance
Insider trading means buying and selling of stocks and shares based
on significant information which is not publicly available. Federal Law
Number 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates Securities and Commodities
Authority (the SCA Law) regulates and prohibits the act of illegal insider
trading. The SCA Law allows insiders (executives or members of the board
of the company or their dependents) to carry out insider transactions if they
publish the trades to the exchange and in the corporate governance reports.
According to Regulation 7 RM and ADX guidance published in 2019, the
corporate governance report shall include all the details regarding the price
or quantities bought or sold. Further, approval from the board of directors
needs to be sought. The ADX and DFM maintain records pertaining to
securities trading transactions by insiders and the exchanges must report on
a daily basis to SCA (the Regulator) regarding such trades. Most
sophisticated stock exchanges have similar rules. Pursuant to ssection 16(a)
of the US Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, insider stock transactions
on a United States stock exchange need to be filed publicly. Empirically, the
most comprehensive data for legal insider trading activity can be found in
the United States as a result of long-embedded rules that require public
filings.
Insider trading is a term commonly used in the securities sector to
describe illegal conduct. However, insider trading can both be legal and
illegal and following the above process will reveal legal insider trading share
sales and purchases. Only the legal insider trading can be analysed
statistically using scientific methods. Since corporate insiders are unlikely
to report illegal transactions that violate the rules, much of the illegal trading
activity is likely unobservable in public filings (Lskavyan, 2015).
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There are several possible theories of how firm value may depend
on the amount of insider trading. It needs to be tested if trades using insider
information will lower or increase long-term firm value. Masson and
Madhavan (1991) expect that firm value could be lowered because potential
investors with rational expectations recognize that insider trading is costly
to them. Other researchers suggest that insider trading or insider
shareholdings have a positive effect on corporate performance (Jeng et al.,
2003). Ting (2013) conducted research on listed companies on the
Taiwanese stock exchange and finds that insider and institutional ownership
both show positive effects on performance. Cline et al. (2017) examine
trades of insiders between 1990 and 2014 on the New York Stock Exchange.
They find that trades by insiders who are managers or directors can have a
positive impact on corporate performance and that persistence in
profitability is higher in firms where insiders have informational
advantages.
In February 2020, there was increased focus on the insider
shareholding by the UAE media and the UK regulator, the Financial
Conduct Authority (Rahman & Derhally, 2020). BR Shetty, the founder of
NMC Health, a UAE healthcare conglomerate with more than 200
healthcare facilities and listed on the London Stock Exchange, resigned as
director and non-executive chairman of NMC Health. Mr Shetty and the
Vice Chairman of the Board were removed from the company on concerns
they misstated their stakes in NMC Health. According to company filings,
it emerged that shares allegedly held by Mr. Shetty, were ultimately owned
by other shareholders, thus reducing the number of shares publicly held by
Mr. Shetty by 9.58%. Although, NMC Health is listed on the LSE and not
the ADX, NMC Health needs to be considered within the context of the
UAE as it is originally an Abu Dhabi company founded in 1975. Until 2020,
it was the biggest UAE healthcare provider and employed around 2,000
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doctors in the UAE. The investigation by the UK’s Financial Conduct
Authority brought other issues to the light which were masked by the
inflated shareholding and insider trading. Ahmed et al. (2020) conducted
research in the UAE test the role of control mechanisms represented by
foreign ownership and insider trading on listed companies’ corporate
performance. The study was carried out with a sample of 50 non-financial
companies in 2019. The findings show that insider trading and foreign
ownership had a significant impact on corporate performance.
Based on the data gathered from the corporate governance reports
of listed companies in the UAE, this dissertation analyses the effect of legal
insider trading on corporate performance in the UAE and determine whether
there is a positive, negative or no apparent relationship between insider
trading in the UAE and performance. In the statistical analysis, dummy
variables are used for firms that do or do not have insider shareholdings or
trades. Based on the above arguments, it is expected that there may be a
positive relationship between detailed regulations and procedures for
internal control and corporate performance in the UAE.
2.2.8 Auditor Rotation – Effect of changing the Auditor Periodically on
Corporate Performance
Not many studies have been conducted globally that measure the
impact of auditor rotation on corporate performance. One major reason for
this is that most jurisdictions have only started to codify a requirement to
regularly change the auditor post the global financial crisis in 2009. Hai
(2019) conducted research in Vietnam investigating the impact of auditor
rotation on audit quality. Hai’s study finds that the rotation of the auditors
has an impact on the motives and quality of the audit. Non-rotation of the
auditors was at the core of world-famous bankruptcies such as Enron or
WorldCom and created a need for the legislators to put in place measures
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which would protect companies and investors alike. In the UAE, mandatory
auditor rotation has been codified in the law since 2015. Article 243(2) of
the Companies Law (2015) states that an auditor’s term shall not exceed
three successive years. However, listed companies are able to seek an
exemption from the rule from the regulator, and exemptions have been
granted. Further, there are conflicting views with regards to rotating or not
rotating the auditor. According to Shockley (1981), businesses develop a
long-term "trust" relationship with their auditors which can make the
auditors inefficient over time. Retaining the same auditors over a long
period of time can lead to the auditors making less efforts in detecting major
errors and tending to agree with their clients. This is an argument in favour
of auditor rotation. However, there is also a view that compulsory rotation
of the auditors can cause auditor quality issues as well as increase costs to
the business. Auditor relationship partners may have a profound
understanding of the business which a new auditor may lack. Litt et al.
(2014) find evidence of lower financial reporting quality following an audit
partner change. Specifically, they find lower financial reporting quality
during the first two years with a new audit partner relative to the final two
years with the outgoing partner. They also find lower financial reporting
quality to be more prevalent for larger clients. These are arguments in favour
of retaining the same auditor and same audit engagement partner and against
the mandatory rotation rule.
In the UK, the mandatory auditor rotation rule became effective
from 1 January 2015. The UK Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)
requires companies listed on the FTSE350 to tender their statutory audit
services not less frequently than every ten years pursuant to The Statutory
Audit Services for Large Companies Market Investigation (Mandatory Use
of Competitive Tender Processes and Audit Committee Responsibilities)
Order (2014). In the United States, Section 203 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
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(2002) (SOX) mandates that the lead partner in an audit firm be rotated off
an audit project every five years. In 2002, SOX accelerated the rotation
period for the lead audit partner from seven to five years. As a result of
Section 203 (SOX), if the lead audit partner continues to conduct audits for
a customer for more than five years, such auditors will no longer be
considered independent. However, further attempts by the US Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board to introduce mandatory auditor
rotation rules such as the ones which are in force in the UAE and the UK,
have not been successful.
To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, auditor rotation has not
been scientifically researched in the UAE, partly because it is still a new
topic because mandatory auditor rotation every three years as prescribed in
Article 243(2) of the Companies Law (2015), has only been introduced in
2015 and was not included in the previous Commercial Companies Law
(1984). Using handpicked data from the corporate governance reports of
listed companies, the researcher will determine whether there has been an
auditor change over a four-year sequence and whether such change or
absence of a change has an effect on corporate performance.
2.2.9 Impact of Internal Controls on Corporate Performance
Not many studies have been conducted globally that measure the
impact of internal controls on corporate performance. One major reason for
this is that internal controls regulations and procedures are still a relatively
new research area. In the United States, SOX (2002) requires public
companies to maintain a solid internal controls framework. It is important
to mention that the control environment, i.e., the detailed regulations and
procedures for internal control are only one element to assess the internal
control system. Other components include the risk assessment, control
activities, information and communication, and monitoring. It is important
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to focus on the detailed regulations and procedures for internal control as
these are most prominent in the applicable UAE legislation.
In the UAE, pursuant to the 2016 corporate governance rules, listed
companies are required to implement and maintain strict internal control
policies and consult directly with the board on internal control matters.
Article 43 of the 2016 corporate governance rules requires “Taking the
necessary procedures to ensure efficient internal control of the workflow in
the Company, including:
“Setting written and detailed regulations and procedures for internal
control, which determines the duties and responsibilities in compliance with
the policy approved by the Board of Directors and the general requirements
and objectives stipulated in the applicable legislations, including this
Decision.
Establishing an internal control department to follow up compliance
with the applicable laws, regulations, and resolutions; requirements of the
supervisory bodies; and the internal policy, regulations, and procedures set
by the Board of Directors.
Setting written procedures to manage conflict of interests and deal
with potential cases of such conflict for Board members, the Senior
Executive Management, and shareholders, and setting the procedures to be
taken in cases of misuse of the Company’s assets and facilities or
misconduct resulting from transactions with Related Parties.”
This dissertation explores whether solid internal controls through
written and detailed regulations and procedures can enhance corporate
performance. In the United States, Ashbaugh‐Skaife et al. (2009) conducted
research on this topic and estimated the relation between market value and
internal control by using a residual income model. Firms with weak internal
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controls are identified as those that disclose material weaknesses in internal
controls in periodic filings to the US regulator as required by SOX rules.
The empirical results show that firms with weak internal control
mechanisms have lower market value. Al Thuneibat et al. (2015) conducted
research of internal control mechanisms in Saudi Arabia. The results of the
study reveal that the effect of internal control on ROA and ROE is
significant and positive.
2.2.10 Impact of Compliance on Corporate Performance
The UAE’s choice of corporate governance regulations is heavily
influenced by the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance framework, whereas
de-facto realities in the UAE corporate environment are quite different from
the United Kingdom or the United States. The UAE capital market is
characterized by a concentrated ownership structure through institutional
and government shareholdings (Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012) and familybased business groups. In the UAE, scientific literature on compliance and
corporate performance is developing. Tariq and Abbas (2013) conduct
research in Pakistan over a period of eight years (2003 to 2010) to assess
compliance since the introduction of the Pakistan corporate governance
code in 2002. The researchers evaluate the efficacy of a rule-based code of
governance and find a significant and positive impact of compliance on
corporate performance (ROA and ROE). The research also finds that
compliance is not linearly related with corporate performance as highly
compliant firms are less profitable than average or low compliant firms.
Goncharov et al. (2006) conduct research in Germany and report that firms
with a higher degree of compliance have share prices priced at a premium
in contrast to firms with a lower degree of compliance. Akbar et al. (2016)
conduct research in the UK between compliance and corporate performance
of UK non-financial publicly listed companies from 1999-2009. The results
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suggest that compliance is not a determinant of corporate performance.
Izquierdo et al. (2020) evaluate the impact of compliance on corporate
performance in Spain pursuant to the Spanish Unified Good Governance
Code. The researchers find that increasing compliance is not a relevant
factor for better corporate performance. Outa and Waweru (2016) analyze
the impact of compliance as set by Kenya’s corporate governance guidelines
on corporate performance. The researchers construct a corporate
governance index based on the Kenyan corporate governance guidelines and
find that compliance is positively and significantly related to corporate
performance. The researchers evaluate how compliance steered financial
performance and firm value from 2002 to 2014. These are very interesting
results based on rule-based compliance with corporate governance codes.
From the literature reviewed, only the research conducted in Kenya purports
to demonstrate an important relationship between compliance and corporate
performance. The results from the UK, Germany, Spain and Pakistan
suggest that compliance with corporate governance regulations is not a
determinant of corporate performance. Based on the results from multiple
jurisdictions, the results from the Kenyan study may be biased and would
merit further research.
2.2.11 Sector Performance after Corporate Governance Reforms
It is of major interest to the regulator and investors whether there
are differences between different sectors and their performance. In India,
Goel (2018) observed that different sectors improved differently in the
second reform period of corporate governance reforms. She reports that
“specifically, the pharmaceutical and chemical sectors registered a
substantial increase and are at the top of the table in the cumulative score”.
The transport and auto sectors were at the bottom of the list in both reform
periods. This may be attributable to the fact that pharmaceutical and
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chemical companies are often multinational companies and subject to
multiple layers of compliance, such as Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) clearance in the United States, or the equivalent in other
jurisdictions, which is subject to a stringent approval process. Palaniappan
and Rao (2015) investigate the effectiveness of corporate governance
reforms on companies listed on the NSE stock exchange in India and find
that reforms have a significant impact on the financial performance of
manufacturing companies. Mansur and Tangl (2018) analyze the impact of
corporate governance reforms on the performance of different sectors on the
Amman stock exchange in Jordan. They observe that banking, insurance,
and service sector companies listed on the Amman stock exchange perform
better after the introduction of the corporate governance reforms.
In this dissertation, the analysed sectors represented on the ADX
and the DFM are consumer staples, energy, transport and logistics, real
estate, construction, services, telecommunication and medical.
2.3 The Role of the OECD in shaping Corporate Governance Principles
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) was the first organisation to offer an international code of corporate
governance principles which was first published in 1999, revised in 2004,
and revised again and endorsed by the G20 in 2015 (Blume, 2017).
According to the OECD, corporate governance is: “Procedures and
processes according to which an organization is directed and controlled. The
corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and
responsibilities among the different participants in the organization – such
as the board, managers, shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down
the rules and procedures for decision-making" (OECD, 2015).
As stipulated by the OECD principles, good corporate governance
should ensure fairness, transparency, and accountability in the management
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of corporate resources. Fairness requires that controlling shareholders, the
Board of Directors, and management should treat all shareholders fairly and
equally. Transparency indicates that the corporate operations should be
transparent both in terms of the decision-making process and the disclosure
of information. Accountability requires that the Board of Directors and
management of the company should be accountable for the company’s
performance to shareholders as well as other stakeholders. The OECD 2015
guidelines are very influential and have been shaped post the 2009 financial
crisis and provide recommendations on corporate governance practices with
emphasis on disclosure and transparency, and the responsibilities of the
board. The OECD corporate governance principles became the basis of
codes developed in many countries and currently have 36 members across
the globe. To date, no Arab country is an OECD member. However, the
principles set out by the OECD are valid and accepted tools for corporate
governance research in emerging economies (Aljifri & Moustafa, 2007;
Otman, 2014). The OECD corporate governance principles encompass
concepts of corporate governance to ensure the basis for an effective
corporate governance framework, shareholder and stakeholder rights and
responsibilities including the rights and equitable treatment of shareholders
and key ownership functions. Other OECD corporate governance principles
focus on the role of institutional investors, stock markets, and
intermediaries, disclosure and transparency and responsibilities of the board
of directors. In this dissertation, the OECD corporate governance principles
(2015) have been operationalized in a questionnaire containing ninety
questions to collect responses from respondents representing listed
companies in the UAE.
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2.3.1 Rights of Shareholders
According to Jesover and Kirkpatrick (2005), the OECD Principles
have gained worldwide recognition as an international benchmark for good
corporate governance beyond non-OECD countries. Shareholders’ rights
include a number of rights such as transfer of share ownership, participation
in company profits through dividends, obtaining regular updates about the
company, voting rights for members of the board of directors, adequate and
timely information about company meetings, discussion of the external
auditor’s report at the annual general meeting, information about the capital
structure of the firm, information regarding fundamental corporate changes,
rights to inspect documents and rights to sue the corporation for wrongful
acts (Gillan, 2006). In the UAE these corporate governance principles are
embedded in the Companies Law (2015) and the Disclosure and
Transparency Rules. Klapper and Love (2004) emphasize that corporate
governance practices are essential in countries with weak legal systems and
weak shareholders rights. The legal framework in the UAE has been
significantly improved since 2009 through various updates as detailed in the
previous chapter. This has increased shareholders’ faith in the UAE stock
exchanges which can be observed by two factors, higher trading volumes on
the stock exchanges as well as increased foreign direct investment. In 2021,
one year after the Covid-19 pandemic, traded values on the ADX rose by
407% and foreign direct investment rose to 30% (Mansoor, 2022).
2.3.2 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
Companies should ensure the equitable and fair treatment of
shareholders. All shareholders should have the possibility to obtain effective
redress for the violation of their rights (OECD, 2015). Processes and
procedures need to be in place ahead of general shareholder meetings that
ensure the equitable treatment of all shareholders (Brudney, 1983; Jesover
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& Kirkpatrick, 2005). Aragon et al. (2021) conduct research whether weak
shareholder protection exacerbates capital fragility and observe that
shareholders in emerging markets may not be adequately protected. In the
UAE, the 2015 Companies Law provides some protections to minority
shareholders, such as the right for minority shareholders to receive the
annual audited accounts of the company and the right for minority
shareholders to inspect the company’s books and records. Foreign investors
have long struggled with the 51% local ownership requirement under UAE
law and until recently certain stocks were not tradable by foreigners. In
2021, many listed entities in telecommunications and the energy sector
obtained internal approvals to raise the ownership limits for non-UAE
nationals to own up to 49 % (Nair, 2021). Equitable shareholder rights are
most likely achieved by a strong implementation of corporate governance
rules and a strong internal control system (Khamis et al., 2020; Ahmed et
al., 2020).
2.3.3 Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance
The stakeholders’ principles focus on the relationship between the
corporation and stakeholders in creating value (OECD, 2015). This
principle covers stakeholder rights that are established by law, such as
mechanisms for employee participation, stakeholders’ compensation and
legal damages, stakeholders’ rights to obtain accurate and timely
information, legal protection for whistleblowers, creditor rights in
bankruptcy scenarios, and the external auditors’ ability to perform their
duties and exercise professional care.
Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) argue in favour of pluralistic
stakeholderism where independent weight is given to stakeholder interests,
and they are balanced with shareholder interests. Stakeholders are a wide
group including employees, creditors, suppliers, and shareholders. Bebchuk
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et al. (2021) argue that firms should voluntarily choose to be stakeholderoriented with no expectation to produce material benefits for stakeholders.
This concept has been embraced by the wider business community including
the Business Roundtable Statement on Corporate Governance and the
Davos World Economic Forum Manifesto on Stakeholder Capitalism. The
UAE Companies Law does not yet support all the principles set out above,
for instance there is not yet a definition of whistleblowing under UAE law
and no protections for whistleblowers. The UAE Penal Code imposes
obligations on all persons to report crimes. However, this reporting
requirement is difficult to enforce under the UAE Penal Code. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) find that firms cannot maximise their value without taking
into consideration the interests of their stakeholders. The principle of
enlightened shareholder value is at the heart of the UK’s Companies Law
2006. Section 172 of the UK Companies Law 2006 sets out the director’s
duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members
as a whole, and, in doing so have regard amongst other matters to the likely
consequences of any decision in the long term.
2.3.4 Disclosure and Transparency
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and
governance of the company (OECD, 2015). SCA’s Resolution No. (3) of
2000 concerning Disclosure and Transparency Regulations and the DFM
Disclosure and Transparency Rules (2018) are the applicable rules in the
UAE to ensure that financial results are appropriately disclosed, disclosure
of key shareholders, disclosure of risk factors, disclosure of executives and
board members’ remuneration, annual audit to be conducted by an external
auditor, annual publication of the corporate governance report, preparation
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of accounts in line with international reporting standards, and disclosure of
related party transactions. The disclosure efforts by the listed companies
need to be in line with the laws and regulations (Adawi & Rwegasira, 2011).
Increased transparency and improved disclosure by listed companies lead to
better communication between the company and its stakeholders (Janadi et
al., 2012). Companies with lower transparency and disclosure tend to be
valued less than companies which accurately disclose to the stock exchanges
(Hassan, 2009). One of the key objectives of corporate governance is to
improve transparency (Fung, 2014).
2.3.5 Responsibilities of the Board of Directors
The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic
guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management by the
board, and the board’s accountability to the company and its shareholders
(OECD, 2015). The main responsibilities of the board are to act in the best
interest of the company, take into account stakeholder interests, monitor the
effectiveness of the company’s governance practices, elect, monitor and
replace executives, when necessary, oversee the performance of the CEO,
set a tone at the top that demonstrates the company’s commitment to
integrity and legal compliance. The Board needs to manage potential
conflicts of interests and supervise the process of disclosure and
communication. There is consensus in the literature that the board needs to
be well functioning and effective in order to implement corporate
governance (Hannoon et al., 2021). In the listed companies in the UAE, the
board is responsible for approving and implementing policies and
procedures to control the affairs of the company. Implementing policies to
ensure compliance with the law and acting in good faith can help reduce the
agency problem between principals and agents of the company (Donadelli
et al., 2014).
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2.4 Challenges and Opportunities for Corporate Governance in the
Middle East
Since 2005, the OECD has maintained the MENA-OECD Working
Group on Corporate Governance to build a regional knowledge platform on
corporate governance that promotes stock market development, enhances
market transparency and disclosure, improves the corporate governance of
state-owned enterprises and supports women’s participation in corporate
leadership. The overall objective is the implementation of international
standards

embodied

in

the G20/OECD

Principles

of

Corporate

Governance which are also the focus of this study in the analysis of the
corporate governance index. According to the OECD’s annual meeting of
the MENA-OECD Working Group on Corporate Governance (2019), the
OECD noted that corporate governance priorities in the MENA region are
changing with more focus being put on risk management and social
responsibilities. The report identified that businesses would play a key role
in leading growth in the region in the post-crisis period which is aligned
with the stakeholder theory of corporate governance. The OECD also
recognized that despite laws being implemented to promote women in
leadership positions, corporate boardrooms in the MENA region still need
more gender diversity. The OECD further recognized that enhancing
transparency and disclosure goes beyond regulations that have been
implemented. There is overall consensus that improving transparency and
disclosure practices attracts investors. The onus is on the companies to lead
the efforts to move towards more robust transparency and disclosure
practices. The latter point may be subject to debate as in mature economies
disclosure and transparency requirements are set by the stock exchange
regulators. In 2021, one-year post-Covid-19, traded values measured by buy
and sell volumes on the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX) rose by
407% from AED 45 billion in 2020 to AED 739 billion in 2021, driven by
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domestic and international investment (Mansoor, 2022). Local investors
accounted for 70% of the ADX’s traded value, while foreign institutional
investors accounted for 30% which is the highest percentage of foreign
investment in MENA (Mansoor, 2022). This shows that foreign investors
have faith in the UAE exchanges and in particular ADX. Previous research
demonstrates that foreign investors are willing to pay a premium for wellgoverned companies (Litvak, 2007).
Prior to the implementation of corporate governance rules in the
UAE in 2009, the Hawkamah Institute for Corporate Governance set out the
key challenges to implementing corporate governance in its 2007 report. At
that time, the Hawkamah Institute identified weak protection of shareholder
rights, weak legal environment, and lack of transparency as the key
obstacles to implementing corporate governance in the UAE. As set out
above, the maturity of the stock exchange is an important factor for listed
companies to establish effective corporate governance frameworks. This
research will investigate the perceived barriers and enablers of corporate
governance by using primary research in form of a questionnaire.
2.5 Limitations of Existing Literature and Identifying Research Gaps
in the context of the UAE
The literature review shows that most studies considered focus on
the OECD principles of corporate governance and corporate governance
mechanisms contained in the 2009 corporate governance rules such as
shareholders rights, chairman/CEO duality, disclosure and transparency
rules. Many studies investigate the difficulties in implementing corporate
governance in the MENA region and the UAE, and recommendations have
been made by the OECD and the scientific literature to solve these problems.
This dissertation is motivated by the gaps in the existing literature. Firstly,
to the researcher’s knowledge no previous study has assessed the adoption
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of corporate governance mechanisms (auditor rotation, insider trading,
directors’ experience, and internal controls) in the UAE. Secondly, no prior
study has investigated the relationship between corporate governance and
corporate performance in the UAE qualitatively by conducting interviews
with board members and executives. Interviewees were sought from the
same pool of respondents that had previously replied to the questionnaire
thus ensuring homogeneity of the sample and a high-profile respondents
pool. Further, this dissertation will measure corporate performance by using
three established measures of corporate performance ROA, ROE and
Tobin’s Q in line with previous research conducted in the field.
As the literature shows, there have been important improvements in
corporate governance in the UAE since 2009 which have significantly
improved investor confidence in the stock exchanges (Mansoor, 2022). Yet,
reforms are needed. The literature on corporate governance in the UAE is
also still limited with sparse publications. This dissertation will make an
original contribution by utilizing quantitative and qualitative methods and
exploring legal, social, and economic factors. It will also explore the
corporate governance mechanisms based on the 2016 corporate governance
rules and the perceptions of stakeholders on potential obstacles and enablers
of corporate governance quantitatively and qualitatively.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented and discussed an overview of the literature
of corporate governance principles and mechanisms and their impact on
corporate performance. It identified the relevant literature and the research
gap. Further, this chapter discussed the role of the OECD principles of
corporate governance and ongoing efforts by the OECD to improve
governance in the MENA region. The legal developments that have been
made since 2009 in the UAE show that important progress has been made
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to establish a corporate governance framework pursuant to which
companies are managed transparently and fairly. This dissertation intends
to build on the prior research by exploring relevant corporate governance
mechanisms that have not been discussed in scientific research in the UAE.
This dissertation contributes to the literature of corporate governance by
filling a research gap and presenting in depth findings on the impact of
corporate governance on corporate performance.
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Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses
Development
3.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to present the conceptual framework
and development of the hypotheses that form the basis of this dissertation.
The literature review in the previous chapter has shown the limitations of
the previous research and the research gap concerning selected corporate
governance mechanisms for this dissertation. To the researcher’s
knowledge, there is no previous research using mixed methods that
measures how and if corporate governance principles and corporate
governance mechanisms impact corporate performance. This chapter is
structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the applicable theories to
corporate governance research. Section 3.3 develops the theoretical
framework. Section 3.4 presents the conceptualization of the variables and
model specifications. Section 3.5 includes the hypotheses development and
Section 3.6 presents the conclusion.
3.2 Applicable Theories
Corporate governance has become instrumental for policy making
for listed corporations and there is an ongoing debate about the applicable
theories (Branston et al., 2006). There is no uniform definition of corporate
governance which has led to researchers proposing different theoretical
views (Brickley & Zimmerman, 2010). There are four broad theories to
explain corporate governance worldwide: (i) Agency Theory; (ii)
Stakeholder Theory; (iii) Stewardship Theory and (iv) Sociological Theory
(Clarke, 2004). There is no unifying theoretical framework which applies to
corporate governance. In the literature, however, mainly three theories are
used, the agency theory, the stakeholder theory, and the stewardship theory.
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Depending on the country-specific and jurisdictional context, it becomes
clear that different theoretical approaches need to be considered when
analysing corporate governance. The most popular theoretical framework,
the agency theory, led to the evolution of the Anglo-Saxon model of
corporate governance which is prevalent in developed economies. The
Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance has been used widely to
develop governance codes around the world, including the UAE (Hart,
1995; Pande & Ansari, 2014).
3.2.1 Agency Theory
Agency theory analyzes the principal agent conflict stemming from
the agent’s representation of the principal. Applied to the corporate
governance context, the agent (manager) represents the principal
(shareholder). The agency problem is a conflict of interest inherent in any
relationship where one party is expected to act in another’s best interests.
The principal-agent problem occurs when the interests of a principal and
agent conflict. Corporate governance can be used to minimize the situations
where conflict occurs through solid corporate rules and policies that help the
board of directors in curtailing excessive powers in the hands of
management. Further, the agency theory focuses on a checks-and-balances
type of governance. This includes, for instance, that the CEO and Chairman
of the Board are two distinct persons. Vo and Nguyen (2014) point out that
the agency theory plays an essential role to explain the functions of the board
of directors on corporate performance. Especially, when the size of a listed
company grows very large, in diffuse shareholdings such as Coca Cola or
Microsoft, shareholders use their effective control when the company is run
by the management (agents). This dissertation analyses the conflicting
interests occurring between principals and agents in context of the UAE. It
is also important to note that since the early 1970s, the purpose of the
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organization has been questioned and challenged in order to embrace a
wider stakeholder group as is possible under the agency theory. Eisenhardt
(1989) propounds that the agency theory no longer seems an adequate theory
to support the notion of the company as a social enterprise (Eisenhardt,
1989). However, as demonstrated by the literature, the agency theory still
remains the most applicable theory to analyze and theorize corporate
governance mechanisms. The separation of ownership and control for
publicly traded companies can result in an agency problem between
management and shareholders. The separation of control and ownership in
publicly listed corporations has caused agency problems, and a series of
corporate governance mechanisms have been implemented to mitigate
them. Corporate governance mechanisms such as information disclosure to
the stock exchange, insider trading rules, board member experience, and
auditor rotation were introduced to control the agency problem between
shareholders and managers to ensure that managers act in the best interest
of the shareholders (Homayoun, 2015). The agency theory is applied to
analyse the mechanisms of corporate governance under analysis in this
dissertation.
3.2.2 Stakeholder Theory
The stakeholder theory states that an organization is impacted by its
employees, suppliers, the local community and creditors. It acknowledges
that officers and directors should take into consideration the interests of all
stakeholders in the governance process, thus addressing ethics and values in
managing an organization. In practice, this theory is well suited to large
corporations that have a profound impact on the community, and which need
to discharge their responsibility in more sectors of the society rather than
focusing solely on their shareholders (Dao & Tran, 2017). Since 2019, the
stakeholder theory has had a bandwagon of support from business leaders
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that consider the stakeholder theory a solution to address a company’s
accountability and role within society. The OECD principles of corporate
governance state that companies should consider their stakeholders, not only
their immediate shareholders. The OECD has extensively published on
negative corporate externalities, i.e., the harm that a corporation does to a
third party. For example, power plants may emit mercury, but not pay for
the damage that mercury causes to those who live near the plant. To fulfill
its promise for improving human wellbeing, the stakeholder theory can be
applied to develop regulatory reforms (Biglan, 2011; Bebchuk & Tallarita,
2020; Bebchuk et al., 2021). The stakeholder theory will be applied to
analyse the principles of corporate governance under analysis in this
dissertation in response to results obtained from analyzing the questionnaire.
Agency theory and stakeholder theory are two important perspectives that
provide significant insight into corporate governance mechanisms, such as
the size of the board of directors, independence and skills of board members,
as well as CEO characteristics.
3.3 Theoretical Framework of Research
The theoretical framework for this dissertation includes the agency
theory to support the corporate governance mechanisms and the stakeholder
theory to support the corporate governance principles. Based on the above
discussion, it is clear that a comprehensive theoretical framework is required
to support the analysis of corporate governance principles and mechanisms.
The agency theory ensures that mechanisms are put in place to curtail
excessive powers of management. According to the agency theory,
mechanisms such as auditor rotation, insider trading rules, and internal
controls assist in the process to monitor management which may lead to
better corporate performance. The stakeholder theory suggests that
company management should consider the different interests of the
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stakeholders of the company. Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) advocate that
the stakeholder theory should be adopted for ethical and moral reasons
without an expectation of material gains for the company. The OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance encompassing shareholders’ rights, the
equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stakeholders in corporate
governance, disclosure and transparency obligations and the responsibilities
of the board of directors are based on the stakeholder theory. Figure 2 below
sets out the theoretical and conceptual framework. The theoretical and
conceptual framework (Figure 2), as conceived by Otman (2014) and
updated by the researcher, illustrates the link between the theories, corporate
governance principles and mechanisms, the control variables and the
dependent variables.

Figure 2: Theoretical and Conceptual Framework

3.4 Conceptualisation of the Variables and Model Specifications
Corporate performance is measured by the dependent variables
ROA, ROE and Tobin’s Q. Two models are set up to scientifically analyze
the impact of corporate governance principles and mechanisms respectively
on corporate performance.
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The first model tests the relationship between the corporate
governance principles results obtained from the questionnaire and corporate
performance. The second model tests the relationship between corporate
governance mechanisms obtained from the secondary data analysis and
corporate performance. The independent variables are the corporate
governance principles (questionnaire results) in the first model and the
corporate governance mechanisms (secondary data analysis) in the second
model. Corporate performance is the dependent variable in both models.
Combining the two models with qualitative research is designed to provide
an in-depth and detailed understanding which allows for deeper engagement
with the research topic as the researcher is able to probe and ask follow-up
questions to the respondents. Here, one assumption involves the data and its
value. It is assumed that the data collected from the respondents during live
interviews would be relevant to the hypotheses. Qualitative data collection
allows the researcher to observe the respondents in their current settings,
thereby understanding their perspectives and goals more clearly (Bloomberg
& Volpe, 2012).
3.4.1 Description of First Model
The first model investigates the effect of the corporate governance
principles on corporate performance. Table 3.1 presents the independent
variables and their measures. The first model uses cross-sectional data of
2020. Cross-sectional data is a type of data collected by observing many
subjects (such as individuals, firms, countries, or regions) at one point of
time. The model is estimated as follows:
Corporate performance = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏 (𝐂𝐆𝐈) + 𝛃𝟐 (SIZE) + 𝛃𝟑 (𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐆) + 𝛆𝐢
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Table 3.1: Independent Variables of the First Model
Symbol
CGI

Variable Name

Descriptions and Measures

Corporate governance

Rights of shareholders

principles

Equitable treatment of shareholders
Role of stakeholders in corporate
governance
Disclosure and transparency
Board responsibilites

SIZE

Firm Size

LEVG

Leverage

3.4.2 Description of Second Model
The second model investigates the effect of corporate governance
mechanisms on corporate performance. Firm size and leverage are included
as control variables. Five corporate governance mechanisms and two
combinations of mechanisms were used: Board member experience, gender,
insider trading, auditor rotation, internal controls, auditor rotation*insider
trading and internal control *gender. In addition, the following sector
specific analysis was carried out: sector*board experience, sector* insider
trading, sector*size and sector*leverage.
The second model relies on data from 2017-2020 and a mixed linear
effects model was applied. According to Kalaian and Raudenbush (1996),
the mixed effects linear model is appropriate to a) allow for different
subsets, (b) incorporate multiple effects per study and (c) treat each effect
as a realization from a population of possible effect sizes. The mixed linear
effects model allows for a more detailed analysis than the pooled OLS
regression model that treats a dataset like cross-sectional data and disregards
that the data has time and individual dimensions. The mixed linear effects
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model allows for a year-by-year observation and distinguishes between the
individual dimensions such as industry sectors, consumer staples and food
and beverage, energy, transport and logistics, real estate, construction,
services, telecommunication and medical which were coded in the data set.
The model is estimated as follows and as further set out in Table 3.2 below:
Corporate performance = 𝛃𝟎 + 𝛃𝟏 (BEXP) + 𝛃𝟐 (GEN) + 𝛃3 (ITRAD) +
𝛃4 (AUDROT) + 𝛃5 (INTCON) + 𝛃𝟔 (SIZE) + 𝛃7 (𝐋𝐄𝐕𝐆) + 𝛃8
(SECTOR) + 𝛃9 (TIME) + 𝛃10 (AUDROT* INTRAD) + 𝛃11
(INTCON*GEN) + 𝛃12 (SECTOR*BEXP) + 𝛃13 (SECTOR*INTRAD) +
𝛃14 (SECTOR*LOGASSETS) + 𝛃15 (SECTOR*LEVG) + 𝛆𝐢
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Table 3.2: Independent Variables of the Second Model
Symbol

Variable

Descriptions

Measures

Name
BEXP

GEN

ITRAD

Board

Sector experience

Percentage of board

experience

of members of the

members on relevant board

board

with sector experience

Presence of female

Percentage of women on the

board members

board

Insider

Legal Insider

Percentage of insider trading

Trading

Trading as

based on number of trades

disclosed in

by the board/management

corporate

and connected persons

Gender

governance
Reports
AUDROT

Auditor

Auditor rotation

Percentage of companies

Rotation as

every three years

having rotated the auditor

per the law

or more frequently

after three years of
implementing Companies
Law 2015

INTCON

Internal

Presence or

Dummy variable for

Control

Absence of an

presence or absence of

internal control

internal control mechanisms

function in the
company
SIZE

LEVG

Firm Size

Leverage

Log10 of total

Natural logarithm of firm’s

assets

total assets

Firm’s leverage

Measured by ratio of total
debt to total assets

SECTOR

Sector

Industry Sector

Listed firm’s industry sector

TIME

Time

Time period

Measures data from 2017 to

selected

2020
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3.4.3 Measurements of the Dependent Variable (Corporate Performance)
Most studies on corporate governance apply accounting-based
performance measures, such as ROE and ROA, in addition to market-based
measures, such as Tobin’s Q, as proxies for corporate performance (Otman,
2014; Alkuwaiti, 2019). Mokhtar and Muda (2012) conduct a comparative
study on performance measures and attributes between ISO and non-ISO
certified companies utilizing eight different performance measures ROA,
ROE, Tobin’s Q, Working Capital (WC), Return on Sales (ROS), Cash
Flow (CF), and Economic Value Added (EVA). They report that there is no
agreed consensus on which performance measure is the most appropriate.
3.4.4 Return on Equity (ROE)
ROE is a ratio that provides investors with insight into how
efficiently a company is run. It measures the profitability of the firm in
relation to stockholders’ equity. The higher the ROE, the more efficient a
company's management is at generating growth. ROE is calculated as the
net income divided by total equity multiplied by one hundred (Bloomberg,
2022):
ROE =

𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
∗ 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦

3.4.5 Return on Assets (ROA)
ROA refers to a financial ratio that indicates how profitable a firm
is in relation to its total assets. ROA is used to determine how efficiently a
company uses its assets to generate a profit. ROA is calculated as the net
income divided by total assets multiplied by one hundred (Bloomberg,
2022):
ROA =
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𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
∗ 100
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

3.4.6 Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q is the market value of a security divided by its asset
replacement cost. Tobin and Brainard (1977) theorized that a securities’
market value divided by its replacement cost should be in equilibrium
around 1. In contrast, a ratio below 1 is likely indicative of negative growth
expectations. Tobin’s Q is calculated by adding market capitalization, total
liabilities, preferred equity, and minority interests divided by total assets
(Bloomberg, 2022):
Tobin's Q =
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠

3.4.7 Control Variables and their Measurements
Control variables are included in regression analysis and mixed
linear effects models to estimate the causal effect of a treatment on an
outcome by controlling for variables that are distinct. Control variables
could strongly influence the results if they were not held constant to test the
relationship of the dependent variables on the independent variables. The
use of control variables is now a hallmark of sophisticated research (Gordon,
1968).
3.4.7.1 Leverage
Explaining the role of leverage in a firms’ performance has been
researched by economists since the 1950s. A firm’s leverage is measured by
the ratio of total debt to total assets (LEVG). Modigliani and Miller (1958)
argue in their influential research that a firm’s value is unaffected by its
capital structure in a perfect market. However, the Modigliani and Miller
model (1963) uses debt in the company’s capital structure and demonstrates
how debt can increase the firm’s value when interest expenses are tax
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deductible. However, in the UAE, interest expenses are not tax deductible.
Therefore, one view is that a firm’s leverage (LEVG) influences a
company’s performance in the UAE negatively, as “issuing debt in GCC is
not motivated by tax deduction but by need” (Zeitun, 2014). Highly
leveraged companies are perceived to have greater risk of default
(Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009) and a higher level of debt increases the risk
of bankruptcy.
Fargher et al. (2001) find that debt covenant violations are
associated with significant increases in both systematic and unsystematic
risks. They also show that the change in unsystematic risk associated with
technical default is a significant predictor of future exchange delisting, even
after controlling for other factors typically associated with increasing
financial distress. Other research finds that financial leverage positively
affects corporate performance. Dessí and Robertson (2003) explain firms
with low growth potential depend on borrowing in order to invest this
money in profitable projects. Further, there is important literature which
suggests that debt reduces the agency problem. By issuing debt, the
company is obliged to make periodic payments of interest and principal.
These periodic payments reduce the amount of free cash flow. Further, the
use of debt also increases the monitoring of managers’ activities via the
bank. Frierman and Viswanath (1994) contend that debt can be used to
reduce the tendency towards excessive risk taking in a firm that includes
debt in its capital structure. Financial leverage is measured with the debt-toequity ratio. It is expressed as: total liabilities/ total assets.
3.4.7.2 Firm Size
Firm size is an important control variable. The literature contains
contrasting views whether large firm size is positively or negatively
associated with performance. Burke et al. (1986) contend that larger firms
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more often adopt more comprehensive governance principles and thus
attract more attention from stakeholders. Mura (2007) explains that, due to
economies of scale, larger firms are expected to be more profitable.
Alkuwaiti (2019) states that larger firms can access cheaper resources and
funds which in turn should increase firm profitability. On the other hand,
other studies find that firm size is negatively associated with corporate
performance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) find that larger boards which are
common in larger firms lead to greater agency costs. AlAwadhi (2018)
identifies a negative impact of UAE firms’ size on their performance. This
control variable is measured by the natural logarithm of the company’s total
assets.
3.5 Hypotheses Development
This section sets out the hypotheses that have been developed based
on the conceptual framework. Seven research hypotheses have been
developed to test the relationship between corporate governance practice
and corporate performance. Research Hypotheses that test corporate
governance mechanisms are analyzed pursuant to the agency theory. The
stakeholder theory is used to analyze corporate governance principles as the
stakeholder theory focuses on the effect of the corporate activity on all
identifiable stakeholders of the corporation.
Hypotheses 1-5 (H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5) will be tested and relate
to the agency theory which suggests that corporate governance mechanisms
can minimize the principal-agent conflict. These hypotheses propose that
board members’ occupational experience, gender representation, legal
insider trading, changing the auditor periodically and solid internal controls
(corporate governance mechanisms) lead to better corporate performance.
Therefore, it is assumed that there is a positive relationship between
corporate governance mechanisms and corporate performance. H6 relates to
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compliance and the corporate governance principles that relate to the
stakeholder theory. H6 suggests that compliance has a positive effect on
corporate performance. H7 investigates compliance amongst sectors of the
listed companies and suggests that there are differences amongst the sectors.
3.5.1 Hypothesis of Board Members Relevant Occupational Experience
and Corporate Performance
The first hypothesis of the dissertation relates to the board
members’ occupational experience and its effect on corporate performance.
The corporate governance reports from 2017 to 2020 suggest that most of
the directors of the listed companies are generalists. In view of this
consideration, the relationship of relevant occupational experience on
corporate performance was assessed both qualitatively and quantitatively.
There is evidence that occupational and functional backgrounds of the board
members is a valuable tool to measure performance (Goodstein et al., 1994;
Kroszner & Strahan, 2001; Van Ness et al., 2010; Brown, 2006). The
literature also recognizes that there is not necessarily a direct linear
relationship between occupational experience and corporate performance as
directors’ short-term goals can impact their decision making (Gupta and
Bailey, 2001). From the relevant studies presented in this study, the first
hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of board
members who have relevant occupational experience and corporate
performance.
3.5.2 Hypothesis of Gender and Corporate Performance
The second hypothesis relates to the role of gender in impacting
corporate performance. This hypothesis was assessed both qualitatively and
quantitatively. The existing literature on this topic is extensive but non-
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conclusive. Some of the literature reviewed finds a positive impact of the
presence of female board members on corporate performance (LückerathRovers, 2013). Hussein and Kiwia (2009) find no positive and significant
relationship between female board members and corporate performance.
Based on the relevant studies discussed in this study, the second hypothesis
is formulated as follows:
H2: There is a positive relationship between gender representation
of board members and the UAE listed corporate performance.
3.5.3 Hypothesis of Insider Trading and Corporate Performance
Monitoring and reporting insider trading transparently ensures that
no trades take place for insiders during a trading window closure. As put
forward by the agency theory, the monitoring function of insider trading can
mitigate the agency problem. The existing research shows that there can be
a positive link between legal insider trading and corporate performance
(Jeng et al., 2003; Ting, 2013; Cline et al., 2017; Ahmed et al., 2020). Based
on the relevant studies discussed in this study, the third hypothesis is
formulated as follows:
H3: There is a positive relationship between insider trading and the
UAE listed corporate performance.
3.5.4 Hypothesis of Auditor Rotation and Corporate Performance
The fourth hypothesis concerns the effect of auditor rotation on
corporate performance. This hypothesis was assessed both qualitatively and
quantitatively. According to the agency theory, auditor rotation can assist
the shareholders in monitoring management activities, such as exacerbated
reliance on an external auditor that has been retained for many years and
thus reduce the potential danger from withholding information or
misrepresenting information in the annual reports. Catanach and Walker
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(1999) assess arguments for and against mandatory auditor rotation and
suggest that audit quality is deemed to be a function of performance. They
also assess to what extent auditor tenure impacts performance. However,
they do not find conclusive evidence that auditor rotation impacts
performance positively. Hai (2019) finds that the rotation of the auditors has
an impact on the motives and quality of the audit. Litt et al. (2014) find
evidence of lower financial reporting quality following an auditor change.
Rotating the auditor has an essential function in mitigating the agency
problem (Islam et al., 2010). Based on the relevant studies discussed in this
study, the fourth hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H4: Changing the auditor periodically has a positive impact on the
UAE listed corporate performance
3.5.5 Hypothesis of Internal Controls and Corporate Performance
The fifth hypothesis measures the impact of internal controls on
corporate performance. Using data from the corporate governance reports
and the interviews, the hypothesis was assessed both qualitatively and
quantitatively. It is generally assumed that the credibility of a firm’s
disclosure is enhanced when there are measurable policies and procedures
in place led by an independent department/function, the internal control
department or an officer that reports directly to the board. With the passage
of the corporate governance rules 2016, listed firms must include a
statement about the quality of their internal control system in the corporate
governance report. In accordance with the agency theory, a solid internal
control system mitigates the agency problem and can enhance corporate
performance (Teru et al., 2017; Alabdullah, 2021). This dissertation
considers the internal control system as presented in the listed companies’
corporate governance reports. Based on the relevant studies discussed in this
study, the fifth hypothesis is formulated as follows:
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H5: Solid internal controls through detailed regulations and
procedures for internal control have a positive impact on the UAE listed
corporate performance
3.5.6 Hypothesis of Compliance and Corporate Performance
The sixth hypothesis will be tested and interpreted pursuant to the
stakeholder theory. The stakeholder theory suggests that companies act
taking into consideration the needs of all stakeholders. Pursuant to the latest
OECD report in the MENA region (2019), corporate governance improves
interactions amongst management, with the board, the company’s
shareholders and other stakeholders. Literature exists that supports that
compliance has a positive impact on corporate performance, yet the same
researchers also find that high levels of compliance can have a negative
impact (Tariq & Abbas, 2013). Padgett and Shabbir (2005) argue that
compliance with the law is more than a box-ticking exercise but makes a
real change to the governance of listed companies for which investors are
willing to pay a premium. Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) propose that firms
consider the interests of stakeholders regardless of whether it has an impact
on corporate performance. Based on the relevant studies discussed in this
study, the so sixth hypothesis is formulated as follows:
H6: Compliance has a positive impact on corporate performance
3.5.7 Hypothesis of Sectors and Corporate Performance
There are differences in compliance with corporate governance
rules amongst industry sectors in the UAE listed companies. The corporate
governance reports are used for this analysis. This dissertation investigates
whether differences in compliance amongst sectors exist based certain
governance mechanisms selected in Model 2. The literature reviewed
suggests that differences exist in how different sectors react to corporate
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governance reforms (Palaniappan & Rao, 2015; Mansur & Tangl, 2018;
Goel, 2018). In this dissertation, the 51 selected companies are coded in
accordance with their respective sector.
H7: There are differences in compliance amongst industry sectors in
the UAE based on the corporate governance reports.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter presented the main theories applicable to this
dissertation. The theoretical and conceptual framework consists of the
corporate governance principles, the corporate governance mechanisms, the
agency theory and the stakeholder theory and their impact on corporate
performance. This chapter also presented the hypotheses development and
the research gap.
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the research methodology utilized in this
dissertation and its contribution to the dissertation’s objectives. This chapter
discusses the research methodology used to test the study hypotheses. Both
quantitative and qualitative research methods have been used to analyse the
variables in the hypotheses of the dissertation. The chapter is set up as
follows. Section 4.2 identifies the research paradigm. Section 4.3 presents
the research methodology including the data collection methods utilized for
the dissertation (questionnaire, interviews and secondary data analysis).
Section 4.4 presents the conclusion.
4.2 Research Paradigm
A research paradigm is a set of common beliefs and agreements
shared amongst scientists about how the research should be understood and
assessed (Kuhn, 1962; Mingers & Brocklesby, 1997; Shah & Abdullah,
2013; Makombe, 2017). The research paradigm should be constructed
before the research design is commenced. Research paradigm is defined as
“an integrated cluster of substantive concepts, variables and problems
attached with corresponding methodological approaches and tools” (Kuhn,
1962). There are three questions that the researcher needs to ask before
beginning the actual research:
1

The ontological inquiry: What is the reality that the researcher wants
to explore and know?

2

The epistemological inquiry: What is it (the ontology) that is available
to explore and how to reach it?
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3

The methodological inquiry: What are the methods and procedures
that will make this inquiry possible?
All of the three above questions are part of the research paradigm.

The paradigm includes the methodology, approach, ontology, and
epistemology to conduct the research. In one paradigm there can be several
methodologies and the methodologies are approaches to research that help
conduct a systematic research. Positivist paradigms relate to scientific
research whereas interpretive paradigms are suitable for the qualitative
research method. The positivist paradigm focuses on an objective
description of facts and observations. The positivist research approach is
generally quantitative and deductive.
Qualitative research is the systematic inquiry into social phenomena
which assists in answering why a particular phenomenon has occurred. The
process of qualitative research is inductive in that the researcher builds
abstractions, concepts, hypotheses, and theories from details. Most
qualitative research emerges from the interpretive paradigm. In many
doctoral studies, the scientific method is the predominant approach to
research, with little attention given to qualitative approaches of social
inquiry. Morgan (2007), who is a supporter of mixed methods research,
argues that instead of focusing on the differences between qualitative and
quantitative methods, such as opposing research paradigms, it will be more
valuable to look for ties or themes that connect quantitative and qualitative
research, and look for the benefits of blending quantitative and qualitative
methods. The term conceptual framework is more commonly used in
qualitative research, while the term theoretical model usually appears as a
tool in quantitative research. Both the conceptual framework and the
theoretical model refer to the key theories, models and ideas that exist in
relation to the topic under analysis in this dissertation.
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As discussed in Chapter 2, the main theories applicable to this
research are the agency and the stakeholder theories. The agency theory is
used to analyse the corporate governance mechanisms whilst the
stakeholder theory is used to analyse the corporate governance principles.
The research paradigm provides guidance to structuring the research
questions and in turn the research questions that form the bedrock of this
dissertation. This dissertation’s research paradigm draws heavily from US
and UK studies, case law, the 2015 OECD Principles of Corporate
Governance, the 2016 corporate governance rules and previous and
subsequent corporate governance rules in the UAE.
4.3 Research Methodologies
The research methodology can be quantitative, qualitative or mixed
methods (both quantitative and qualitative) and within each of these
methodologies there are several research techniques. For the purpose of this
dissertation and investigation of the research questions, a mixed-methods
methodology is most suitable to provide an in-depth analysis founded on
scientific principles. Alkuwaiti (2019) relied solely on secondary analysis
for her dissertation. Alagha (2016) and Otman (2014) both conducted
questionnaires. After reviewing the secondary sources and results of
previous questionnaires, there is a research gap, especially when dealing
with the new legislation and theoretical developments in the field of
corporate governance. Alagha and Otman relied on the 2009 Code which
was at a time when corporate governance was still in its infancy in the UAE.
Alkuwaiti relies on the 2016 corporate governance rules, but she did not
filter out the banks, financial institutions, and insurance companies which
were outside the remit of the 2016 corporate governance rules. Therefore,
her findings benefit from being further investigated and refined as the
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sample was not adjusted to the requirements of the 2016 corporate
governance rules.
Triangulation refers to the use of multiple research methods to
develop a comprehensive understanding of the phenomena (Jogulu &
Pansiri, 2011). Jogulu and Pansiri indicate that triangulation is a research
strategy that can enhance the validity and credibility of the findings. Mixed
methods research has a number of advantages. Combining qualitative with
quantitative research means the study will benefit from detailed,
contextualized insights offered by the qualitative data and the generalizable,
externally valid results offered by the quantitative data.
According to Rossman and Wilson (1985), mixed methods research
has four distinct purposes: corroboration, elaboration, development, and
initiation. Corroboration refers to the classical triangulation where different
methods are used to test the results for consistency. Elaboration refers to
enrichment of the study’s findings thus offering perspectives which would
not be achieved if only one research method was used. Development refers
to the corroboration of the results generated by one method which are then
validated or corroborated by the other research method. Initiation suggests
that results obtained from one research method can unveil a paradox or
contradiction leading to novel ideas. By employing the qualitative and
quantitative methods, this dissertation yields greater richness in data and
findings were compared through different instruments (quantitative and
qualitative) which enabled cross check results. Further, statistical results
were further tested qualitatively with descriptions and explanations that
were obtained from the interviewees. As a result, the researcher could make
inferences confidently (Jogulu & Pansiri, 2011). Initially, as part of the
quantitative research, validity and reliability were tested under a positivist
research paradigm to ensure the objectivity of the quantitative analysis.
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This research uses quantitative and qualitative methods of data
gathering. The quantitative research method applies to the questionnaire and
secondary data collection and the qualitative research method applies to the
interviews. Quantitative research emphasizes “the measurement and
analysis of causal relationships between variables” (Denzin & Lincoln,
1995). The quantitative approach develops research reliability by
objectivity. In line with the objectives of this dissertation, a positivist
deductive approach is applied to the questionnaire and secondary data
analysis in the two quantitative models under analysis.
The quantitative research findings can be confirming explanatory,
and predictive. The questionnaire technique follows a deductive approach
(Neuman, 1996). This dissertation adopts the quantitative method to analyse
financial panel data (longitudinal) and the primary data collected from the
questionnaire. Sample selection criteria is limited to companies listed on
either DFM or ADX from 2017 to 2020. The reliability and validity of the
data is ensured by using the appropriate statistical tests.
4.3.1 Questionnaire (Quantitative)
The questionnaire was used to collect input in relation to the OECD
corporate governance principles as applied in the UAE and supplemented
by relevant questions drawing from the corporate governance rules. A
number of studies conducted on corporate governance employ a
questionnaire (Otman, 2014; Alagha, 2016). The structured questionnaire
employs a five-point Likert scale. In total, there were 134 companies listed
on DFM and ADX during the research period. Insurance, banks and
financial companies amount to 70 listed institutions. After subtracting the
70 banks, iinsurance, and financial companies and companies with
incomplete data 51 target companies remain which form the population of
this dissertation. All target companies received the questionnaire, either to
77

their Investor Relations officer (mandatory function for listed companies)
for forwarding to an executive or directly to the executives. The respondents
include executives, board members, investment officers, lawyers and
accountants. This respondent group is similar to sample groups that
participated in prior research on corporate governance (Otman, 2014;
Alagha, 2016).
4.3.2 Questionnaire Instrument Design
The questionnaire was developed based on pre-existing survey
instruments in corporate governance that have tested corporate governance
standards with high reliability and validity (Otman, 2014). The
questionnaire was updated to align with the 2016 corporate governance rules
in relation to insider trading, auditor rotation and sector experience of
directors. The questionnaire was then divided into five sections with ninety
questions in total covering: a) concepts of corporate governance; b) OECD
Principles of Corporate Governance; c) obstacles to implementation; d)
enablers of corporate governance practice in the UAE; and e) demographic
information of participants. Each corporate governance principle measured
has several indicators: Principle 1 The Concept of Corporate Governance:
(3 indicators); Principle 2 Right of Shareholders: (11 indicators); Principle
3 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: (6 indicators); Principle 4 Role of
Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: (7 indicators); Principle 5
Disclosure and Transparency: (13 indicators); Principle 6 Responsibility of
the Board of Directors: (16 indicators); Principle 7 Obstacles that affect
corporate governance: (15 indicators); Enablers of corporate governance:
(19 indicators).
The questionnaire reflects the legislative updates to the corporate
governance principles in the UAE and utilises a five-point Likert scale
(‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neutral’, ‘agree’, ‘strongly agree’) and does
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not contain open-ended questions. In constructing a questionnaire, open and
closed format questions can be used. Whether open or closed ended
questions are appropriate, depends on various factors: purpose of the
questionnaire, data analysis tools, proposed format for communicating
findings. As this dissertation pursues mixed-methods research, and to ensure
scientifically reliable results, the questionnaire was structured with closedended questions, with each question requiring a rating from 1-5 as set out
above.
Results will be presented in Chapter 5 principle by principle. The
more indicators used to measure a principle, the stronger is the scale (Pelz,
2020). Descriptive statistics is an appropriate technique for questionnaires.
The normality of the data population also needs to be tested so that
appropriate statistical methods can be used.
4.3.3 Questionnaire Pilot Study
The questionnaire was cross reviewed by the Advisor and the CoAdvisor to ensure it was comprehensive, up-to-date, and clear. Based on
their feedback, the questionnaire was revised. The researcher conducted the
pilot questionnaire gathering data from 34 respondents from the same target
population that completed the final questionnaire and evaluated the data
statistically to confirm the survey’s reliability and validity. In research there
are four types of validity that need to be supported. Construct validity refers
to whether the questionnaire measures the concept that it is intended to
measure. Content validity attests whether the questionnaire is representative
of what it aims to measure. Face validity assesses whether the content of the
questionnaire is suitable for tis aims and criterion validity assesses whether
the results accurately measure the outcome they are designed to measure.
The questions used in the questionnaire are succinct and to the point. The
results obtained by the pilot study indicated that the questionnaire
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instrument is valid. The pilot study questionnaire was submitted from the
university email with a cover letter explaining the research objectives. The
cover letter explained that all results would be treated confidentially and that
participation in the study would be voluntary and unpaid. The pilot study
process took place from May to July 2020.
4.3.4 Construction of Corporate Governance Index
In order to measure the quality of corporate governance for the
firms, the researcher constructed a Corporate Governance Index based on
both internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance. The index
encompasses the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (the
“OECD Principles”). The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (“OECD”) is an intergovernmental economic organisation
with thirty-eight member countries, founded in 1961 to stimulate economic
progress and world trade. The OECD Principles help policy makers evaluate
and improve the legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for corporate
governance. The OECD Principles were first published in 1999 and have
since become an international benchmark. In 2015, the updated Principles
were endorsed by the OECD Council and the G20 Leaders Summit. The six
OECD Principles are:
1) Ensuring the basis of an effective corporate governance framework
2) The rights of shareholders and key ownership functions
3) The equitable treatment of shareholders
4) The role of stakeholders in corporate governance
5) Disclosure and transparency
6) The responsibilities of the board
The questionnaire was structured in line with the OECD Principles
for Corporate Governance (2015) (presented in detail in the previous
chapter), covering the following:
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1) The concepts of Corporate Governance: (3 indicators);
2) Right of Shareholders: (11 indicators);
3) Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: (6 indicators);
4) Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: (7 indicators);
5) Disclosure and Transparency: (13 indicators);
6) The Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: (16 indicators);
7) Obstacles that affect corporate governance: (15 indicators);
8) Enablers of corporate governance: (19 indicators).

Under each section, closed ended questions were used as this is the
most appropriate question format for Likert scale questionnaires (TaylorPowell, 1998). The OECD Principles are widely used in scientific corporate
governance research (Otman, 2014; Alagha, 2016). The questionnaire in this
study (Appendix A) builds on previous research and uses additional
indicators taken from the 2016 corporate governance rules to allow for a
more granular view of how the corporate governance framework is
perceived in the UAE. The 90 questions were coded 1 to 5 depending on
respondents’ perceptions to what extent they agree or disagree with a
statement. The sub-indices were created by computing the total items in
each sub-index for each participant. Finally, the mean of the respondents’
answers for each company was determined. The index includes respondents’
input in relation to all sub-indices. The CGI was computed using the formula
below as previously tested by Otman (2014):
CGI = (rights of shareholders + equal treatment of shareholders +
role of the stakeholder + disclosure and transparency + responsibilities of
the board).
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4.3.5 Reliability Testing and Statistical Technique
Cronbach’s alpha is a common test score reliability value which
measures internal consistency and assesses how closely related a set of items
are as a group (Taber, 2018). Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0 to 1 and the
larger the reliability coefficient, the more repeatable or reliable are the test
scores. Durham et al. (2017) suggest taking 0.670 as the minimum
acceptable alpha value although some studies recommend to not use
Cronbach’s alpha unconditionally (Sijtsma, 2009). This dissertation uses
Cronbach’s alpha to measure the reliability of the responses to the
questionnaire. Reliability tests were carried out for: Principle 1 The Concept
of Corporate Governance: (3 indicators); Principle 2 Right of Shareholders:
(11 indicators); Principle 3 Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: (6
indicators); Principle 4 Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: (7
indicators); Principle 5 Disclosure and Transparency: (13 indicators);
Principle 6 Responsibility of the Board of Directors: (16 indicators);
Principle 7 Obstacles that affect corporate governance: (15 indicators);
Enablers of corporate governance: (19 indicators). The main statistical
technique to be applied for the first model is descriptive statistics.
There are two types of statistical techniques: parametric and nonparametric. Parametric statistics are used with continuous, interval data that
shows equality of intervals or differences. Non-parametric methods are
applied to ordinal data such as Likert scale data involving higher or lower
ranking data such as a scale from 1-5. Non-parametric statistics is based on
either being distribution-free or having a specified distribution but with the
distribution parameters unspecified. In the first model, corporate
governance principles from the questionnaire are used as independent
variables and corporate performance is the dependent variable. The BoxCox transformation process (Box & Cox, 1964) is designed to determine an
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optimal transformation of Y with the aim to satisfy the assumptions of the
linear regression model. Often, an appropriate transformation of Y both
stabilizes the variance and makes the deviations around the model more
normally distributed. The basic assumption of Box-Cox is data must be
positive with no negative values. In the second model, corporate governance
mechanisms (board member experience, gender, insider trading, auditor
rotation) are independent variables, while corporate performance is a
dependent variable. By including dummy variables in a regression model,
the researcher needs to be cautious of the dummy variable trap. The dummy
variable trap is a scenario in which the independent variables are
multicollinear, which means two or more variables are highly correlated.
The degree of linear association between two variables ranges from +1 to 1, where a correlation of ±1 means that there is a linear relationship between
the variables (Maxwell et al., 2004).
A linear mixed-effects model was applied to Model 2. In the
literature, linear mixed-effects models are also described as multilevel
models (Goldstein, 2010) or hierarchical linear models (Raudenbush, 2009).
Linear mixed-effects models play an important role in statistical analysis
and offer many advantages over more traditional analyses, such as standard
linear models. Linear mixed-effects models allow between groups factors as
well as a within groups subjects (repeated measures) and are an extension
of the multiple regression (Maxwell et al., 2004). Linear mixed-effects
models make several assumptions, in particular about the distribution of
residual and random effects (Schielzeth et al., 2020). However, violations
of these assumptions are common in real datasets, and it is not always clear
to what extent these violations matter to accurate and unbiased estimations.
Schielzeth et al. (2020) evaluate the effects of skewed and heteroscedastic
residual variances and find that linear mixed effect models are usually robust
to the violation of assumptions. Skrondal (2000) and LeBeau et al. (2018)
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use Monte Carlo simulation to explore the relationship between assumption
violations and model performance. Monte Carlo simulation, also known as
Monte Carlo method, is a computational algorithm that predicts the
probability of different outcomes when the intervention of random variables
is present. The exploratory data analyses with simulations confirmed the
overall robustness of the linear mixed-effects model. Recent research
suggests that Gaussian models are remarkably robust to non-normality over
a wide range of conditions, meaning that P-values remain fairly reliable
except for data with influential outliers (Knief & Forstmeier, 2020). In
scientific literature, linear models are typically said to be robust to the
violation of the normality assumption when it comes to hypothesis testing
and parameter estimation as long as outliers are handled properly (Warton
et al., 2016), yet authors seem to differ notably in their interpretation on how
serious we should take the issue of non-normality. Based on the literature,
this dissertation argues that violating the normality assumption in linearmixed models bears risks that are limited and manageable. A P-value of less
than 0.05 is statistically significant. It indicates strong evidence against the
null hypothesis, as there is less than five percent probability the null is
correct. Regression coefficients signify whether there is a positive or
negative correlation between each independent variable and the dependent
variable. The application of the mixed effects model is appropriate for the
data and produces statistically significant results. The model includes both
fixed effects which are model components used to define systematic
relationships such as changes over time from 2017 to 2020.
4.3.6 Ethical Considerations
There are ethical considerations for all research projects regardless
of the methodologies used and ethical issues need to be considered during
all phases of the study (Saunders et al., 2012). Particularly, in studies that
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involve primary data collection, there are ethical issues which the researcher
will need to address. This dissertation abides by the rules and guidelines
outlined in the UAEU’s DBA Policy on Ethics.
In studies involving primary collection of data, for example by way
of questionnaire or interview, voluntary participation of respondents in the
research is important. Moreover, participants have the right to withdraw
from the study at any stage if they wish to do so. Respondents should
participate on the basis of informed consent. The principle of informed
consent involves the researcher providing sufficient information and
assurance about taking part so that respondents understand the implications
of participation and to reach a fully informed, considered and freely given
decision about whether or not to do so, without the exercise of any pressure
or coercion. Both the questionnaire and the semi-structured interview
obtained consent from the UAEU’s Ethics Office in April 2020. The
questionnaire was completed by email and online using the UAEU’s online
platform. Strict confidentiality of the participants was maintained as
participants were not asked to disclose their names or personal data. The
participating organizations’ names were also not disclosed nor requested in
the questionnaire or the semi-structured interview. Since the semi structured
interviews were held in a live environment, additional ethical considerations
are applicable as set out below.
Ethical approval for the semi-structured interviews was obtained in
April 2020 upon obtaining feedback regarding the content of the semistructured interview questions from the advisor and the co-advisor, who
confirmed that the content of the interview questions was appropriate and
conducive to answering the research questions under investigation (Willett,
2014).
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4.3.7 Further Ethical Considerations Applicable to Interviews
Ethical considerations of interview design involve obtaining the
subjects’ informed consent to participate in the study, securing
confidentiality, and considering the possible consequences of the study for
the subjects. The researcher also needs to ensure that there is no bias and no
prompting of responses. With any direct gathering of data such as during an
interview, the researcher needs to avoid embarrassment, stress, discomfort,
pain or harm and maintain an objective and impartial lense at all times
(Cowles, 1988).
All interviewees received adequate information about the purpose
of the research study in the form of an official letter and transcript of the
semi-structured questions (Appendix B). The researcher also obtained
interviewees’ verbal consent during the interviews so that interviewees
could reconsider their participation. The data collected was electronically
stored in password-protected files on the researcher’s computer and
respondents were assured that their data would be destroyed after the
research is completed. As illustrated above, the researcher complied with
the additional requirements of live data collection at all times.
This dissertation also uses secondary data extracted from annual
reports, corporate governance reports and stock market data. The corporate
governance reports contain personal data of company executives and board
members, as well as salary details and share ownership details. In
connection with these sources, any type of misleading information, as well
as representation of primary data findings in a biased way must be avoided.
Ethical considerations in business research mean “a code of conduct
or expected societal norm of behavior while conducting research” (Sekaran,
2006). Another ethical consideration on relationships between researchers
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and participants stems from the notion that interaction between researchers
and participants is vital to unearthing “subjugated knowledge”, the lived
experiences of research participants and the meanings they ascribe to those
experiences (Hesse-Biber & Johnson, 2015). Mixed methods designs with
qualitative components can provide balance (Chiu et al., 2013).
4.3.8 Qualitative Research: Semi-Scripted Interviews
There is an increasing body of work outside of the UAE that
recognizes the epistemological foundations of qualitative research and
demonstrates how qualitative research can contribute to the richness of the
research and contribute to its credibility (Patnaik, 2013). Interviews can test
theories, generate theories and provide explanations to gaps identified in the
quantitative research. As is the case with quantitative research, qualitative
research needs to ensure a high quality of data collection, including validity
and reliability of the data. Interviews were transcribed, coded, categorized,
analyzed, and themes were examined and coded in NVIVO12. NVIVO12
helped with the in-depth analysis, collection of emerging themes, and
comparison of perspectives in alignment with the literature and the applied
theories.
The research interview, one of the most important qualitative data
collection methods, has been widely used in conducting field studies and
ethnographic research (Palinkas et al., 2015). Qualitative research focuses
on analyzing texts collected in interview formats from individual
participants. This dissertation uses the qualitative approach to evaluate the
interviews the researcher conducted to obtain a real understanding whether
the corporate governance reforms in the UAE were successful. The
qualitative results will assist in explaining the quantitative results further,
particularly in instances where there is a perceived contradiction in results
or where the quantitative analysis is inconclusive. Qualitative research goes
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beyond the numbers and investigates opinions and thought processes in
depth. The research aim of research question #1 of this dissertation, “How
is corporate governance understood by stakeholders in the UAE?” also
needs to be analyzed qualitatively. Further, qualitative research elucidates
why stakeholders and research respondents take a certain position or action.
Previous research on this topic analyzed and measured the corporate
governance mechanisms and principles quantitatively, leaving a research
gap for future research to adopt qualitative methods. According to the
literature, in order to select interviewees, the following strategies apply
purposive sampling and probability sampling. Purposive sampling is known
as selective or subjective sampling during which the researcher relies on his
or her own judgment when choosing members of the population to
participate in the study. Probability sampling is the random selection of
respondents. For the interviews, interviewees needed to be selected based
on certain characteristics and in line with the study. They also needed to
have completed the questionnaire as a gate-keeping criteria to ensure they
belonged to the same group of respondents (population) qualified to take
part in the study. Therefore, the purposive sampling technique was adopted
for the qualitative part of this research.
While there is a large and growing literature on methods for
qualitative research, one area that remains underdeveloped is sample size
estimation (Hagaman & Wutich, 2017). Calculating the adequacy of
probabilistic sample sizes is generally straightforward and can be estimated
mathematically, even in qualitative research (Galvin, 2015). However, there
are many challenges to determining the appropriate size needed for
purposeful samples used often in qualitative research. Guest et al. (2006)
focus on reaching study-wide saturation (i.e., reaching the point at which no
new themes emerge). Guidelines for determining non-probabilistic sample
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sizes are virtually non-existent. Purposive samples are the most commonly
used form of non-probabilistic sampling, and their size typically relies on
the concept of “saturation”, or the point at which no new information or
themes are observed in the data (Guest et al., 2006). As the researcher is
interested in obtaining in-depth information purposive sampling is the most
appropriate technique for identifying high quality interviewees. Cohen et al.
(2013) conducted interviews with 22 experienced directors from U.S. firms
about the effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in promoting high-quality
financial reporting and good corporate governance. Cohen indicates that the
quality of the responses is saturated.
The primary value of the qualitative analysis of this dissertation is
to provide (1) a cross-check of my method against the results obtained from
the quantitative analysis and (2) richer data that provides answers to some
of the questions conjured up by the quantitative research.
4.3.9 Semi-scripted Interviews: Sample Size and Data Collection
The qualitative data has been obtained from semi-structured
interviews. The participants were from the same population that participated
in the questionnaire and principally CEOs and C-Suite executives from
listed corporations in the UAE; auditing and consulting firms based in the
UAE, as well as investors in UAE stock. Other participants included experts
in corporate law and corporate governance. Following Carlsen and
Glenton’s (2011) guidelines, and in line with the qualitative literature on
corporate governance reviewed, the researcher planned in advance the
number of interviews, due to time and resource constrains. Twenty-two
interviews were conducted for this dissertation. This is an appropriate and
common sample size for qualitative research for the subject matter and data
saturation was reached as the researcher collected overlapping answers as
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confirmed by the literature reviewed (Van Rijnsoever, 2017; Roy et al.,
2015).
Interviews fall into three categories: unstructured, semi-structured,
and structured. The unstructured interview is a data collection method that
relies on asking interviewees questions with no set pattern or arrangement.
Semi-structured interviews are based on a list of themes and questions that
the interviewer covers. Structured interviews are standardized and
systematic. The same predetermined questions are presented to all
candidates.
The semi-structured in-depth interviews explore issues identified as
relevant during and after conducting the pilot study questionnaire and gather
vital primary data that corresponds to this dissertation’s objectives and helps
answer the dissertation’s research questions. Usually, personal contact and
face-to-face interviews would be important for qualitative research as
interviewees may benefit from building up a more personal rapport which
increases their confidence and trust in the interviewer. As a result of the
Covid-19 pandemic all interviews were conducted remotely using Microsoft
Teams, Skype or the telephone.
4.3.10 Targeting Interviewees
The next step was to contact target respondents. Formal cover
letters were sent by email to respondents of the questionnaire requesting
them to participate in an interview with semi-scripted questions on the topic.
The letter introduced the researcher and the research project, outlined
potential benefits of the research, and assured recipients that confidentiality
would be safeguarded at all times. If there was no response within two
weeks’, the researcher would follow up by email. In total, twenty-two
participants completed interviews.
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Finding the “right person” for an interview is of key importance in
qualitative research as it has a direct impact on the data quality obtained.
Interviewees need to have the requisite experience and be able to share it
freely. For high profile interviewees, it is important for the interviewer to be
familiar with the background and profile of each participant. Prior to each
interview, the researcher familiarized herself with the listed company and
profile or biography of the interviewee. This assisted in building a rapport
from the start of each interview. Respondents were assured that there were
no right or wrong answers. The researcher also sought individual permission
to record the interview.
Notes were taken by the researcher during each interview,
regardless of whether it was recorded or not. For non-recorded interviews,
notes were the main source for data analysis; while for interviews that were
allowed to be recorded, taking notes was also a useful way to capture the
main points. Further, the perceptions of the interviewees and the manner in
which they process and interpret information could potentially be influenced
by the multiple accountabilities each participant has, such as being
accountable to the board as well as being accountable to the legislation in
their own business experiences. The overall objective of the dissertation is
to gain insight into directors’ and executives’ perceptions of the
effectiveness of corporate governance with respect to enhancing corporate
performance. The criterion for assessing effectiveness is that the legislation
has achieved what it intends. The researcher took notes of salient features
during the interview in addition to the recording. For interview that could
not be recorded, the notes were key for the data analysis. All notes were
saved in Microsoft word in a password locked file prior to being transferred
into NVIVO12.
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4.3.11 Interviewer’s Knowledge and Credibility
For qualitative data research, the researcher’s knowledge and
credibility are particularly important (Patnaik, 2013). This is especially
important in the context of interviews, as the interviewer must have highly
technical and interpersonal skills. For this dissertation, the researcher is a
corporate lawyer and with more than fifteen years’ experience in regulatory
and compliance matters in the UAE, the US and the UK. The researcher’s
credibility from the interviewees’ perspective is strengthened by the
researcher’s academic knowledge on the topic (Patnaik, 2013).
4.3.12 Validity and Reliability
For qualitative data research, the researcher’s knowledge and
credibility Validity exists when the findings reflect and represent the reality
(Saunders et al., 2012). Maxwell distinguishes amongst five types of
validity in qualitative research: descriptive validity, interpretive validity,
theoretical validity, generalizability and evaluative validity (Maxwell,
1992). Maxwell adopts a realist approach to validity based on the kinds of
understanding at which qualitative research aims. Maxwell’s understanding
of validity can be aligned with Patnaik’s in that validity is relative to and
dependent on the method of inquiry chosen by the researcher. Descriptive
validity can pertain to statistically descriptive aspects of accounts, such as a
claim that a certain phenomenon was frequent, typical or rare. The data must
accurately reflect what the participant has stated. Descriptive validity
therefore forms the base on which all other forms of validity are built on.
According to Maxwell (1992), interpretive validity captures how well the
researcher reports the participants’ understanding of the questions asked.
Interpretive validity is a matter of inference from the words and actions of
the participants. Theoretical validity addresses the theoretical constructions
that the researcher develops during the study. Theoretical validity in
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qualitative research evaluates the validity of the researcher’s concepts and
the theorized relationships among those concepts. Generalizability refers to
the ability to apply the theories resulting from the research universally
(Maxwell, 1992). This is problematic in qualitative research as
generalizability often contradicts with interpretive validity. Qualitative
research studies a select group, so the results from qualitative research may
only be applicable to a similar group. Evaluative validity distances itself
from the data and tries to assess the evaluation by the researcher himself or
herself. In the context of this dissertation evaluative validity is particularly
important as the qualitative research helps to plug gaps left by the
quantitative research.
For reliability to be established in quantitative research, the
measurement needs to be consistent. Reliability is different from validity. If
different observers or methods produce descriptively different data or
accounts of the same events or situation, this puts into question the reliability
of the data. Data can be considered reliable if different observers or methods
achieve the same results qualitatively. In qualitative studies, reliability
depends on the stability of responses to a dataset but also on a philosophical
assumption that the data presented is accurate and true (Guest et al., 2006).
It is acknowledged that human behaviour is never static. As a result,
qualitative studies can rarely be replicated. Avoiding observer bias, observer
error, and participant error are crucial to ensure reliable qualitative results.
4.3.13 The Process of Conducting Semi-Structured Interviews
Data collection of twenty-two interviews occurred from May 2020
to March 2021. Selected interviewees were provided a cover letter and a
printout of the semi-structed interview questions in advance (Appendix B).
Interviewees were also assured that all answers would be treated
confidentially and that they could terminate the interview at any time.
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Further, they were informed that the data would be used anonymously and
that neither the interviewee nor his or her organization would be identified
as part of the study. Both skype and Microsoft teams have recording
features, and ahead of the interview, interviewees were given the option to
conduct a recorded interview. For recorded interviews, the interviewee was
again assured that recording could be stopped at any time. Following the
initial demographic questions, the interviewees were guided by the
interview protocol. When, during the interview, follow-up questions arose,
the researcher provided further explanations and follow-up questions to
probe further. For this reason, the length of the interviews varied, ranging
from 45- 90 minutes approximately. Every interview was transcribed within
24 hours (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006) allowing the documentation of
relevant comments.
4.3.14 NVIVO 12
This dissertation utilized Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data
Analysis Software (CAQDAS) to analyze the qualitative data. The selected
CAQDAS is NVIVO12, the predecessor of which was taught during the
DBA Program. In order to familiarize herself with NVIVO12, the researcher
took an additional training course. The searching and coding tools of
NVIVO12 allow detailed data interrogation. All transcribed interviews were
directly imported to NVIVO12. The searching tools of NVIVO12 allow
“auto coding”. The analysis obtained with this software allows to validate
or reject some of the results obtained from the quantitative analysis. The
introduction to NVIVO12 states that a node is a specific theme, place,
person or area of interest. Nodes can be coded manually or automatically by
coding sources such as interviews. The nodes then provide the storage areas
(tree nodes or node matrices) for themes and subthemes. NVIVO12
facilitated the analysis and provided a clear audit trail enhancing confidence
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in the results. Nodes were first gathered automatically and then renamed and
merged into a hierarchical structure to allow in depth analytical coding
based on the research questions. The final structure and scaffold of the
hierarchical layout of all nodes were generated and showed the final nodal
structure of the qualitative analysis, incorporating fifteen nodes as set out in
Table 4.1 below:

Table 4.1: NVIVO12 Coding
Node Names

Files

References

1.

Audit

10

42

2.

Board

13

61

3.

Business

14

23

4.

Capitalism

9

26

5.

Change

8

26

6.

Compensation

11

22

7.

Compliance

9

27

8.

Control

13

51

9.

Governance

14

54

10.

Information

14

68

11.

Internal control

9

29

12.

Law

13

29

13.

Protection

13

24

14.

Results

15

23

15.

Returns

6

42

NVIVO12 contributed to the validity of the results by ensuring that
results were probed. The qualitative research needs to be based on selective
inquiries to ensure the data is thoroughly interrogated. The researcher found
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that NVIVO12 helped identify key issues underlying the research and
assisted in achieving an in-depth analysis.
4.3.15 Pilot Interviews
Prior to conducting the interviews, the researcher conducted three
pilot interviews to confirm the suitability of the interview questions (Reiter,
2011). The sample of the pilot study should represent 10% of the overall
sample size (Johanson & Brooks, 2010). Taking into consideration that the
researcher conducted twenty-two interviews, three pilot interviews were
deemed appropriate. The pilot study revealed that each interview would be
about 60 minutes, which was longer than expected. Interviewees also
referred to the 2020 corporate governance rules occasionally as they came
into effect in April 2020, albeit with a grace period until 31 December 2020.
The results of the pilot study confirmed that the target group (population)
was suitable to answer all questions with an appropriate level of depth and
first-hand experience. Moreover, the semi-structured approach helped
collect the most appropriate and relevant aspects under inquiry.
4.3.16 Interview Questions
The mechanisms of corporate governance (gender representation,
occupational experience, auditor rotation, compliance, internal control) are
investigated using open-ended questions.
The interview questions are semi-structured to allow the interviewer
to follow up and probe the respondents’ answers. The researcher, through
her experience as a practicing lawyer in the field of corporate governance in
the UAE, acquired an in-depth understanding of the theoretical and legal
background of the topic. During interviews, the researcher was also flexible
with timing which led to interviews being between forty-five to ninety
minutes long. The interview questions aim to reveal the respondents’
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perspectives on the impact of corporate governance principles and
mechanisms on corporate performance. The aim of posing analyzing the
research questions and hypotheses twofold is to be able to correlate the
respondents’ perspectives as well as the data analysis qualitatively and
quantitatively.
4.3.17 Interview Profiles
Twenty-two interviews were conducted. All interviews were oneto-one interviews. The interviews lasted from forty-five minutes to one-hour
and twenty minutes. COVID-19 prevented conducting face-to-face
interviews. Ten interviews were carried out by telephone, and all other
interviews were conducted using Microsoft Teams or Skype. Subject to
permission from the interviewees, eighteen interviews were recorded and
transcribed for analysis with NVIVO12. Appendix C provides the overview
of the interviewees. Nine of the twenty-two interview participants were
CEOs, six were lawyers, four investment officers, two executives and one a
board member of the UAE listed companies. All of the CEOs had audit
committee experience. The interviewees had between 5 to 20+ years’
professional experience as a director or in an executive capacity with
average experience of approximately 15 years. The companies represented
many sectors of the economy including Services, Real Estate, Construction
and Energy. The interview sample reflects a highly experienced, diverse
group of executives with significant corporate governance experience
before and after the 2016 corporate governance reforms.
4.3.18 Template Analysis for Qualitative Results
Template analysis is an approach that involves applying a template
(categories) based on prior research and theoretical perspectives. Template
analysis is well suited to NVIVO12 precisely because this method offers in-
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depth data analysis to examine and interpret the data and data nodes
identified with NVIVO12.
4.3.19 Secondary Data Collection and Measurement
Secondary data is an essential method of data collection, especially
in the field of corporate governance which is rule and theory based.
Secondary data measures the following four corporate governance
mechanisms: Board member experience, gender, insider trading, auditor
rotation, ROE, ROA, and Tobin’s Q. For the purpose of this dissertation,
data was collected from 2017 to 2020. This is an important time period as it
is a post-reform period following the implementation of the 2016 corporate
governance rules and the 2015 Companies Law. The sample size of the
dissertation consists of 51 listed companies out of overall 132 listed
companies. After excluding banks, insurance, financial companies, foreign
companies and companies with incomplete data, 51 companies remain.
Companies for which no data was available, such as missing corporate
governance reports, were excluded from the dissertation. The corporate
governance principles in Model 1 are evaluated by the questionnaire where
respondents rate each of the principles on a Likert scale from 1-5 (1 meaning
“not at all agree” and 5 meaning “strongly agree”). The data to evaluate the
corporate governance mechanisms in Model 2 is obtained from the listed
companies corporate governance reports from 2017 to 2020.
4.3.20 Secondary Data Statistical Analysis
The statistical software package SPSS version 28 is used for the
statistical analyses. In addition, linear mixed effects models are performed
with the help of the statistical software package STATA 17. Linear mixed
effects models are an extension of simple linear models to allow for both
fixed and random effects. Data can be analyzed at multiple levels, either
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within a group, such as companies in one sector or among groups,
comparing sectors or performance per year. Minitab statistical software is
used for the Box-Cox power transformations in both models. When working
with non-parametric data, Minitab selects the best mathematical function for
this data transformation and the Box-Cox transformation is a scientifically
recognized option to transform residual data into normality.
4.4 Conclusion
This chapter sets out the research paradigm and the research
methodology. The adopted methodology was justified by the positivist
research paradigm. Although positivism was traditionally considered to be
chiefly associated with quantitative methods, the positivist paradigm is also
applicable to qualitative research conducted as part of mixed-methods
research (Kuhn, 1962). A deductive approach to make predictions and
analysis based on previously established theories was applied for this
dissertation. In line with the theory presented, this dissertation adopts a
mixed methods research (survey, interviews and secondary data analysis).
The qualitative and quantitative data collection process and software
packages used are set out in this chapter. The chapter also emphasizes the
importance to comply with applicable ethical guidelines.
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis
5.1 Introduction
This chapter uses data from the questionnaire, audited financial
statements and the Corporate Governance Reports of the UAE listed
companies. Data in relation to board members’ qualifications and legal
insider trading was obtained from the Corporate Governance Reports. The
hypotheses are tested with two research models. The first model has been
developed using data from the questionnaire. The second model analyzes
the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms (insider trading,
gender, auditor rotation, board member expertise) and corporate
performance.
Section 5.2 includes the descriptive data analysis of the responses
to the Questionnaire (Model 1). This is followed by multicollinearity
diagnostics for Model 1 in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 presents the regression
analysis for Model 1. Descriptive statistics of Corporate Governance
Mechanisms is presented in Sections 5.5. Section 5.6 contains the
descriptive analysis amongst sectors. This is followed by multicollinearity
diagnostics for Model 2 in Section 5.7. The Linear Mixed Effects Model
Analysis for Model 2 is presented in Section 5.8. Section 5.9 discusses the
results of the interviews (qualitative research), and Section 5.10 addresses
the hypotheses. Section 5.11 concludes.
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of the Questionnaire (Model 1)
The questionnaire was distributed using the university’s bespoke
electronic survey tool Blue Platform© by UAEU. Only executives, board
members, accountants, audit committee members, internal audit, legal
counsel or investment officers of the listed entities in the UAE could
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participate. Potential respondents were invited via email from the
researcher’s UAEU account (via the HR department or Investor Relations
Department of the listed entity). Questionnaire data was collected for the
pilot study from May to July 2020 and the main study from July 2020 to
March 2021. As mentioned for the pilot questionnaire, questionnaires were
sent to the participants. The questionnaire was sent to 155 target
participants. After several reminders, the researcher collected a total of 54
completed and valid questionnaires. The response rate was 34.8%. Table 5.1
below presents an overview of the response rate and groups of participants.

Table 5.1: Received Questionnaires and Response Rate
Groups

Received Questionnaires and Response
Rate

Executive

26

Board members

1

Accountant

1

Auditor

1

Lawyer

10

Investment officer

15

Total and overall response

54/155 = 34.8%

rate

Table 5.2 presents the highest academic qualification for the five
groups of respondents. 22.2% of respondents had completed their bachelor’s
degree. 52.0% hold a master’s degree and 14.8% had a PhD. In aggregate,
89% of respondents are holders of a bachelor’s degree or higher. Only
11.0% of respondents had a diploma or secondary school as their highest
qualification. This reflects the high level of education of the respondents.
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As illustrated in Table 5.3, 68.5% of respondents were male and 31.5% of
respondents were female. 48.1% of respondents were executives, 27.7%
were investment officers and 18.5% were lawyers as shown in Table 5.4
Table 5.5 shows that 91% of respondents had more than 11 years of
professional experience. This is testimony to the seniority of the respondents
who participated in this research.

Table 5.2: Distribution of Frequency and Percentage of Educational
Qualification of Respondents
Education

Frequency

Percentage

PhD

8

14.8

Master

28

52.0

Bachelor

12

22.2

Diploma

3

5.5

Secondary

3

5.5

Total

54

100

Table 5.3: Distribution of Frequency and Percentage of the Gender of
Respondents
Gender

Frequency

Percentage

Male

37

68.5

Female

17

31.5

Total

54

100
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Table 5.4: Job Positions
Position

Frequency

Percentage

Executive

26

48.1

Board member

1

1.9

Accountant

1

1.9

Auditor

1

1.9

Lawyer

10

18.5

Investment officer

15

27.7

Total

54

100

Table 5.5: Work Experience
Experience

Frequency

Percentage

Less than five years

3

5.5

5–10 years

2

3.5

11–15 years

13

24.0

16–20 years

28

52.0

More than 20 years

8

15.0

Total

54

100

Cronbach’s alpha measures the internal consistency between items
on a scale. Cronbach’s alpha can be used to measure the internal consistency
of a questionnaire or survey. Cronbach’s alpha ranges between 0 and 1, with
higher values indicating that the survey or questionnaire is more reliable.
For reliability testing using Cronbach’s alpha, Khanna et al. (2011)
recommend a minimum level of 0.6. Nunnally and Bernstein (1978)
recommend a minimum level of 0.7. Cronbach alpha values are dependent
on the number of items on the scale. When there are a small number of items
on the scale (fewer than 10), Cronbach alpha values can be quite small. In
this situation, it can be better to calculate and report the mean inter-item
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correlation for the items. Average inter-item correlation is a way of
analysing internal consistency reliability. The ideal range of the average
inter-item correlation is 0.15 to 0.5, if the result was less, the items would
not be well correlated and do not measure the same idea or construct. If the
value is higher than 0.5, that is a sign that the items are so close that they
are repetitive. In this case, five sub- indices have been created with the
results of the questionnaire. Internal consistency for the sub-indices is
measured with both inter item correlations as well as Cronbach’s alpha.
Inter-item correlations for the five sub- indices are set out in Table 5.6
below.

Table 5.6: Inter-Item Correlations
Corporate

Corporate Governance

Governance

Index

Inter-Item Correlation

Index No.
1

Rights of shareholders

0.272

2

Equitable treatment of

0.241

shareholders
3

Role of stakeholders in

0.253

corporate governance
4

Disclosure and transparency

0.250

5

Responsibility of board of

0.248

directors

Cronbach’s alpha was measured for each subscale of the
questionnaire which contains 90 questions in total as set out in Table 5.7
below. Reliability was tested for: The Concept of Corporate Governance: (3
indicators); Principle 1 Right of Shareholders: (11 indicators); Principle 2
Equitable Treatment of Shareholders: (6 indicators); Principle 3 Role of
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Stakeholders in Corporate Governance: (7 indicators); Principle 4
Disclosure and Transparency: (13 indicators); Principle 5 Responsibility of
the Board of Directors: (16 indicators); Obstacles that affect corporate
governance: (15 indicators); Enablers of corporate governance: (19
indicators).

Table 5.7: Cronbach’s Alpha
Reliability Analysis of the Questionnaire
No.

Statements

Number of

Coefficient Alpha

Items

Value

1

Concept of corporate governance

3

0.191

2

Rights of Shareholders

11

0.876

3

Equitable Treatment of Shareholders

6

0.838

4

Role of Stakeholders in Corporate

7

0.933

Governance
5

Disclosure and Transparency

13

0.928

6

Responsibility of the Board of

16

0.966

15

0.875

19

0.941

Directors
7

Obstacles that affect corporate
governance

8

Enablers of corporate governance

Cronbach’s alpha is consistently above 0.8 except for the concepts
of corporate governance which has a Cronbach alpha of .191 which was
expected as this item only contained three indicators which elicited different
responses from respondents which had therefore no internal consistency.
Items 2, 3, and 7 yield a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.8 which is very good and
Items 4, 5, 6 and 8 yield a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.9 which is excellent
and demonstrates high internal consistency of the questionnaire. Items 2-6
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are used to construct the corporate governance index which is used for the
regression analysis of Model 1 whilst Items 1, 7, and 8 are analysed using
descriptive statistics. The descriptive results show that for Item 1, the second
statement representing the stakeholder theory, “Corporate governance refers
to an organisation’s relationship with all its stakeholders who are affected
by or affect the organisation’s operations and decisions”, has the highest
mean (4.19), followed by the first statement representing the agency theory
(4.00), “Corporate governance refers to an organization’s relationship with
its shareholders to ensure that it acts in accordance with the interests of those
shareholders”. The third statement representing the extended stakeholder
theory, “ccorporate governance refers to an organization’s relationship with
all members of society, irrespective of whether they affect or are affected
by the organization’s operations and decisions”, has the lowest mean (3.63).
This implies that according to the respondents, the stakeholder model is the
most appropriate for the UAE. Items 7 and 8 focus on the obstacles and
enablers of corporate governance in the UAE. The questionnaire results
show that amongst the obstacles, a weak internal control system (mean of
4.09) is perceived as the highest possible obstacle to the implementation of
corporate governance, followed by a lack of board members with the right
skills (3.96) and lack of transparency in relation to insider trading (3.85) and
poor financial and non-financial disclosure (3.85). The least important
obstacle was the state of the UAE economy (2.89). Amongst the enablers,
‘Establishing a robust evaluation process of the board of directors, senior
management and committee members’ was ranked highest, with a mean
score of 4.46. The second highest ranked enabler was ‘An effective
compliance program including policies and procedures for handling
concerns related to potential violations of law has a positive effect on
corporate performance, with a mean score of 4.39. The third highest ranked
enabler was ‘Senior management and board development and succession
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planning need to be engrained in the company’s culture’ and the fourth
highest ranked enabler was ‘An effective internal control function over
financial reporting and its disclosure controls and procedures has a positive
effect on corporate performance’. The least ranked enabler was ‘ensuring
gender diversity at board level’ with a mean of 3.83.
As shown in Table 5.8, board responsibilities (RBD) with a mean
score of 4.07 and shareholders’ rights (RSH) with a mean score of 4.05
represent the highest scores compared to other principles indicating that
board responsibilities are taken seriously, and shareholders’ rights are
protected. The role of stakeholders (TRHS) follows with a mean score of
4.01 signifying that stakeholders’ interests are safeguarded. The Disclosure
and Transparency index (DT), with a mean score of 3.98 and the Equitable
Treatment of Shareholders (ETSH) with a mean of 3.89, score lowest. In
general, the average Corporate Governance Index (CGI) is 4.0 (SD = 1.019)
of the analyzed items. The standard deviations of the sub-indices are similar
(ranging from 0.97 to 1.03) which indicates approximately equal variation
in the sub-indices.
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Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Index and SubIndices
Variable

Mean

Std.

Min. Max. Skewness Kurtosis

Dev.
Rights of shareholders

4.05

1.018

1.64

5

-0.789

-0.256

Equitable treatment of

3.89

1.033

1.33

5

-0.592

-0.181

4.01

1.05

1.462

5

-1.021

0.712

3.98

0.97

1.462

5

-0.827

0.438

4.07

1.027

1.125

5

-1.134

1.016

4.0

1.0196 1.474

5

-0.8726

0.3458

shareholders
Role of stakeholders in
corporate governance
Disclosure and
transparency
Responsibilities of board
of directors
CGI

In Table 5.8, the statistics reveal that the maximum implementation
is represented by the responsibilities of the board of directors, with a score
of 4.07. In contrast, among all of the corporate governance principles, the
minimum implementation principle is equitable treatment of shareholders
with a score of 3.89. Overall, the average Corporate Governance Index
(CGI) is 4.0 which indicates a high level of compliance of the listed
companies as perceived by the respondents.
Skewness is a measure to determine the lack of symmetry. If the
skewness is between -1 and -0.5 (negatively skewed) or between 0.5 and 1
(positively skewed), the data is moderately skewed. If the skewness is less
than -1 (negatively skewed) or greater than 1 (positively skewed), the data
is highly skewed. According to George and Mallery (2019), a range between
-2 and +2 may still be a normal distribution for skewness. It is observed that
the responsibility of the board of directors represents a maximum standard
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skewness of -1.134, while the equitable treatment of shareholders sub-index
shows a minimum standard skewness of -0.592. Kurtosis measures how flat
or peaked the distribution is. According to Wan et al. (2014), the data is
considered normally distributed if the standard kurtosis statistics fall within
the range of -1 and +1. According to George and Mallery (2019), a range
between -2 and +2 may still be a normal distribution for kurtosis. In terms
of kurtosis statistics, the responsibility of the board of directors shows a
standard kurtosis of 1.016, and the shareholders’ rights shows standard
kurtosis of -0.256. The corporate governance index represents a standard
skewness of -0.8726 and kurtosis of 0.3458.
5.3 Multicollinearity in Model 1
Table 5.9 shows that the highest Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) at
8.233 and the lowest at 1.065. VIF is a measure of the amount of
multicollinearity. The lowest tolerance coefficient is 0.121. According to
the literature, there is no concern with a VIF of less than 10 (Gujarati &
Porter, 2009; Shan & McIver, 2011) and correlations of less than 0.9. Based
on the results of the VIF, there does not appear to be a multicollinearity issue
among the variables. There is one tolerance variable above 0.9, the CGIIndex 1 at 0.939 but this should not be of concern as the corresponding VIF
value for the variable is small.
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Table 5.9: Multicollinearity of Model 1
Variable

Collinearity

Statistics

(Constant)

Tolerance

VIF

CGI – Index 1

0.939

1.065

CGI – Index 2

0.289

3.457

CGI – Index 3

0.121

8.233

CGI – Index 4

0.383

2.609

CGI – Index 5

0.175

5.720

5.4 Regression Analysis of Model 1
The results of the Shapiro-Wilkes test found that the data of
Model 1 is not normally distributed (P-value < 0.001). In statistical research,
the normality assumption is met when the P-value in the Shapiro-Wilkes test
is > 0.05. Values less than 0.05 would cause the researcher to reject the null
hypothesis that the data follows a normal distribution. The scientific
literature recommends the use of transformations when data is not normally
distributed (Bishara & Hittner, 2012; Puth et al., 2014). A frequent
assumption of parametric methods is that errors are normally distributed
(Lumley et al. 2002). The “normality assumption” underlies the most
commonly used tests for statistical significance, such as techniques of
regression. The choice of the best transformation is usually not obvious,
especially with data gathered from the social sciences.
In order to analyze the impact of corporate governance as measured
by the Corporate Governance Index on corporate performance, regressions
were run with different performance measures (ROA, ROE & Tobin’s Q) as
the dependent variables and the sub-indices: shareholders’ rights index,
equal treatment of shareholders index, role of the stakeholder index,
disclosure and transparency index, and responsibilities of the board index as
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the explanatory variables along with the control variables leverage and
company size. The time period of the questionnaire and the performance
measures was 2020.
To study the appropriate transformation needed for RoE, RoA and
Tobin’s Q, the researcher uses the Box–Cox parametric power
transformation function in the Minitab statistical software. Minitab selects
the best mathematical function for this data transformation. For Tobin’s Q
(2020), Box-Cox proposed to raise Tobin’s Q by the power of -1. This fixed
the violation of the normality assumption, and the test of normality was
satisfied. Shapiro-Wilks P-value is 0.189. In the regression results for the
year 2020, the R-squared value is 0.435. and Leverage and sub-indices 4
(Disclosure and Transparency) and 5 (Responsibilities of Board of
Directors) were both significant. The F-test (4.517) for the regression is
significant (P-value < 0.001).
Regressions carried out with ROE (2020), and ROA (2020) did not
contain coefficients that were statistically significant. This is likely because
both ROA and ROE for 2020 contained a high number of negative numbers
because of the poor economic performance of the companies in 2020. As
shown in Table 5.10 for Tobin’s Q, the results show that the model has
satisfactory explanatory power regarding the relationship between the
dependent and independent variables and adequately describes the data.
This is confirmed by the results of the R-squared for Tobin’s Q which is
43.5% indicating that 43.5% of the change in Tobin’s Q is explained by
changes in the corporate governance index. The model is capable of
explaining a variability of 43.5% in the performance of the listed companies
in the UAE. The impact of index 4 (Disclosure and Transparency) is
inversely proportionate and in fact positively related to Tobin’s Q. Subindex 5 (Responsibilities of the Board of Directors) negatively affects
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Tobin’s Q and is statistically significant. When the value of sub-index 5
increases, holding all the other variables constant, Tobin’s Q decreases.

Table 5.10: Regression Coefficients of Model 1
Variable

Significance

Outcome

Size 2020

0.233

Not significant

Leverage 2020

0.006

Significant

CGI – Index 1

0.117

Not significant

CGI – Index 2

0.126

CGI – Index 3

0.112

CGI – Index 4

0.022

Significant

CGI – Index 5

0.002

Significant

a. Dependent Variable: TOBQ2020_inv

5.5 Descriptive Statistics of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
(Model 2)
In this part, descriptive statistics are shown for the variables
selected for this dissertation. As shown in Table 5.11, gender and board
experience are expressed as percentages. For board experience the
maximum statistic is 1 meaning that 100% of the directors of that
observation had the relevant board expertise. For gender, the maximum
statistic is 25% meaning that one fourth of the board members of that
observed board was female. The minimum statistic for gender is 0 meaning
for that observation there were no female board members on that board of
directors. The minimum statistic for board experience is 14% meaning that
14% of that board had the relevant expertise.
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Table 5.11: Descriptive Statistics of Model 2
Variable

Mean Std. Dev. Min.

Max.

Skewness Kurtosis

Gender

0.028

0.571

0

0.25

1.714

1.692

Board Experience

0.434

0.182

0.14

1.00

0.403

-0.437

Tobin’s Q

0.662

0.647

0.00

5.46

3.496

18.341

RoE

3.412

20.428

-68.83 69.12

-0.750

3.948

RoA

2.175

8.743

-32.28 31.89

-0.885

2.709

LogAssets

22.417

3.818

17.61

56.56

5.796

43.464

Leverage Debt/Assets

23.951

32.738

0.00

329.37

6.557

54.859

Concerning the standard skewness statistics, it is observed that
gender represents a skewness of 1.714 and kurtosis of 1.692 which indicates
that the data for gender likely does not follow a normal distribution.
According to George and Mallery (2019), a range between -2 and +2 may
still be a normal distribution for skewness and kurtosis. Wan et al. (2010)
consider +1/-1 the appropriate range for a normal distribution for skewness
and kurtosis. It is observed that board experience represents a skewness of
0.403 and kurtosis of -0.437. Regarding, the corporate performance
measures, the mean value for Tobin’s Q is 0.662, with a minimum value of
0.00 and a maximum value of 5.46. The mean value for ROE is 3.41, with
a minimum of -68.83 and a maximum of 69.12. The ROA averages around
2.17, with a minimum value of -32.28 and a maximum value of 31.89. The
descriptive statistics show that the corporate performance data is not
normally distributed.
Regarding the control variables, it can be observed that the mean
firm size is 22.41 (log assets), with a minimum of 17.61 (log assets) and a
maximum of 56.56 (log assets). Leverage has the greatest variation, ranging
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from a minimum of 0.00 for a listed company with no debt and a maximum
of 329.37, and the mean leverage is 23.95. The skewness and kurtosis results
show that the data is not normally distributed.
As shown in Table 5.12, internal control and auditor rotation are
dummy variables indicating that a company has implemented solid internal
controls (1) or has a weak internal control system (0). Auditor rotation is
expressed as (1) for auditor rotation took place and (0) for no auditor rotation
took place.

Table 5.12: Frequency Reporting for the Corporate Governance
Mechanisms Auditor Rotation and Internal Control
Variable

Frequency

Percent

Auditor Rotation

57

27.9%

No Auditor Rotation

147

72.1%

Solid Internal Control

93

45.6%

Weak Internal Control

111

54.4%

Pursuant to the law auditor rotation is mandatory every three years,
so for the observed period from 2017 to 2020 every company should have
rotated the auditor once. The sample consists of 51 companies that are
observed over four years resulting in 204 observations. Auditor rotations
took place 57 times which means the companies largely complied with the
auditor rotation requirement every three years. Pursuant to the 2016
corporate governance rules, it is mandatory that an internal control system
is maintained at all times. The observed frequencies are 93 positive
observations of a solid internal control system and 111 observations of a
weak internal control system. This means the majority of companies
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(54.4%) were not compliant with the requirement to establish and maintain
a solid internal control system pursuant to the 2016 corporate governance
rules.
5.6 Descriptive Analysis of Sectors – Kruskal-Wallis and MannWhitney U Tests
To determine whether there are significant differences in
compliance with corporate governance amongst industry sectors, the
Kruskal-Wallis and Mann–Whitney U non-parametric tests were used to
determine whether there are significant differences among the eight industry
sectors (Cleophas et al., 2006). The following eight sectors, as shown in
Table 5.13, were considered in this dissertation. Compliance was tested both
with the corporate governance index and its sub-indices as developed for
Model 1 and the corporate governance mechanisms insider trading, gender
and board experience from Model 2. The data for Model 1 relates to 2020.
The data for Model 2 includes observations from 2017 to 2020.

Table 5.13: Industry Sectors
Sector

Number of Listed Companies

1

Consumer staples, F&B

8

2

Energy

3

3

Transport & Logistics

3

4

Real Estate

4

5

Construction

18

6

Services

11

7

Telecommunication

2

8

Medical

2

116

There were no significant differences among the eight sectors based
on the results of the questionnaire (Model 1). As set out in Table 5.14, the
results were not statistically significant. The corporate governance index is
based on the fifty-four questionnaire responses collected in 2020. It is likely
that due to the small sample size, no statistically significant results could be
achieved in this instance.

Table 5.14: Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Hypotheses Test
Summary Model 1
Null Hypothesis

Significance

Decision

The distribution of CGI -

0.309

Retain the null hypothesis of no

Index 1 is the same across

difference regarding shareholders’

categories of Sector.

rights across the eight sectors.

The distribution of CGI -

0.313

Retain the null hypothesis of no

Index 2 is the same across

difference regarding equitable

categories of Sector.

treatment of shareholders across
the eight sectors.

The distribution of CGI -

0.584

Retain the null hypothesis of no

Index 3 is the same across

difference regarding the role of

categories of Sector.

stakeholders across the eight
sectors.

The distribution of CGI -

0.471

Retain the null hypothesis of no

Index 4 is the same across

difference regarding disclosure

categories of Sector.

and transparency across the eight
sectors.

The distribution of CGI -

0.495

Retain the null hypothesis of no

Index 5 is the same across

difference regarding

categories of Sector.

responsibilities of the board of
directors across the eight sectors.

a. The significance level is 0.05.
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Analyzing

compliance

using

the

corporate

governance

mechanisms, produced statistically significant results. The Kruskal- Wallis
test highlights, in Table 5.15, that there are differences in the distribution of
Gender across different sectors and the result is statistically significant.
Insider trading across different sectors was not statistically significant.
Therefore, the null hypothesis needs to be retained in this case. The
Kruskal–Wallis test also shows that there are significant differences in the
distribution of board experience. The corporate governance mechanisms
auditor rotation and internal controls could not be analyzed with KruskalWallis as dummy variables were used. Table 5.16 shows that female gender
representation on listed companies ranked highest at 132.06 in the
telecommunications sector followed by consumer staples at 118.31. The
lowest representation of female directors can be found in the energy and
medical sectors at 80.50. Table 5.17 shows that board experience ranked
highest at 138.89 in the consumer staples sector followed by real estate at
115.75 and services at 115.70. Board experience ranked lowest in
telecommunications at 31.0 and the medical sector at 29.0.
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Table 5.15: Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Hypotheses Test
Summary Model 2
Null Hypothesis

Significance

Decision

The distribution of

0.109

Retain the null hypothesis of no

InsTrad

is the same

difference regarding insider

across categories of

trading across the eight sectors.

Sector.
The distribution of
Gender

0.018

is the same

Reject the null hypothesis of no
difference regarding gender

across categories of

diversity across the eight sectors.

Sector.
The distribution of
BoardExp

<0.001

is the same

Reject the null hypothesis of no
difference regarding board

across categories of

members’ experience across the

Sector.

eight sectors.

a. The significance level is 0.05.

Table 5.16: Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Mean Ranks of
Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Gender
Gender

Total

Sector

N

Mean Rank

Consumer Staples

32

118.31

Energy

12

80.50

Transport & Logistics

12

111.17

Real Estate

8

103.50

Construction

80

95.25

Services

44

106.26

Telecommunication

8

132.06

204

observations
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Table 5.17: Independent Samples Kruskal-Wallis Mean Ranks of
Corporate Governance Mechanisms: Board Experience
Board Experience

Sector

N

Mean Rank

Consumer Staples

32

138.89

Energy

12

109.08

Transport & Logistics

12

61.54

Real Estate

8

115.75

Construction

80

99.01

Services

44

115.70

Telecommunication

8

31.00

Medical

8

29.00

Total observations

204

The Mann–Whitney U test is useful for comparing two sample
means on a continuous measure to specify whether two population means
differ significantly. This technique is used to test the difference between two
independent groups (here industry sectors) (Cleophas et al., 2006). In this
study, the Mann–Whitney test is used to verify which pairs of sectors are
significantly different (see Table 5.18). The pairwise comparisons of sectors
with Mann-Whitney show the differences between sector pairings that are
statistically significant. Two key sectors emerge. There are differences in
the implementation of corporate governance in the energy sector compared
with consumer staples, medical and telecommunication. There are also
differences in the implementation of corporate governance in the in the
telecommunication sector compared with energy, medical and construction.
Finally, there are differences between the consumer staples and construction
sectors that are statistically significant.
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Table 5.18: Kruskal-Wallis Pairwise Comparison of Sectors
Sector Sample Pairing

Test Statistic

Significance

1

Consumer Staples/Energy

37.813

0.008

2

Medical/Energy

37.813

0.024

3

Telecoms/Energy

-51.562

0.008

4

Telecoms/Medical

51.563

0.015

5

Consumer staples/Construction

23.063

0.009

6

Telecoms/Construction

-36.812

0.019

To identify the differing sector pairings, the Mann–Whitney test
compared 28 pairs (n= 8) of the eight sectors (1&2, 1&3, 1&4, 1&5, 1&6,
1&7, 1&8, 2&3, 2&4, 2&5, 2&6, 2&7, 2&8, 3&4, 3&5, 3&6, 3&7, 3&8;
4&5, 4&6, 4&7, 4&8, 5&6, 5&7, 5&8, 6&7, 6&8, 7&8). The following
sector comparisons prove to be statistically significant (** see Table 5.19).
The Table shows that Telecommunications differed from all other sectors.
Consumer staples differed from Transport & Logistics, Services differed
from Construction and the Medical sector differed from services and
telecommunication.
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Table 5.19: Mann-Whitney Comparisons Between Two Sectors
Tobin’s Q

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Telecom
Telecom

Medical

Services
Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics
Logistics

Energy
Energy

Transport &

Staples

1

Staples

Consumer

Whitney U

Transport &

Mann-

Consumer
Staples

2

Energy

3

Transport &

**

Logistics

4

Real Estate

5

Construction

6

Services

7

Telecommun

**

**

Medical

Construction

Consumer

Whitney U

Real Estate

Mann-

**
**

**

**

**

**

**

**

ication
8

Medical

**

**

**The result is significant at level 0.05.

5.7 Multicollinearity in Model 2 and the Dummy Variable Trap
In Model 2, dummy variables were used for presence or absence of
an internal control function (1;0) and presence or absence of auditor rotation
(1;0). Replacing categorical independent variables by their dummy variable
does not create multicollinearity. As shown in Table 5.20, based on the
results there are no serious multicollinearity issues in Model 2.
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Table 5.20: Multicollinearity of Model 2
Variable
(Constant)

Collinearity Statistics
Tolerance

VIF

Insider Trading

0.956

1.047

Gender

0.907

1.102

Auditor Rotation

0.904

1.106

Internal Control

0.910

1.099

Board Experience

0.856

1.182

LogAssets

0.928

1.078

Leverage

0.921

1.086

Sector

0.856

1.169

Time Window

0.917

1.090

5.8 Linear Mixed-Effects Model Analysis: Model 2
The results of the Shapiro-Wilkes test of the regression residuals
found that the errors of Model 2 are not normally distributed for ROE, ROA,
or Tobin’s Q. Box-Cox transformations were carried out in Minitab. As
discussed at the beginning of this chapter, when data is not normally
distributed (e.g., skewed, zero-inflated, binomial, or count data),
transformation of data before analysis is often advisable and visual
inspection for outliers and heteroscedasticity is important for the
assessment.
Model 2 contains two control variables (leverage and size) as well
as repeated values of board member experience, gender, insider trading, and
auditor rotation that are measured four times from 2017 to 2020. Both
control variables and coefficients are divided into intra-group sectors,
representing the eight sectors of listed companies in the UAE to analyse the
effect of the independent variables in different sectors on corporate
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performance. Overall, the data is balanced and any companies with missing
data were removed by the researcher ahead of the analysis.
5.8.1 Results of Modelling Tobin’s Q
As shown in Table 5.21, type III tests of fixed effects model
produced the following statistically significant results:

Table 5.21: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects with Dependent Variable
Tobin’s Q
Variable

F-Test

Significance

Intercept

1.534

0.220

AudRot

1.950

0.167

IntCont

1.295

0.258

Time

3.058

0.037

Sector

2.496

0.032

InsTrad

4.502

0.036

Gender

3.415

0.068

BoardExp

2.653

0.108

LogAssets

0.371

0.545

LeverageDebtAssest_log

5.683

0.019

AudRot * InsTrad

4.513

0.036

Sector * LogAssets

2.446

0.033

Sector * LeverageDebtAsset_log

2.288

0.036

Intercept

1.534

0.220

a. Dependent Variable: (TOBQ + 1) ** (-1).

As shown in Table 5.22, using Tobin’s Q as dependent variable and
selected corporate governance mechanisms as independent variables,
produced relevant statistically significant results. Time, sector, Insider
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trading, interaction of auditor rotation and insider trading, sector, interaction
of sector and logassets and interaction of sector and indebtedness were
statistically significant with P-values below 0.05.

Table 5.22: Test of Significance of Repeated Measures Covariance Matrix:
Tobin’s Q
Covariances of

Estimate of

Std.

P-

Lower

Upper

Repeated

Covariance

Error

value

Bound

Bound

UN (1, 1)

0.0183

0.0043

<0.001

0.0115

0.0291

UN (2, 1)

0.0100

0.0032

0.002

0.0036

0.0164

UN (2, 2)

0.0125

0.0033

<0.001

0.0075

0.0210

UN (3, 1)

0.0112

0.0038

0.003

0.0036

0.0187

UN (3, 2)

0.0131

0.0037

<0.001

0.0057

0.0205

UN (3, 3)

0.0200

0.0048

<0.001

0.0124

0.0322

UN (4, 1)

0.0129

0.0044

0.003

0.0043

0.0216

UN (4, 2)

0.0143

0.0042

<0.001

0.0060

0.0225

UN (4, 3)

0.0209

0.0052

<0.001

0.0105

0.0312

UN (4, 4)

0.0257

0.0062

<0.001

0.0160

0.0413

Measures

a. Dependent Variable: 1/(TOBQ + 1).

Table 5.22 shows that the repeated measures are significantly
correlated which validates the use of the mixed effects model in this
regression analysis. UN(i, j), represent the covariance between time periods
i and j where i, j =1,4 and 1=2017, 2=2018, 3=2019, 4=2020. For example,
UN(2, 1) shows the covariance between the 2017 and 2018 measures of the
dependent variable across the listed companies. Overall, it can be inferred
that there is an impact of corporate governance on performance and there
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are differences between the impact of corporate governance on performance
for all time periods observed against the dependent variable Tobin’s Q. The
lower bounds and upper bounds (limits of accuracy) are small which means
we likely have a high degree of accuracy with this model.
Tables 5.23 to 5.27 below show the coefficients of the regression of
TOB’s Q versus the independent variables from SPSS output. Regression
coefficients are computed based on the interactions between the presence or
absence of auditor rotation and internal controls.
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Telecoms
-0.59

Medical

Services
0.72

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of
Auditor
Rotation;
Absence of
Internal Control

Table 5.23: Regression Equations of Tobin’s Q Versus Various Predictors

0.02

2019

0.02

2020

0.00
-0.02

3.30

0.20

3.77

1.03

-0.32

-0.03

2018

BoardExp Gender

2017

InsTrad

-1.16

Intercept

Regression Coefficients

-0.22

LogAssets

0.09

0.00

-0.04

-0.14

0.02

0.00

0.04

-0.15

LeverageDebtAssest_log

-0.03

0.28

0.15

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.18

-0.15

Table 5.23 shows the coefficients of the regression of Tobin’s Q
versus the continuous independent variables for companies of specific
sectors for which AudRot = 0 (absence of auditor rotation) and IntCont = 0
(absence of internal control). Table 5.24 shows the effects of the same
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independent variables on Tobin’s Q in the case of companies implementing
internal controls in the absence of auditor rotation, i.e., AudRot = 0 and
IntCont = 1. Because Box-Cox transformations raised Tobin’s Q by the
power of -1, we need to reverse interpret the regression coefficients in tables
5.23 – 5.26 when assessing the effects of the independent variables on
Tobin’s Q. Therefore, implementing internal controls has a positive effect
on corporate performance with the value of the intercept slightly increasing
across all sectors.
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0.02

0.00

-0.02

-0.22

-1.19

Intercept

0.09
0.00
-0.04
-0.14
0.02
0.00
0.04
-0.15

-0.03
0.28
0.15
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.18

3.28

3.74

1.01

-0.35

-0.62

p

BoardEx Gender InsTrad 2020 2019 2018 2017

0.02

0.70

LogAssets

-0.03

0.17

LeverageDebtAssest_log

Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of
Auditor Rotation;
Presence of
Internal Control

Table 5.24: Regression Equations of Tobin’s Q Versus Various Predictors

Regression Coefficients

-0.15
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Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Presence of
Auditor Rotation;
Absence of
Internal Control

Table 5.25: Regression Equations of Tobin’s Q Versus Various Predictors

3.32

-0.58

0.74

0.22

3.78

1.05

-0.31

-1.15

-0.03
0.02
0.02
0.00

-0.20

-0.22

0.09

0.00

-0.04

-0.14

0.02

0.00

0.04

-0.15

0.28

0.15

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.18

-0.15

-0.03

LeverageDebtAssest_log

LogAssets BoardExp Gender InsTrad 2020 2019 2018 2017 Intercept

Regression Coefficients

Table 5.25 shows the impact of an auditor rotation when no internal
control system was in place on the relationship between the corporate
governance mechanisms and corporate performance. In this case, Tobin’s Q
slightly increases across all sectors. The effect of legal insider trading on
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Tobin’s Q is higher in the presence of auditor rotation. The regression
coefficient of legal insider trading in the presence of auditor rotation is 10
times its coefficient in the absence of auditor rotation, i.e., 0.2 versus 0.02.
It is worth noting that the fitted relationship between Tobin’s Q and the
independent variables in Tables 5.23 to 5.26 is not linear because the
dependent variable is the inverse of Tobin’s Q, i.e., 1/(TOBQ + 1), and as
such the changes in the values of the regression coefficients represent
increments in the value of inverse Tobin’s Q rather than Tobin’s Q.
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Services

Telecoms

Medical

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Presence of
Auditor Rotation;
Presence of
Internal Control

Table 5.26: Regression Equations of Tobin’s Q Versus Various Predictors

0.19

0.71

-0.60

3.29

Regression Coefficients
-1.17

-0.33

1.02

3.76

2018

0.02

2019

0.02

2020

0.00

InsTrad

-0.20

Gender

-0.22

-0.15

LogAssets

-0.03

0.09

0.00

-0.04

-0.14

0.02

0.00

0.04

-0.15

LeverageDebtAssest_log

2017

BoardExp

Intercept

-0.03

0.28

0.15

0.03

0.02

0.01

0.02

0.18

For companies that implemented both auditor rotation and
established an internal control mechanism, performance slightly increased
for consumer staples and energy. It decreased for transport, real estate,
construction, services, telecommunication and medical. The results for
tables 5.23 to 5.26 need to be reverse interpreted as Tobin’s Q was raised
by -1 during the Box-Cox transformations.
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According to the values of regression coefficients, in the presence
of auditor rotation, a 1 insider trading disclosure has a positive impact on
Tobin’s Q. Specifically, a one unit increase in insider trading results in 0.2
decrease in the response variable 1/(TOBQ +1). For companies that rotated
the auditor and implemented internal control mechanisms, we also observe
a similar positive impact on insider trading disclosure.
5.8.2 Results of Modelling RoA
Type III tests of fixed effects model produced the following
statistically significant results:

Table 5.27: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects with Dependent Variable ROA
Variable

F-Test

Significance

Intercept

32.025

<0.001

AudRot

1.768

0.188

IntCont

0.451

0.504

Time

3.306

0.027

Sector

3.094

0.011

InsTrad

0.077

0.782

Gender

5.032

0.027

BoardExp

4.775

0.034

LogAssets

7.007

0.011

LeverageDebtAssest_log

0.006

0.937

AudRot * InsTrad

11.347

0.001

Sector * InsTrad

2.819

0.011

a. Dependent Variable: (ROA + 35)^2.
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A linear mixed effects model was used on a Box-Cox
transformation of ROA, that is, (ROA + 35)2. This transformation was
derived using Minitab. Since the minimum value of unadjusted ROA is –
32.28, the value 35 was added to ROA to make its values positive as this is
a requirement of the Box-Cox transformation.
Predictors: Auditor Rotation; Internal Control; Time; Sector;
Insider Trading; Gender; Board Experience; Natural logarithm of assets;
natural logarithm of indebtedness; auditor rotation in combination with
insider trading; sector in combination with insider trading.
Time, sector, gender, board experience, logassets, auditor rotation
* insider trading, sector * insider trading were statistically significant with
P-values below 0.05. Auditor rotation, internal control and insider trading
were not statistically significant. Table 5.28 shows that certain repeated
measures are significantly correlated which validates the use of the mixed
effects model in this regression analysis.
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Table 5.28: Test of Significance of Repeated Measures Covariance Matrix:
ROA
Covariance

Estimates of

Std.

P-

Lower

Upper

of Repeated

Covariances

Error

value

Bound

Bound

Measures
95% confidence interval
UN (1, 1)

274579.653

0.0043

<0.001

168358.925

447816.981

UN (2, 1)

107522.026

0.0032

0.009

26619.878

188424.175

UN (2, 2)

174367.189

0.0033

<0.001

105668.440

287729.395

UN (3, 1)

61070.719

0.0038

0.157

-23428.085

145569.525

UN (3, 2)

124734.774

0.0037

0.006

35052.342

214417.207

UN (3, 3)

236998.540

0.0048

<0.001

146788.463

382647.974

UN (4, 1)

64069.752

0.0044

0.261

-47646.632

175786.136

UN (4, 2)

120038.239

0.0042

0.018

20307.023

219769.455

UN (4, 3)

214373.925

0.0052

0.001

83499.025

345248.824

UN (4, 4)

451654.102

0.0062

<0.001

292667.626

697007.148

a. Dependent Variable: (ROA + 35)^2.

UN(i, j), represent the covariance between time periods i and j
where i, j =1,4 and 1=2017, 2=2018, 3=2019, 4=2020. For example, UN(2,
1) shows the covariance between the 2017 and 2018, (UN 4/2) 2020/18 and
(UN4/3) 2020/19 respectively and are statistically significant. The distance
between the lower bounds and upper bounds is large which means there is
considerable variation between the subjects. Table 5.29 shows the
coefficients of the regression (ROA + 35)2 versus corporate governance
mechanisms for companies of specific sectors, without auditor rotation or
internal control.
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Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of Auditor
Rotation; Absence
of Internal Control

Table 5.29: Regression Equations of ROA Versus Various Predictors

1495.73

BoardExp

741.16

LogAssets

-37.00

LeverageDebtAssest_log

Gender

2434.01

1101.54
1317.18

InsTrad

-1784.31

0.00

1863.38

2020

1016.21

79.28

1621.04

2019

-3366.99

100.70

314.60

2018

-3113.11

300.30

-603.64

2017

200.56

1968.35

1942.80

2434.55

Intercept

1498.44

Regression Coefficients

3.89

We observe in Table 5.30 that in companies which implemented an
internal control system, but did not rotate the auditor, the mean performance
increases across all sectors slightly as compared to companies without an
internal control system.
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Gender

1495.73

BoardExp

741.16

LogAssets

-37.00

LeverageDebtAssest_log

3.89

2038.11

2012.56

2504.32

1568.21

Intercept

1171.30

0.00

1317.18

2020

2503.77

79.28

-1784.31

100.70

2019

1933.14

2018

1016.21

300.30

1690.80

2017

200.56

-3366.99

314.60

-3113.11

-603.64

InsTrad

Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of Auditor
Rotation; Presence
of Internal Control

Table 5.30: Regression Equations of ROA Versus Various Predictors

In Table 5.31, we observe that companies which adhered by the law

and rotated the auditor, this impacted legal insider trading and ROA

decreased for all sectors.

137

BoardExp

741.16

LogAssets

1495.73

-37.00

LeverageDebtAssest_log

Gender

3.89

Medical
1013.12
3136.74

Telecoms
2345.58
35.25

Services
1774.95

Construction

2835.77

0.00

1532.62

2020

-1547.43

79.28

2134.16

100.70

2019

-1293.55

2018

1215.92

300.30

InsTrad

2017

2020.12

Real Estate
1879.93

1854.37 Transport & Logistics

Energy
2346.13

1410.02 Consumer & Staples

Parameter
Intercept

Presence of Auditor
Rotation; Absence of
Internal Control

Table 5.31: Regression Equations of ROA Versus Various Predictors

In companies that implemented both auditor rotation and
established an internal control mechanism as shown in Table 5.32,
performance slightly decreased across all sectors. Insider trading disclosures
increase when companies rotate the auditor or implement internal controls.
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BoardExp

741.16

LogAssets

1495.73

-37.00

LeverageDebtAssest_log

Gender

3.89

Medical
1082.88
3136.74

Telecoms
2415.35
35.25

Services
1844.72

InsTrad

2835.77

Construction
0.00

1602.38

79.28

2020

-1547.43

2019

2134.16

100.70

-1293.55

300.30

2018

1215.92

2017

2020.12

Real Estate
1949.69

Logistics

Transport &
1924.14

Staples

Consumer &

Energy
2415.89

Intercept

1479.78

Parameter

Presence of
Auditor Rotation;
Presence of
Internal Control

Table 5.32: Regression Equations of ROA Versus Various Predictors

According to the values of regression coefficients, in the presence
of auditor rotation, insider trading disclosure has a positive impact on ROA.
Moreover, this positive impact is not uniform across the companies’ sectors.
The results in the tables show that the coefficients of Insider Trading do not
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change when Internal Control changes while holding Auditor Rotation
fixed, i.e., Internal Control does not alter the impact of Insider Trading on
ROA as opposed to Auditor Rotation.
5.8.3 Results of Modelling RoE
As shown in Table 5.33, type III tests of fixed effects model
produced the following statistically significant results:

Table 5.33: Type III Tests of Fixed Effects with Dependent Variable ROE
Variable

F-Test

Significance

Intercept

15.764

<0.001

AudRot

1.880

0.175

IntCont

5.582

0.021

Time

2.131

0.108

Sector

2.444

0.039

InsTrad

7.488

0.007

Gender

5.032

0.027

BoardExp

4.775

0.034

LogAssets

7.993

0.005

LeverageDebtAssest_log

1.541

0.218

AudRot * InsTrad

8.489

0.006

IntCont * Gender

1.176

0.284

Sector * BoardExp

8.886

0.004

a. Dependent Variable: (ROE + 70)^1.5.

A linear mixed effects model on the Box-Cox transformed
dependent variable (ROE + 70)1.5 = √(𝑅𝑂𝐸 + 70)3 was used to investigate
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the relationship between ROE and the corporate governance mechanisms
while accounting for the repeated measures in the data.
70 was added to ROE in computing the square root to make the
value inside the square root positive. The minimum value of ROE is -68.83
after excluding the case with ROE = -655.2. The case with ROE = -655.2
presented an outlier when one of the listed energy companies booked a
significant impairment on its oil and gas assets during that year.
Predictors: Auditor Rotation; Internal Control; Time; Sector;
Insider Trading; Gender; Board Experience; natural logarithm of assets,
natural logarithm of leverage; Auditor rotation in combination with insider
trading; Internal Control in combination with Gender; Sector in combination
with Board Experience
Sector, board experience, insider trading, internal control, gender,
internal control×gender, sector×board experience and auditor rotation ×
insider trading were statistically significant with P-values below .05.
Auditor rotation, and LeverageDebtAssest_log were not statistically
significant.
Table 5.34 shows that certain repeated measures are significantly
correlated which validates the use of the mixed effects model in this
regression analysis as demonstrated above.
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Table 5.34: Test of Significance of Repeated Measures Covariance Matrix:
ROE
Covariance

Estimate of

Std.

P-

Lower

Upper

of Repeated

Covariances

Error

value

Bound

Bound

Measures
95% confidence interval
UN (1, 1)

31605.401

8532.653

<0.001

18619.094

53649.299

UN (2, 1)

137.868

6223.505

0.982

-12059.977

12335.715

UN (2, 2)

46075.706

10951.784

<0.001

28916.717

73416.725

UN (3, 1)

1559.419

5857.085

0.790

-9920.256

13039.095

UN (3, 2)

23697.595

9046.314

0.009

5967.144

41428.046

UN (3, 3)

36868.764

9857.932

<0.001

21830.574

62266.146

UN (4, 1)

-7391.892

6235.425

0.236

-19613.101

4829.316

UN (4, 2)

21234.679

9156.971

0.020

3287.344

39182.013

UN (4, 3)

32923.076

9751.627

<0.001

13810.238

52035.915

UN (4, 4)

49094.094

11797.895

<0.001

30653.168

78629.068

a. Dependent Variable: (ROE + 70)^1.5.

Table 5.35 shows the impact of absence of auditor rotation and
absence of internal control on the mean performance of selected sectors.
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Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of
Auditor Rotation;
Absence of
Internal Control

Table 5.35: Regression Equations of ROE Versus Various Predictors

783.14
-6.05

0.00

993.27

2020

-6.05

37.21

526.74

51.38

2019

884.90

2018

817.99

110.02

25.34

177.97

918.12

1013.81

1233.58

1219.02

LeverageDebtAssest_log LogAssets BoardExp Gender InsTrad

2017

-121.86

760.41

593.98

482.44

94.18

Intercept

Regression Coefficients

-15.15

18.60

We observe in Table 5.36, that companies which implemented an
internal control system but did not rotate the auditor, the mean performance
increases across all sectors slightly when comparing Tables 5.35 and 5.36.
In Table 5.37, we observe that companies which adhered by the law and
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rotated the auditor, this impacted legal insider trading and ROE increased
for all sectors. The coefficient of Insider Trading is 25.34 when Internal
Control= 0 and 552.94 when Internal Control =1. Auditor Rotation does not
impact the effect of Insider Trading on ROE.

Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Absence of
Auditor Rotation;
Presence of
Internal Control

Table 5.36: Regression Equations of ROE Versus Various Predictors

1079.50

869.36
-6.05

0.00

-6.05

37.21

2020

612.97

2019

884.90

51.38

904.22

2018

-121.86

846.64

680.21

568.67

110.02

25.34

177.97

918.12

1013.81

177.37

1219.02

BoardExp Gender InsTrad

2017

LeverageDebtAssest_log LogAssets
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180.41

Intercept

Regression Coefficients

-15.15

18.60

Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Presence of
Auditor Rotation;
Absence of
Internal Control

Table 5.37: Regression Equations of ROE Versus Various Predictors

749.21
-6.05

0.00

959.35

2020

-6.05

37.21

492.81

51.38

2019

884.90

2018

784.07

110.02

552.94

177.97

918.12

1013.81

1233.58

1219.02

LeverageDebtAssest_log LogAssets BoardExp Gender InsTrad

2017

-121.86

726.49

560.06

448.51

60.26

Intercept

Regression Coefficients

-15.15

18.60

Companies that implemented both auditor rotation and established
an internal control mechanism as shown in Table 5.38, performance slightly
increased across all sectors when compared to not rotating the auditor and
no internal controls.
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Medical

Telecoms

Services

Construction

Real Estate

Logistics

Transport &

Energy

Staples

Consumer &

Parameter

Presence of
Auditor Rotation;
Presence of
Internal Control

Table 5.38: Regression Equations of ROE Versus Various Predictors

37.21

2020

0.00

LeverageDebtAssest_log

835.44

2019

-6.05

51.38

1045.57

2018

-6.05

110.02

552.94

884.90

-121.86

177.97

918.12

1013.81

177.37

1219.02

LogAssets BoardExp Gender InsTrad

2017

579.04

870.30

812.72

646.29

534.74

146.48

Intercept

Regression Coefficients

-15.15

18.60

We also observe an impact of board experience and gender. When
internal control is implemented, the coefficient for gender decreases from
1233.58 to 177.37. when auditor rotation is implemented, it has no effect on
gender.
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The regression coefficients are computed based on the interactions
of the variables shown in the table above. According to the values of
regression coefficients, auditor rotation has a positive impact on insider
trading disclosure.
5.9 Interviews
For this dissertation, 54 senior executives of the UAE listed
companies were approached for interviews based on a number of
considerations. All senior executives who agreed to participate in the
interviews had previously completed the questionnaire. In total, 22 senior
executives participated in interviews. The interview transcripts were then
coded using NVIVO12. The results as set out in Table 5.39 show how
corporate governance is understood by the leaders of UAE companies.

Table 5.39: Auto Coded Themes NVIVO12
Theme

Interview File Frequency

Total References

Market

6

66

Stakeholder

16

63

Governance

14

54

Control

13

51

Performance

13

45

Management

16

44

Returns

6

42

Shareholders

8

52

Measures

10

27

Risk

14

32

Internal Control

9

29

Protection

13

24

Results

15

23
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The interviews confirm that respondents are aligned with the
stakeholder theory of corporate governance. According to the stakeholder
theory, companies should design their corporate strategies considering the
interests of their stakeholders, those groups and individuals who can affect
or are affected by the organization’s purpose (Freeman, 1984). The metaanalysis in NVIVO12 also shows that there is enhanced focus on the stock
markets, performance and the stakeholders. The data collected from the
interviews does not support H1 (Occupational Experience) or H2 (Gender).
H6 (Board responsibilities) is validated. It needs to be pointed out that
quantitative and qualitative findings were integrated in the final data
analysis and testing of the hypotheses. For instance, the variables used in
the survey assisted in drafting interview questions, identify new themes, and
to label findings. Figure 3 was produced with the interview results in
NVIVO12. According to the interviews, corporate governance is a broad
concept encompassing both financial performance and control.
It is also worth noting that according to the interviewees
understanding of the stakeholder theory, shareholders are legitimate
stakeholders. The findings also confirm that respondents are looking for
government regulation or control as part of corporate governance. Although
interviewees acknowledge that control by the government is relatively weak
because organizations and their shareholders tend to benefit from internal
control mechanisms and management’s prudent analysis, evaluation, and
balancing, there is a strong desire for regulatory controls for the listed
companies in the UAE. Therefore, these actions are most likely achieved by
strong internal and external controls as shown in the top left-hand corner of
the figure. Interviewees are also very concerned with creating value and
achieving high performance. Shareholders need to be able to benefit from
their investments. In contrast, ‘socially responsible’ controls were not
deemed appropriate. Several interviewees mentioned that for the variables
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gender and board members’ experience, cultural aspects of the UAE had a
role to play. Culture is still considered a pervasive factor hindering females
in ascending on the corporate ladder (responsibilities at home and bias by
male colleagues). Culture or wasta were also perceived in the board member
appointments/nominations. For example, a candidate’s reputation or social
connections may be an important factor in his or her nomination for a board
seat. Overall, there is a big move by the UAE legislature to move towards a
more secular model and discourage cultural involvement in the legislature.
This is exemplified by the most recent developments in the UAE penal code
of 2022, the updated Personal Status Law of 2021 and the 2020 corporate
governance rules amongst others.

Figure 3: Hierarchy Chart of Nodes
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5.10 Results of Hypotheses
The objective of this dissertation is to evaluate the impact of
corporate governance on corporate performance. Two conceptual models
were developed, and regressions and linear mixed effects models were
utilized. Table 5.40 is the summarizes the results of the hypotheses testing.
Based on the data analysis of the second model, only certain of the
corporate governance mechanisms selected were found to be statistically
significant. Auditor rotation* insider trading was consistently statistically
significant in all three linear mixed effects models using Tobin’s Q, RoA
and RoE as dependent variable. Auditor rotation is the legal requirement to
change the external auditor every three years which was introduced by the
Companies Law. Insider Trading in this research is the legal insider trading
measured by the number of trades executed by executive management and
the board of directors and their connected persons and disclosed in the
yearly corporate governance reports. Based on the scientific literature from
other jurisdictions, there is evidence that insider trading can have a positive
or negative effect on corporate performance. On the one hand, trading by
executive management and board members can be interpreted as a sign of
confidence in the listed company’s performance. On the other hand, legal
insider trading can also have a negative effect on performance and the
reasons for that are not entirely clear. Insider trading as an independent
variable and not in combination with auditor rotation proved to be
statistically significant in regressions using Tobin’s Q and RoE as the
dependent variable and demonstrated to have a positive effect on corporate
performance. The existing literature on auditor rotation is inconclusive as to
whether changing the auditor in line with the statutory requirement has a
positive effect on corporate performance. It is interesting to note that in the
UAE and based on the research sample there was a positive and statistically
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significant effect on corporate performance (ROA and ROE) for those
companies that rotated auditor every three years and reported consistent
legal insider trading. In the linear mixed effects model using Tobin’s Q, the
effect was slightly negative. These results are comparable to those of
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) who researched leadership structure and found
that leadership structure was significantly and positively related ROA and
ROE but not to Tobin’s Q which is a market-based measure of corporate
performance.
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5.11 Conclusion
This chapter contains the results of analyzing the 54 selected listed
companies

quantitatively and

qualitatively.

In Model

1, Board

responsibilities (4.07) followed by Shareholder rights (4.05) have the
highest means. In the regression analysis, the indices Disclosure &
Transparency and Responsibilities of the Board of Directors were
statistically significant, and Model 1 has an R square of 0.435. In Model 2,
Insider trading in combination with auditor rotation was statistically
significant in the mixed linear effects model. The interviews and descriptive
analysis of the questionnaire confirmed that the applicable theory for
corporate governance in the UAE is the stakeholder theory. The meaning of
the statistical results, and the insights provided by the qualitative research
will be further elucidated in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
6.1 Introduction
This chapter interprets the quantitative and qualitative results and
discusses their implications. The results were interpreted based on
statistically significant results and qualitative results from the interviews
conducted. A set of seven testable hypotheses was developed to answer the
research questions. This research was carried out to respond the research
questions:
•

Research Question #1: How is corporate governance understood by
stakeholders in the UAE?

•

Research Question #2: Do corporate governance reports of the UAE
listed firms comply with the 2016 corporate governance code stipulated
by the UAE statutory requirements?

•

Research Question #3: What is the impact of the 2016 corporate
governance code on the performance of the UAE listed firms?

•

Research Question #4: Do sector-specific variations in the level of
compliance exist in the corporate governance reports of these UAE
firms and why?
The following hypotheses have been developed to test the

relationships between corporate governance practice and corporate
performance.
•

H1: There is a positive relationship between the percentage of board
members who have relevant occupational experience and corporate
performance.

•

H2: There is a positive relationship between gender representation of
board members and corporate performance.
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•

H3: There is a positive relationship between insider trading and
corporate performance

•

H4: Changing the auditor periodically has a positive impact on
corporate performance.

•

H5: Solid internal controls through detailed regulations and procedures
for internal control have a positive impact on corporate performance.

•

H6: Compliance has a positive impact on corporate performance.

•

H7: There are differences in compliance with the 2016 corporate
governance rules between sectors.
Section 6.2 explains how corporate governance is understood by the

stakeholders in the UAE. Section 6.3 contains the analysis of the corporate
governance principles and to what extent they impact corporate
performance. Sections 6.4 and 6.5 explain the potential obstacles to and
enablers of corporate governance in the UAE. Section 6.6 discusses the
corporate governance mechanisms selected for this research. Section 6.7
discusses the relationship between board members’ occupational experience
and corporate performance. Section 6.8 discusses the link between gender
and corporate performance. Section 6.9 discusses the link between insider
trading and corporate performance. Section 6.10 analyzes the relationship
between auditor rotation and corporate performance. Section 6.11 presents
the relationship between internal control and corporate performance.
Section 6.12 presents a summary of the results of compliance on corporate
performance. Section 6.13 explores differences in compliance with the 2016
corporate governance rules between sectors in the UAE listed companies.
Section 6.14 analyzes the role of the UAE exchanges in implementing
corporate governance and Section 6.15 presents the conclusion of the
chapter.
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6.2 The Concepts of Corporate Governance
The questionnaire proposed three concepts of corporate governance
which represent different applicable theories. The first statement is
underpinned by the agency theory: “Corporate governance refers to an
organisation’s relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in
accordance with the interests of those shareholders”. The second statement
is underpinned by the stakeholder theory: “Corporate governance refers to
an organisation’s relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or
affect the organisation’s operations and decisions”. The third statement is
underpinned by the extended stakeholder theory: “Corporate governance
refers to an organisation’s relationship with all members of society,
irrespective of whether they affect or are affected by the organisation’s
operations and decisions”. The descriptive results show that the second
statement representing the stakeholder theory has the highest mean (4.19),
followed by the first statement representing the agency theory (4.00). The
third statement representing the extended stakeholder theory has the lowest
mean (3.63). This implies that according to the respondents, the stakeholder
model is the most appropriate for the UAE. This finding is in line with
previous research on this topic in the UAE (Otman, 2014) and current
theoretical research conducted in the United States (Bebchuk & Tallarita,
2020). The stakeholder theory of corporate governance focuses on the effect
of corporate activity on all identifiable stakeholders of the corporation. This
theory posits that corporate managers should take into consideration the
interests of each stakeholder in its governance process. The extended
stakeholder theory incorporates a moral and social responsibility in the
stakeholder theory regardless of the stakeholders’ connection with the firm
(Boda & Zsolnai, 2016). Stakeholderism should not be expected to produce
material benefits to stakeholders. From a theoretical perspective, even if
stakeholderism cannot be expected to benefit stakeholders materially, it is
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expected to move corporate responsibility in the right direction ethically.
However, as noted by interviewees in this research, the acceptance of the
stakeholder theory can insulate corporate leaders from shareholders and
make corporate leaders less accountable. Interviewee #6 noted that “when a
listed entity published false financial statements, the regulator did not take
action. Some of the companies are mismanaged and nothing is done. There
is a lack of authority and no punishment”. Although firmly established in
the UAE on the basis of existing research, the stakeholder theory bears risks
as pointed out by the interviewees. The stakeholder theory urges
institutional investors to become more deferential to corporate leaders and
more accepting of arrangements that may take place between listed
companies and the regulator and insulate management from market pressure
as there are only limited reported fines and no legal case reporting. Such
insulation may increase slack and underperformance which may take the
pressure off managers and the board but would hurt both shareholders and
stakeholders long term. The semi-structured interviews revealed that
respondents had a thorough understanding of the corporate governance rules
and the requirements by the listed companies. The main priorities for the
interviewees were market transparency and corporate performance.
Respondents were aware of the regulatory framework in the UAE as well as
how a solid corporate governance framework within the organization can
impact how the organization operates. Whilst overall there is trust in the
corporate governance reforms, respondents also identified areas of concern
such as insufficient market control by the government. The following
quotations have been reproduced verbatim from the interview transcripts:
“The problem is that government is trusting the listed companies too much.
This has an impact on the market because there is a lot of faith here in the
UAE in the big companies. Small and mid-size companies in the UAE are
more scrutinized than the big ones when it should be the other way around”
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(Interviewee #1). Respondents also clearly look to the regulator to be
vigilant and follow international best practices when scrutinizing filings:
“SCA needs to check all the submissions properly. A lot of the companies
cook the books. Some audit reports are not correct”. (Interviewee #1)
Respondents noted a lack in market transparency and highlighted it as an
area in need of further reforms. Based on the interviews, there are gaps with
the stakeholder theory in the UAE and it would be desirable if managers and
the Board became more shareholder responsive. Shareholder-friendly
reforms or measures that further empower shareholders should be
considered.
6.3 Analysis of the Corporate Governance Principles
This section discusses the corporate governance principles. The
descriptive statistics results demonstrate that the corporate governance
principles are overall well implemented in the listed companies with
statistical means equal to or exceeding 3.89. Responsibility of the board of
directors has the highest mean (4.07). The corporate governance framework
should ensure the strategic guidance of the company, the effective
monitoring of management by the board and the board’s accountability to
the company and its shareholders (OECD, 2015). Rights of shareholders has
the second highest mean (4.05). The assessment of the quality of
shareholders’ rights and the extent to which shareholders’ rights were being
protected was based on the principle of the rights of shareholders (OECD,
2015). The role of stakeholders in corporate governance has the third highest
mean (4.01). Disclosure and Transparency has a mean of 3.98. The principle
with the lowest mean is equitable treatment of shareholders (3.89). All
shareholders should have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for any
violation of their rights (OECD, 2015). A mean of 3.89 is a neutral rating
on the Likert scale where respondents have a tendency to almost agree with
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the statement. Overall, the rating is slightly improved compared to Otman
(2014) where this principle achieved an overall mean of 3.57. The present
findings support previous research about corporate governance in the UAE
(Otman, 2014; Hussainey & Aljifri, 2012). The board members are
knowledgeable about the corporate governance principles. The results of
this research show that there is overall an improved adaptation of the
principles of corporate governance when comparing the results of the
descriptive statistics with Otman (2014) who used a similar questionnaire.
This can be attributed to the regulator’s significant effort to improve
corporate governance practice as achieved by implementation of the
corporate governance rules 2016.
6.4 Potential Obstacles to Adopting Corporate Governance
This section presents the feedback of respondents concerning
potential obstacles to adopting corporate governance, such as lack of board
members with the right skills, lack of female board members, lack of
transparency in relation to insider trading and weak internal controls.
Descriptive results reveal that most participants agreed that this list of
potential obstacles might affect the implementation of corporate
governance.
The results demonstrate that a weak internal control system (mean
of 4.09) is perceived as the largest possible obstacle to adopting corporate
governance, followed by a lack of board members with the right skills (3.96)
and lack of transparency in relation to insider trading (3.85) and poor
financial and non-financial disclosure (3.85). The least important obstacle
was the state of the UAE economy (2.89). The present study has identified
that weak internal control systems, lack of board member expertise, and lack
of transparency in relation to insider trading are key obstacles to
implementing good corporate governance. Therefore, these variables have
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been operationalized in separate research hypotheses which are discussed
and analyzed in this chapter. The literature supports that these mechanisms
are barriers to implementing efficient corporate governance in research
conducted in the United States (Masson and Madhavan, 1991, Pettit, 1995,
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009).
6.5 Potential Enablers to Adopting Corporate Governance
Possible enablers to adopt corporate governance are gender
diversity at board level, disclosing insider shareholding in accordance with
the rules, and a mature compliance function that improves performance.
Setting the tone at the top to embed corporate governance in long-term value
creation, changing the external auditor every three years; an effective
internal control function over financial reporting and its disclosure controls
and procedures have a positive effect on corporate performance; an effective
compliance program including policies and procedures for handling
concerns related to potential violations of law has a positive effect on
corporate performance, senior management and board development and
succession planning need to be engrained in the company’s culture and
establishing a robust evaluation process of the board of directors, senior
management and committee members. The descriptive results demonstrate
that the respondents overall agreed with the list of possible enablers.
‘Establishing a robust evaluation process of the board of directors, senior
management and committee members’ was ranked as the first enabler, with
a mean score of 4.46. The second-ranked enabler was ‘An effective
compliance program including policies and procedures for handling
concerns related to potential violations of law has a positive effect on
corporate performance’, with a mean score of 4.39. The third-ranked enabler
was ‘Senior management and board development and succession planning
need to be engrained in the company’s culture’ and the fourth-ranked
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enabler was ‘An effective internal control function over financial reporting
and its disclosure controls and procedures has a positive effect on corporate
performance’. The least ranked enabler was ‘ensuring gender diversity at
board level’ with a mean of 3.83. These results are very important and
provide useful insights into the possible enablers of the implementation of
good corporate governance. The four highest ranking enablers and the least
ranking enabler (gender) have been operationalized in research hypotheses
which are discussed in this chapter. The respondents’ perspectives are
consistent with previous research, which finds that these enablers could be
effective in improving corporate governance practices (Lehmann &
Weigand, 2000; Mahadeo et al., 2012; Iren, 2016).
6.6 Corporate Governance Mechanisms
The corporate governance mechanisms include occupational
experience, gender representation, insider trading, auditor rotation, sector
and internal control. The descriptive results show that implementing
occupational experience, insider trading rules and policies, auditor rotation
and internal control have an impact on corporate performance. The
corporate governance mechanisms have been selected based on the
literature and based on the applicable UAE laws and regulations. The 2016
corporate governance rules stipulate the applicable requirements for four of
the selected corporate governance mechanisms: occupational experience,
gender representation, insider trading, and internal control. The requirement
for auditor rotation was introduced by the 2015 Companies Law. Therefore,
the selected mechanisms are of current importance in the UAE and also
globally. There are of course many other corporate governance mechanisms
such as chairman/CEO duality; mechanisms relating to the board of
directors, the audit committee or other board committees and which are all
measurable and viable research topics. For this research, the selected
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corporate governance mechanisms have been chosen as they are well
defined by the law and of contemporary importance. Precisely because they
are novel, they have not been explored in depth by academic research in the
UAE and make promising research topics for this and future research.
6.7 Board Members’ Occupational Experience
Relevant occupational experience was evaluated on the basis of the
board members’ curriculum vitae as included in the corporate governance
reports and expressed as a percentage for statistical analysis. For example,
if five out of seven board members had compliant experience, the value for
that company would be 5/7 = 71.42%. The 2016 corporate governance rules
require at least five years sector relevant occupational experience for listed
firm board position candidates. In the statistical analysis, occupational
experience was statistically significant and positive in the regression
conducted using RoA as a dependent variable but was not statistically
significant in regressions using Tobin’s Q or RoE. The results are consistent
with the literature which suggests that occupational experience can be a
relevant factor for corporate performance, but this is not necessarily the case
(Van Ness et al., 2010; Brown, 2006; Kroszner & Strahan, 2001). The
qualitative research provides some further evidence. Respondents were
aware of the applicable corporate governance rules but highlighted that the
law was not followed consistently in the board candidate nomination
process. They noted that candidates were still put forward based on “wasta”
or nepotism rather than merit: “It should be at least five years’ experience,
but this is not always followed. There is always wasta, and sometimes
decisions are not based on the qualifications of the person. This is a Middle
Eastern topic. Favouritism and wasta are there.” (Interviewee #5). Another
respondent noted that many listed firms were run by their shareholders
rather than management and considered director experience a negligible
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factor (Interviewee #6). The evidence gathered shows that this is a relevant
and important area of future research and indeed a likely factor that
influences corporate performance in the UAE.
6.8 Gender
Article 40 of the 2016 Code requires that listed companies’
candidates for Board membership shall be represented by at least 20%
female board member candidates. In 2021, the UAE was the first country in
the Middle East to roll out a mandatory quota for female board member
representation in the UAE. In March 2021, the World Bank confirmed that
the UAE has the highest level of women participating in the workforce,
57.5% in 2020 of any country in the Middle East and North Africa region.
According to Bloomberg, as of 30 December 2021, women sit on the boards
of 28 of the 110 listed companies in the UAE, or 26% of the total. However,
they only make up around 3.5% (29 of a total of 823 board members) of
board directors of these firms (Bloomberg, 2022). Of the 51 companies
considered for this dissertation, sixteen had female directors, which
represent 31.37% of the sample. The regulator has emphasized that having
at least one woman on the board of every listed company is mandatory.
So far, it is not known if any companies have been fined for not
meeting the quota. Companies without a woman on the board are required
to publish a justification in the corporate governance report for the relevant
year. Further, only two companies of the sample had a policies for Diversity
and Opportunity that were published on the corporate website.
In the statistical analysis, gender was statistically significant and
positive in regressions using RoA and RoE as the independent variable. The
results of the Model 2 analysis show that the presence of one or more female
directors on the board relates positively and significantly to ROE (P-value
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0.05) and ROA (P-value of 0.027). The regression analysis also shows the
presence of women to be a significant variable in relation to ROA and ROE
but not in relation to Tobin’s Q. These results are comparable to those of
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) as presented in the previous chapter. Both results
suggest that on average the presence of women on the board is a significant
feature of companies that perform better. However, a P-value of 0.05 is on
the cusp of statistical significance, and the regression with Tobin’s Q was
not statistically significant. Therefore, this research cannot confirm a
causality that appointing women to the board leads to improved corporate
performance. This is consistent with the literature (Lückerath-Rovers, 2013;
Hussein & Kiwia 2009).
There are other factors that need to be considered too. The
qualitative results regarding appointing women to boards were mixed. In
fact, some respondents suggested that no changes (i.e., quotas) were needed
to encourage female leaders. Most interviewees emphasized that women did
not get enough support internally from their organizations to reach board
positions for cultural reasons. Once women reach a certain age, society
wants them to take on more responsibilities at home (Interviewee #2).
“There is a snowball effect. The view has been that males should lead, and
women are in the supporting roles. If they are in leading roles, they are
frequently belittled or not taken seriously (Interview #5).
6.9 Insider Trading
All purchase and sales transactions (insider trading data) were taken
from the corporate governance reports published on the exchanges’
websites. These records include the date of the transaction, the number of
shares involved, the price paid, the name of the insider, and his or her
relationship with the firm. For the ADX and DFM- listed firms, the
researcher considered the data from 2017 to 2020 for the statistical analysis.
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This dissertation is concerned with legal insider trading as disclosed in the
corporate governance reports to the regulator and not with illegal insider
trading which is a criminal activity under applicable law. Insider trading
frequency is measured as a percentage of trades executed by the company’s
board members and their dependents in aggregate. For example, 5/7 = 0.714
indicates that 5 trades have been executed by seven board members in a
given year. The existing literature on this topic has been published outside
of the UAE and much of it suggests there is a positive correlation between
corporate performance and legal insider trading.
The statistical analysis in Model 2 suggests that legal insider trading
volumes of relevant securities have a positive and significant impact on
corporate performance in the regressions conducted using Tobin’s Q and
RoE as dependent variables. Legal insider trading related positively and
significantly to ROE (P-value 0.007) and Tobin’s Q (P-value 0.036) but not
in relation to ROA. Furthermore, the combination of insider trading *
auditor rotation proved statistically significant in all regressions performed
for Model 2 with the following results, ROE (P-value .004), ROA (P-value
0.001), and Tobin’s Q (P-value 0.36).
The literature suggest that legal insider trading can have a positive
impact on corporate performance (Masson & Madhavan, 1991). The
assumption behind the hypothesis that is that employees would have a stake
in corporate performance as shareholders rather than being merely salaried
employees. The same logic applies to stock option awards. Employees may
be incentivized to perform better which will in turn improve corporate
performance. Compliance with auditor rotation in the UAE is separately
discussed under Hypothesis #4 below. Causality and cross-linkage between
insider trading and auditor rotation and potentially other performanceinfluencing factors are areas for further research and analysis.
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6.10 Auditor Rotation
As discussed in the literature review, auditor rotation is not
mandatory in all mature jurisdictions, for instance it is currently not
mandatory for the listed companies in the UK or the USA. The 2015
Companies Law made auditor rotation after three years mandatory in the
UAE. However, as a result of industry pressure in the UAE the rules were
changed with effect from January 2, 2021. Pursuant to the UAE Federal
Decree Law No. (26) of 2020, the auditor rotation period was increased from
three to six years. One of the assumptions behind this hypothesis is that
longer auditor tenure reduces earnings quality and regular rotation will lead
to enhanced compliance and better corporate performance. This is consistent
with the literature (Shockley, 1981). The statistical analysis in Model 2
suggests that auditor rotation as an independent variable was not statistically
significant. However, it was positive and statistically significant in
combination with insider trading. The combination of insider trading *
auditor rotation proved statistically significant in all regressions performed
for Model 2 with the following results, ROE (P-value 0.004), ROA (P-value
0.001) and Tobin’s Q (P-value 0.36). The qualitative analysis also
confirmed that auditor rotation was perceived as one of the key elements of
compliance. “Changing auditor every three years has benefited the listed
companies and made a positive impact on the UAE listed corporate
performance” (Interviewees #2 and #4). “Prior to implementing auditor
rotation, the auditor was a potential source of corruption (Interviewee #5).
6.11 Internal Controls
The corporate governance rules require the listed companies to
establish an internal control function that reports directly to the Board. For
the statistical analysis, a dummy variable was used to express the presence
or absence of an internal control function in accordance with the law.
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The independent variable “Internal control” proved not to be
statistically significant. The qualitative analysis of the corresponding
hypothesis was also not conclusive, and respondents testified that not all
companies had implemented solid internal control frameworks. Internal
control was perceived to have a significant effect on performance if
supported by top management by interviewees who noted that internal
control in the UAE was still very fragile. Compliance with this requirement
was seen as a tickbox exercise. This shows that the UAE markets are still
fragmented in respect of establishing a solid internal controls framework.
This is an opportunity for the regulator to address the issue to detect
companies that are non-compliant and ensure common principles and
standards that underpin the corporate governance rules are followed. Indeed,
fragmentation in implementing the law will only create arbitrage
opportunities for misconduct, affecting the integrity of the markets.
In Marchand v. Barnhill (2019), the Delaware Supreme Court permitted a
lawsuit to proceed against directors of a firm for breach of fiduciary duties
arising from a failure of oversight regarding food safety and compliance
matters. The Delaware Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, held that
the complaint alleged particularized facts that supported a reasonable
inference that the board failed to implement any internal control system to
monitor food safety performance or compliance
Under re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation (1996),
directors were held to have a duty “to exercise oversight” and to monitor the
corporation’s operational viability, legal compliance and financial
performance. A board’s utter failure to attempt to ensure a reasonable
information and reporting system exists is an act of bad faith in breach of a
duty of loyalty. In light of Marchand v. Barnhill (2019) and Caremark
(1996), boards of both public and private companies should consider either
appointing a committee to monitor the legal compliance and safety risks
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facing the company or making the subject a periodic topic for board
presentations and discussion. The board should also explicitly require that
senior officers promptly and candidly advise the board of all information
indicating material problems with the company’s performance or legal
compliance.
6.12 Compliance
This hypothesis was assessed using the stakeholder principles used
in Model 1. A corporate governance Index was constructed containing five
sub-indices and results from the questionnaire were used to evaluate the data
statistically. According to the literature, compliance can have a positive
impact on corporate performance (Dao & Tran, 2017). The results
demonstrate that corporate governance can impact corporate performance.
The average score for the implementation of the corporate governance index
is 4.0. The results demonstrate that there have been further improvements in
compliance thanks to the 2016 corporate governance rules.
In the regression analysis, board responsibilities and shareholders
rights were both statistically significant. The secondary data analysis of the
corporate governance reports from 2017 to 2020 showed over 70%
compliance with the requirements as set out by SCA for the corporate
governance reports. Compliance with the UAE statutory requirements was
measured by the disclosures made in the corporate governance reports and
completeness of such disclosures. Companies with incomplete corporate
governance reports were discarded from the analysis. The qualitative
analysis backed up these findings. Compliance with corporate governance
rules was perceived to be 80% achieved. When asked about drivers and
obstacles for compliance with corporate governance rules, respondents
identified the UAE government as a key driver: “The government is the
main driver for implementation of compliance in UAE” (Interviewee #5).
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The government was also perceived as a key enforcer of corporate
governance rules in the UAE, and Dubai was considered to be ahead of Abu
Dhabi. “Dubai is more advanced in the financial field compared to Abu
Dhabi. The other emirates should aim for better law enforcement. There is
also a grey area between local and federal laws. Federal law (criminal law)
enforcement should be stronger and there should be more awareness raised
by the regulator amongst listed company directors (Interviewee #5)”.
Perceived obstacles to compliance were conflicts of interests and corruption.
“The main obstacle is culture. The concept of conflict of interest is very
important and the corporate world in the UAE still does not understand it
very well. There are conflicts of interests which should be disclosed. The
law is there but implementation is still lacking (Interviewee #5). The results
suggest that listed companies can further improve their corporate
performance by further implementing corporate governance mechanisms
and principles.
6.13 Differences in Compliance Amongst Sectors
Eight industry sectors were considered for this research: Consumer
staples and F&B, Energy, Transport and Logistics, Real estate, construction,
services, telecommunication and medical. To determine whether there are
significant differences in compliance amongst industry sectors, the KruskalWallis and Mann–Whitney U non-parametric tests were applied. Sector was
also used as a variable in the regressions. In the regressions, all companies
were coded in accordance with their sector. Compliance was tested both
with the corporate governance index and its sub-indices as developed for
Model 1 and the corporate governance mechanisms insider trading, gender
and board experience from Model 2. The Kruskal-Wallis test applied to
Model 1 did not produce statistically significant results. The statistical
analysis in Model 2 confirmed that sector-specific differences do exist and
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are statistically significant. Gender diversity was most prominent in the
telecommunication and consumer staples and food and beverage sectors and
lowest in the energy and medical sectors. The latter is also confirmed by the
corporate governance reports which state that energy firms and medical
firms struggle with finding adequate female talent. Directors with the best
requisite board experience (at least five years of sector experience) were
found in the consumer staples and food and beverage sectors and real estate.
Directors

with

the

least

requisite

board

experience

were

in

telecommunications and in the medical sector. Further efforts should be
made to promote internal talent in these sectors. Sector as a variable has a
positive and significant impact on corporate performance in the regressions
conducted using ROA (0.011), ROE (0.039) and Tobin’s Q (0.032) as
dependent variables. The academic literature reviewed suggests there are
sector-specific variances in the level of compliance achieved by the listed
companies (Goel, 2018; Alkuwaiti, 2019). This research concludes that
sector-specific variations do exist. When further analyzing differences in the
impact on corporate governance reforms on performance of the listed
companies per sector, Energy and Telecommunications result as significant.
Energy and Telecommunications are both highly regulated sectors in the
UAE and all companies in these sectors are majority government owned and
also represent the largest companies listed on the UAE exchanges. They are
also characterized as quasi-government companies. The companies in the
Energy and Telecommunications sectors in the UAE have the highest
market capitalization. Market capitalization refers to the total market value
of a company’s outstanding shares of stock. As of July 2020, TAQA’s
market capitalization was AED 142.79 billion and Etisalat’s was
AED 146.97 billion (Valecha, 2020). The corporate governance reports also
confirm that these firms are among the most compliant with no fines
reported from 2017 to 2020. All firms in these sectors were compliant with
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auditor rotation and insider trading disclosures. In the GCC and the UAE,
state owned companies are often listed to increase stock market size. The
regulator also has a vested interest that these large state-owned public
companies perform well and are fully compliant with the rules. The
remaining sectors considered for this dissertation were consumer staples,
transport & logistics, real estate, construction, services and medical which
did not produce statistically significant results. The best-governed firms in
the UAE are in sheltered, infrastructural and highly regulated sectors such
as Telecommunications and Energy. The analysis of the 210 corporate
governance reports from 2017 to 2010 (consisting of four reports for each
company being considered for this research) also show that differences
among sectors do exist in the implementation of corporate governance. The
reports for companies in the Energy and Telecommunications sectors were
the ones that appeared to comply most closely with the rules whilst reports
issued by listed companies in the construction and consumer staples sectors
were less compliant.
6.14 Role of UAE Stock Exchanges in Corporate Governance
Stock exchanges are assigned the role of monitoring the compliance
with legislation and securities regulation. Since the promulgation of the
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, stock exchanges have often
enlarged their regulatory role to embrace a wider palette of corporate
governance concerns. Exchanges are the first interface point between
corporate governance-related regulations and deemed compliance or noncompliance. In essence, by raising transparency and discouraging illegal or
irregular practices, exchanges accumulate “reputational capital” which
dictates how the exchanges are perceived by the outside world. Exchanges
play a key role in the development of corporate governance
recommendations and encourage their application by the listed companies.
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The most prominent channel for such influence is the exchanges’ traditional
oversight of listing, maintenance and disclosure requirements whether in a
self-regulatory capacity or acting on behalf of regulators. The most common
model to measure compliance is the comply or explain model as is prevalent
in the United Kingdom. The UAE approach permits a number of
permutations in its approach to assess compliance. For example, a listed
company may be requested to disclose whether it has adopted a specific
policy regarding insider trading or whether it has female board members. In
terms of the enforcement, the ability of the UAE exchanges to pursue
companies which do not provide adequate levels of disclosure varies. Based
on the results of this research, the ability of the UAE exchanges to take
enforcement action differs based on the legal basis of the 2016 corporate
governance code and the national securities regulation framework. Relying
solely on statistical analysis is not sufficient to establish the impact of the
2016 corporate governance reforms on corporate performance. The
questionnaire, interviews and data collection from the annual reports helped
achieve a more thorough analysis. One area highlighted by the interviewees
was the role of penalties by the UAE exchanges: “Definitely 2016 corporate
governance rules have helped, the rules played a role in penalizing
companies that were not compliant. (Interviewee #5). Another respondent
noted that there is still a lack of visibility as to the fines imposed by the
regulator and UAE courts: “Real fines and prison sentences should be
imposed. Fines should reflect the real market losses as is the case in the US”.
6.15 Conclusion
This chapter presented the research findings and associated
hypotheses testing.

The relationships set out in the hypotheses were

discussed in alignment with the agency and stakeholder theories and the
results

of

the

qualitative

research

identified

weaknesses

with
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stakeholderism. In agreement with Rowley and Berman (2000), this
research demonstrates that there are other external effects, such as
reputation effects, market measures, or disclosures which need to be
evaluated qualitatively.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This chapter first presents a summary of the main findings and
elaborates on the conceptual contributions, contributions to current
knowledge as well as the limitations of the dissertation and suggests avenues
for further research. This dissertation contributes to the corporate
governance literature by pursuing a mixed methods approach. To the
researcher’s knowledge occupational experience, insider trading, auditor
rotation, and internal control have not previously been measured or
scientifically tested in academic research in the UAE.
7.1 Summary of Main Findings
The dissertation examined a sample of fifty-one companies listed
on UAE exchanges, as well as twenty-two interviews and fifty-four
completed questionnaires to obtain valuable primary data. In Model 1, this
dissertation used a CGI in line with the OECD Principles. Model 2 is unique
in many respects. Occupational experience, gender representation, insider
trading, auditor rotation, sector and internal control were analyzed using a
linear fixed effects model. Three measures of corporate performance were
used: Tobin’s Q, ROA, and ROE.
Legal insider trading in combination with auditor rotation and
sector proved to be statistically significant in all regressions carried out for
Model 2. Gender was also statistically significant in the regressions using
ROE and ROA as dependent variables. Among the eight industry sectors
considered for this dissertation, differences were found in compliance with
the corporate governance rules, and the Energy and Telecommunications
sectors were significant amongst the eight sectors considered.

175

The researcher critiqued the agency theory which is the
predominantly used theory for corporate governance research in the Middle
East, and in light of recent legal developments in 2019, tested this theory
and suggested how theory could be extended or reconstructed to conform to
the current socio-economic climate. Apart from the agency theory, there is
an academic debate of whether stakeholderism is appropriate in developing
countries. The results support stakeholderism, as confirmed by the
quantitative and the qualitative research, although weaknesses with
stakeholderism have been identified.
This dissertation will benefit academics, investors, practicing
lawyers, regulators, shareholders, executive management of UAE listed
companies and academic researchers. This dissertation focuses on listed
companies on the ADX and the DFM and deliberately omits NASDAQ
Dubai, the third UAE stock exchange, as NASDAQ Dubai is regulated by
the Dubai Financial Services Authority and subject to the regulations of the
DIFC, the Dubai International Financial Centre free zone, whereas ADX
and DFM are regulated by the same regulator, SCA and subject to the same
legal framework. This research will contribute to the development of theory
and practice, because not only is mixed methods research scarce, but also
because findings are not mature or inexistent, especially in relation to
occupational experience, gender representation, insider trading and auditor
rotation.
7.2 Commonalities and Uniqueness
Variables such as occupational experience, insider trading, auditor
rotation, and internal control mechanisms are particularly important as to
the researcher’s knowledge; they have not been researched in the context of
the UAE. This dissertation contributes to the literature by providing a
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detailed review and testing of the new UAE’s corporate governance
principles and suggests avenues for future research.
This dissertation is motivated by the numerous reforms in the field
of corporate governance in the UAE. In the wake of high-profile corporate
failures globally, the question is whether regulatory reforms are sufficient
to enhance corporate governance and corporate performance by, for
example, enhancing board efficiency through occupational expertise,
making gender diversity mandatory, auditor rotation, and monitoring insider
trading.
The research is unique in numerous ways. To date, to the
researcher’s knowledge there is no academic research that analyses the
impact of insider trading and auditor rotation on corporate performance in
the UAE. Given the regulator’s emphasis on insider trading since 2018 and
the mandatory establishment of an insider trading oversight committee for
all listed companies, this highlights the importance of this research topic and
will in turn offer a new contribution to corporate governance literature in
the Middle East.
From a practical perspective, this research will benefit
organizations in developing a framework for the implementation of
corporate governance strategies to ensure compliance with applicable rules
and regulations.
7.3 Limitations and Directions for Future Research
After filtering out companies with incomplete data, insurance
companies and banks outside the remit of this study, the sample size was
relatively small consisting of fifty-one companies. As a result, a relatively
small number of completed questionnaires could be collected. The
questionnaire was sent to 155 executives at the fifty-one listed companies.
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Overall, fifty-four completed questionnaires were collected. The response
rate was 34.8%. As the focus of the dissertation was to measure the impact
of the 2016 corporate governance reforms, data observations could not be
increased and were limited to the period from 2017 to 2020. With a larger
sample size, additional testing metrics could be developed.
The data analysis was challenging as was noted by previous
research conducted in this field. Both Otman and Alkuwaiti noted that the
data collected was statistically not normal which was also confirmed by this
research. Alkuwaiti noted that for the corporate governance mechanics she
investigated using ROA and ROE as measures of corporate performance did
not produce any significant results and pointed this out as an issue that needs
further investigation. As this dissertation collected data from 2017 to 2020,
there is an overlap with data collected by Alkuwaiti whose sample covers
data until 2018. As discussed above, ROA, ROE, and Tobin’s Q produced
statistically significant results across all three performance measures whilst
other independent variables such as gender was statistically significant for
both ROA and ROE but not for Tobin’s Q. Future research may benefit from
other financial measures such as Return on Sales (ROS) and Return on
Invested Capital (ROIC).
For insider trading, it is so far only possible to measure this variable
by relying on the corporate governance reports and handpicking the data
from the reports. The regulator would benefit from publishing insider
trading data online and in a searchable format and from implementing an
annual Market Cleanliness Metric (MC metric). The MC metric should be
based on the percentage of abnormal movements in price prior to a key event
(for example, a takeover). It would then also be beneficial to publish this
metric as it could act as a proxy for illegal insider trading in the market to
detect the amount of illegal insider dealing that might be occurring.
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The results of this study show that a better regulated market
improves the quality of listed companies. Market participants have
expressed that it would be desirable to have data on prosecutions by the
regulator and enforcement cases to ensure that the UAE stock exchanges
uphold and demonstrate the highest examples of market integrity and
transparency. This involves a dynamic combination of both supervision and
enforcement working together.
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Appendix A
QUESTIONNAIRE

An Assessment of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
and Principles on corporate performance: The Case of UAE.
Dear Survey Participant,
We would like you to participate in this study to carry out an
assessment of the impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and
Principles on corporate performance concerning the listed companies in the
UAE. The main purpose of the questionnaire in this research is to investigate
the perceptions of different stakeholder groups in listed companies in the
UAE regarding concepts, principles and obstacles concerning corporate
governance. This research is conducted as part of completing the Doctorate
of Business Administration (DBA) Degree in the United Arab Emirates
University (UAEU). A summary of the report will be available to all the
interested participants. Please indicate your interest by providing me with
your email address in the specified section.
Kindly note that participation is voluntary, and accordingly you
may withdraw at any time from the study. There is minimal risk in
participating in this study since all data collected will be anonymous. No
personal data will be collected for this research (personal data being defined
as any information that identifies an individual) apart from your email
address in case your email address contains personal data.
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If you have questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to
contact the researcher directly as per the contact information below.
Thank you in advance for your valuable contribution to this
important study.
General instructions to complete the survey

•

Please tick the following statement if you agree to participate:

I agree to voluntarily participate in the study ___ Agree

Carina Schaefer
Doctorate of Business Administration (DBA) Student
College of Business and Economics
United Arab Emirates University (UAEU)
E-Mail: 201790487@uaeu.ac.ae

Who should complete this questionnaire?
The following questions should be answered by Executives, Board members,
accountants, auditors, audit committee members, lawyers, investors in UAE stock
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First: Background information
Please tick the appropriate box

1.1.
Gender

 Male  Female
1.2. Qualifications

 Secondary

 Diploma

 Bachelor  Master  Doctorate

1.3. Your position

Executive

Board
member

Accountant

Auditor

Audit committee
member

Lawyer

Investment
Officer

1.4. Years of experience in current role

 Less 5 yrs
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5-10
yrs

11-15
yrs

16-20
yrs

More than 20
yrs

Second: Concepts of Corporate Governance
The following is a list of possible definitions of corporate governance. Using
the scale below, please identify the extent to which you agree or disagree
about how appropriate you think each definition is in the UAE environment.
Please indicate the level of agreement with each statement. Do this by
circling one of the five numbers after each statement according to the
following scale:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

A. Statements
1. Corporate governance refers to an organisation’s
relationship with its shareholders to ensure that it acts in
accordance with the interests of those shareholders.
2. Corporate governance refers to an organisation’s
relationship with all stakeholders who are affected by or
affect the organisation’s operations and decisions.
3. Corporate governance refers to an organisation’s
relationship with all members of society, irrespective of
whether they affect or are affected by the organisation’s
operations and decisions.

5
Strongly
Agree

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
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Third: Principles of Corporate Governance
Please indicate the level of agreement with each statement. Do this by
circling one of the five numbers after each statement according to the
following scale:
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

B. Shareholders have the right to:
1. transfer ownership of their shares
2. participate in company profits.
3. obtain information related to the company regularly.
4. vote in general meetings.
5. vote in elections and remove members of the board of
directors.
6. be adequately and timely informed about company
meetings.
7. discuss the external auditor’s report at the Annual
General Meeting.
8. be informed about the capital structure of the firm.
9. be informed about decisions concerning fundamental
corporate changes.
10. inspect corporate documents.
11. sue the corporation for wrongful acts.
C. Equitable Treatment of Shareholders
1. All shareholders who are from the same class are
treated equally.
2. Shareholders have the right to obtain information
about voting rights before they purchase shares.
3. Processes and procedures for general shareholder
meetings allow for equitable treatment of all
shareholders.
4. shareholders are protected from insider trading.
5. There are no restrictions on cross-border voting.
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5
Strongly
Agree

1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

6. Board members and key executives disclose material
interests in any transaction or matter directly affecting
the company.
D. Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance
1. Stakeholder rights that are established by law are
respected by the company.
2. Performance-enhancing mechanisms for employee
participation are permitted to develop.
3. Stakeholders have the opportunity to obtain effective
redress for violation of their rights.
4. Stakeholders have the right to obtain sufficient and
reliable information on a timely basis.
5. Stakeholders have the right to freely communicate their
concerns about illegal or unethical practices to the board.
6. Creditor rights and bankruptcy procedures are
enforced.
7. Auditors perform their duties and exercise professional
care in the conduct of audits.
E. Disclosure and Transparency
1. The financial and operating results of the company are
disclosed.
2. The objectives of the company are disclosed.
3. Major share ownership is disclosed.
4. Foreseeable risk factors are disclosed.
5. Remuneration of board members and key executives is
disclosed.
6. Issues regarding employees and other stakeholders,
such as programs for human resource development and
training, are disclosed.
7. An annual audit of the company is conducted by an
independent auditor.
8. Information is prepared and disclosed in accordance
with International Accounting Standards.
9. Channels for the dissemination of information on a
timely basis to relevant users are provided.
10. Shareholdings in the company by senior management
or the board of directors are disclosed
11. The Company publishes a Corporate Governance
report
12. Timely and accurate disclosure is made on all
material matters
13. Related party transactions are disclosed.

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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F. Responsibility of the Board of Directors
1. Board members act in the best interests of the
company and the shareholders.
2. The board takes stakeholders’ interests into account.
3. The board monitors the effectiveness of the company’s
governance practices.
4. The board of directors elects, monitors and replaces
executives when necessary.
5. Board oversees performance of the CEO
6. Board sets the tone at the top that demonstrates the
company’s commitment to integrity and legal
compliance
7. The board monitors and manages potential conflicts of
interest of management, board members and
shareholders.
8. The board supervises the process of disclosure and
communication.
9. Board members are provided with accurate relevant
information about the company.
10. Board approves strategic plans.
11. Board members are able to devote sufficient time to
their responsibilities.
12. Board members have the necessary technical
skills/knowledge to contribute to the financial success of
the company
13. Board members have the necessary work experience
to contribute to the financial success of the company
14. Board members have the necessary industry
experience to assess the operational performance of the
company
15. The board has meaningful input and decision-making
authority over the company’s capital allocation process
16. Gender diversity in the board composition
strengthens company performance and promotes longterm shareholder value

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5

Fourth: Obstacles and Enablers that affect Corporate Governance
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Please indicate the extent of your agreement as to whether the following
potential obstacles and enablers affect the practice of corporate
governance in the UAE.

1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neutral

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

G. Obstacles
1. Weak legal controls and law enforcement
2. Culture of the UAE community
3. Weak accounting and auditing profession
4. Retaining the same external auditor for a period
exceeding three years
5. Poor-quality accounting and finance education
6. Weak infrastructure of financial institutions
7. Lack of legal and regulatory systems that govern
companies’ activities
8. Government interference in business activities
9. The state of the UAE economy
10. The costs of practicing good corporate governance
outweigh the benefits
11. Poor financial and non-financial disclosure
12. Lack of Board members with the right skills
13. Lack of female board members
14. Lack of transparency in relation to insider trading
15. Weak internal control system
H. Enablers
1. Ensuring wide adoption of international accounting
and auditing standards
2. Ensuring gender diversity at board level
3. Disclosing insider shareholding in accordance with the
rules
4. A mature compliance function improves performance
5. Using training and other means of support

1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5

1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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6. Developing incentive programs for compliance with
1 2 3 4 5
principles of corporate governance
7. Establishing corporate governance education
1 2 3 4 5
programs at universities
8. Establishing an institute of directors for training,
1 2 3 4 5
raising awareness and education for CEOs, directors, and
board members
9. Enhancing professional accounting and auditing
1 2 3 4 5
bodies
10. Participating in international events, conferences,
1 2 3 4 5
meetings, and committees dealing with corporate
governance
11. Encouraging research into corporate governance in
1 2 3 4 5
the UAE
12. Learning from the experiences of other countries
1 2 3 4 5
concerning corporate governance practice
13. Setting the tone at the top to embed corporate
1 2 3 4 5
governance in long-term value creation
14. Initiating regional corporate governance partnership 1 2 3 4 5
programs with international organizations such as the
OECD
15. Changing the outside auditor every three years has a 1 2 3 4 5
positive effect on corporate performance
16. An effective internal control function over financial 1 2 3 4 5
reporting and its disclosure controls and procedures has a
positive effect on corporate performance
17. An effective compliance program including policies 1 2 3 4 5
and procedures for handling concerns related to potential
violations of law has a positive effect on corporate
performance
18. Senior management and board development and
1 2 3 4 5
succession planning need to be engrained in the
company’s culture
19. Establishing a robust evaluation process of the board 1 2 3 4 5
of directors, senior management, and committee
members
____________________________________________________________
_____
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Any additional comments:
…………………………………………………………………………
……….………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………
…………

Thank you for your cooperation
If you would like a copy of the study results report, please complete the
following details:

E-mail:
………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………
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Appendix B
SEMI-SCRIPTED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Carina Schaefer
Doctor of Business Administration (DBA) Student
College of Business and Economics
United Arab Emirates University (UAEU)
E-Mail: 201790487@uaeu.ac.ae
Tel: 0566855978

An Assessment of the Impact of Corporate Governance Mechanisms
and Principles on corporate performance: The Case of UAE.
Re: Invitation to Participate in Academic Research Interview
Dear Madam/Sir,
I would like you to participate in an interview to examine the impact
of various Corporate Governance mechanisms and principles. The main
purpose of the interview is to gather in depth information of the research
topic. Each interview will be recorded. Recording/s will only be used by the
researcher for research purposes and will not be shared with third parties.
Kindly note that participation is voluntary, and accordingly you
may withdraw at any time from the interview. There is minimal risk in
participating in an interview since all data collected will be anonymous. No
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personal data will be collected for this research (personal data being defined
as any information that identifies an individual). Neither your name, nor
your job title, nor your organization will be identified or identifiable. The
demographic data will only be collected to ensure the selection of
appropriate interviewees. Interviews may be conducted in person or over the
telephone.
If you have questions regarding this study, please do not hesitate to
contact the researcher directly as per the contact information below.
Thank you in advance for your valuable contribution to this
important study.

Please tick the following statement if you agree to participate:

I agree to voluntarily participate in the interview ___ I agree
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First: Background information

1.1.
Gender

 Male  Female
1.2. Qualifications

 Secondary

 Diploma

 Bachelor  Master  Doctorate

1.3. Your position

Executive

Board
member

Accountant

Auditor

Audit committee
member

Lawyer

Investment
Officer

1.4. Years of experience in current
role
 Less 5 yrs

212

5-10 yrs

11-15 yrs

16-20 yrs

More than 20 yrs

Semi-structured Interview questions
“7RM” means The Chairman of Authority's Board of Directors'
Resolution No. (7 R.M) of 2016 Concerning the Standards of Institutional
Discipline and Governance of Public Shareholding Companies
Gender representation
In 2012, the UAE Cabinet made it compulsory for corporations and
government agencies to include women on their boards of directors. The
2012 announcement was made by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, Vice
President of the UAE, and Ruler of Dubai, in December 2012. However,
since then no fixed quotas for gender representation on UAE listed
companies Board of Directors have been introduced in the UAE. Pursuant
to 7RM there is no firm obligation for a Board of Directors to have female
members – it merely requires nominating female candidates for election.
When compared to a few decades ago, today women are more educated,
highly qualified, and ready to assume responsibilities for high-level,
highly impactful positions in the corporate world. However, progress in that
direction at the UAE-listed companies seems to be slow 1. Do you believe 7RM is an efficient rule to get women in the board
room?
2. What changes would you like to see in legislation to achieve a more
equal gender balance?
3.
Board members occupational experience
Resolution 7RM, Article 41(a), requires that “the candidate shall
have at least five years’ experience in the field of the Company which he/she
is nominated for its Board membership”
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4. Are you satisfied that companies listed on the ADX or the DFM
comply with this criterion?
Rotation of auditor
The overarching responsibility for monitoring management’s
actions with respect to financial reporting, is with the audit committee and,
ultimately, the board. The UAE Companies Law requires that external
auditors are rotated every three years.
5. Do you think this is an appropriate requirement for listed companies
in the UAE? Explain your answer and provide examples
Compliance
Corporate governance refers to a framework of procedures, policies,
and rule that is used to determine the overall performance and direction of
the company. Compliance is a term used to describe the process through
which a business demonstrates that it has implemented requirements in
contracts, regulations, policies, and laws. Corporate governance and
compliance are linked. In fact, they fall under the umbrella term of
governance, risk management, and compliance (GRC).
Thinking about compliance:
6. How has the compliance function evolved for listed companies in
the UAE since 2014?
7. Pursuant to 7RM (Article 43), it is the duty of the BoD “to ensure
compliance with applicable laws, regulations, and resolutions, as
well as the requirements of the supervisory authorities”. To what
extent, do you believe have listed companies in the UAE achieved
this?
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8. A major auditing firm in the UAE conducted a study in the US in
2016 and found that based on survey results over the long term,
companies that maintain a “best-in –class” compliance program
financially outperform companies that do not, do you agree or
disagree? Explain why
9. What are the main drivers of compliance in the UAE?
10. Do you believe 7RM has contributed to better compliance?
Internal Control
Establishing an internal control department is mandatory under
7RM. Internal control is a crucial aspect of an organization’s governance
system and ability to manage risk and is fundamental to supporting the
achievement of an organization’s objectives and creating, enhancing, and
protecting stakeholder value. It is widely acknowledged that effective
internal control also creates a competitive advantage, as an organization
with effective controls can take on additional risk whereas the absence of
adequate internal control measures exposes the financial management of an
organization to certain threats (incorrect financial statements, incorrect
valuation of assets etc.)
11. To what extent do you believe, is an efficient internal control
department a driver of corporate performance?
12. What internal control measures do you consider the most
important?
13. Do you believe efficient internal control has significant effect on
business performance?
Generic questions
14. According to your experience, what are the main obstacles in
implementing effective corporate governance in the UAE?
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15. What are the main improvements you would like to see in CG in the
next 5 years in the UAE?
16. What improvements would you like to see from SCA specifically?
17. Comply or explain has been part of the UK corporate governance
framework since it was introduced in 1992. Do you think comply or
explain is the right approach in the UAE or should it be comply or
fine? Explain
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Appendix C
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✓
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#R12

✓

#R13
#R14
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✓
✓

MA
MA
BA

CEO
Lawyer
Lawyer
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11-15

01/10/2020
14/10/2020
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45min
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#R16
#R17

✓
✓

BA
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✓
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11/11/2020

45min
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✓
✓
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Officer
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✓
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✓
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15/03/2021

60min

✓
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